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THE BRIDGEWATER TREATISES

ON THE POWER WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF GOD

AS MANIFESTED IN THE CREATION

TREATISE I

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN

BY THE REV. T. CHALMERS D.D.

IN TWO VOLUMES

ON THE POWER WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF GOD AS MANIFESTED IN THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN

BY THE

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VOL II

59823

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LONDON

WILLIAM PICKERING

1833

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C. WHITTINGHAM, TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE.

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PART I.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

CHAPTER VII.

On those special Affections which conduce to the economic well-being of Society

1. WE now proceed to consider the economic, in contra-distinction to the civil and political well-being of society, to the extent that this is dependent on certain mental tendencies—whether these can be demonstrated by analysis to be only secondary results or in themselves to be simple elements of the human constitution. We may be said indeed, to have already bordered on this part of our argument—when considering the origin and the rights of property; or the manner in which certain possessory affections, that appear even in the infancy of the mind and anticipate by many years the exercise of human wisdom, lead to a better distribution, both of the earth and of all the valuables which are upon it, than human wisdom could possibly have devised, or at least than human power without the help of these special affections could have carried

into effect. For there might be a useful economy sanctioned by law, yet which law could not have securely established, unless it had had a foundation in nature. For in this respect, there is a limit to the force even of the mightiest despotism —insomuch that the most absolute monarch on the face of the earth must so far conform himself, to the indelible human nature of the subjects over whom he proudly bears the sway; else, in the reaction of their outraged principles and feelings, they would hurl him from his throne. And thus it is well, that, so very generally in the different countries of the world, law, both in her respect for the possessory and acquired rights of property and in her enforcement of them, has, instead of chalking out an arbitrary path for herself, only followed where nature beforehand had pointed the way. It is far better, that, rather than devise a jurisprudence made up of her own capricious inventions—she should, to so great an extent, have but ratified a prior jurisprudence, founded on the original or at least the universal affections of humanity. We know few things more instructive than a study of the mischievous effects, which attend a deviation from this course—of which, we at present shall state two remarkable instances. The evils which ensue when law traverses any of those principles, that lie deeply seated in the very make and constitution of the mind, bring out into more striking exhibition the superior wisdom of that

nature from which she has departed—even as the original perfection of a mechanism is never more fully demonstrated, than by the contrast of those repeated failures, which shows of every change or attempted improvement, that it but deranges or deteriorates the operations of the instrument in question. And thus too it is, that a lesson of sound theology may be gathered, from the errors with their accompanying evils of unsound legislation—on those occasions when the wisdom of man comes into conflict and collision with the wisdom of God.

2. Of the two instances that we are now to produce, in which law hath made a deviation from nature, and done in consequence a tremendous quantity of evil, the first is the Tythe System of England. We do not think that the provision of her established clergy is in any way too liberal—but very much the reverse. Still we hold it signally unfortunate that it should have been levied so, as to do most unnecessary violence to the possessory feeling, both of the owners and occupiers of land all over the country. Had the tythe, like some other of the public burdens, been commuted into a pecuniary and yearly tax on the proprietors—the possessory feeling would not have been so painfully or so directly thwarted by it. But it is the constant intromission of the tythe agents or proctors with the fields, and the *ipsa corpora* that are within the limits of the property—which exposes this

strong natural affection to an annoyance that is felt to be intolerable.* But far the best method of adjusting the state of the law to those principles of ownership which are anterior to law, and which all its authority is unable to quench—would be a commutation into land. Let the church property in each parish be dissevered in this way from its main territory; and then, both for the lay and the ecclesiastical domain, there would be an accordance of the legal with the possessory right. It is because these are in such painful dissonance, under the existing state of things, that there is so much exasperation in England, connected with the support and maintenance of her clergy. No doubt law can enforce her own arrangements, however arbitrary and unnatural they might

* The following example of the thousands which might be alleged will show how apt the possessory feeling is to revolt against the legal right, and at length to overbear it.

The fee-simple of the Church property of the Dean and Chapter of Durham is in the Dean and Chapter of Durham.

The custom for ages has been to let houses on leases of forty years, and lands on leases of twenty-one years, at small reserved rents, these leases being renewable at the end of seven years, at the pleasure of the Dean and Chapter on the payment of arbitrary fines—which fines however as actually levied are exceedingly moderate, one year and a quarter being asked for houses, and one and a half for lands.

Several of the families of the occupiers of lands and houses so leased have been in possession for generations—and long possession has given to some of these occupiers such a strength of possessory feeling, that they have the sense of being aggrieved, if they do not get the renewals on their own terms.

be; but it is a striking exhibition, we have always thought, of the triumph of the possessory over the legal, that, in the contests between the two parties, the clergy have constantly been losing ground. And, in resistance to all the opprobrium which has been thrown upon them, do we affirm, that, with a disinterestedness which is almost heroic, they have, in deed and in practice, forborne to the average extent of at least one half, the assertion of their claims. The truth is, that the felt odium which attaches to the system ought never to have fallen upon them. It is an inseparable consequence of the arrangement itself, by which law hath traversed nature—so as to be constantly rubbing, as it were, against that possessory feeling, which may be regarded as one of the strongest of her instincts. There are few reformations that would do more to sweeten the breath of English society, than the removal of this sore annoyance—the brooding fountain of so many heartburnings and so many festerments, by which the elements of an unappeasable warfare are ever at work between the landed interest of the country, and far the most important class of its public functionaries; and, what is the saddest perversity of all, those, whose office it is by the mild persuasions of Christianity, to train the population of our land in the lessons of love and peace and righteousness—they are forced by the ne-

cessities of a system which many of them deplore, into the attitude of extortioners; and placed in that very current, along which a people's hatred and a people's obloquy are wholly unavoidable.* Even under the theocracy of the Jews, the system of tithes was with difficulty upholden; and many are the remonstrances which the gifted seers of Israel held with its people, for having brought of the lame and the diseased as offerings. Such, in fact, is the violence done by this system to the possessory feelings, that a conscientious submission to its exactions, may be regarded as a most decisive test of religious obedience—such an obedience, indeed, as was but ill maintained, even in the days of the Hebrew polity, although it had the force of temporal sanctions, with the miracles and manifestations of a presiding deity to sustain it. Unless by the express appointment of heaven, this yoke of Judaism, unaccompanied as it now is by the peculiar and preternatural

* There is often the utmost injustice in that professional odium which is laid upon a whole order, and none have suffered more under it, than the clergy of England have, from the sweeping and indiscriminate charges, which have been preferred against them, by the demagogues of our land. We believe that nothing has given more of edge and currency to these invectives, than the very unfortunate way in which their maintenance has been provided for: and many are the amiable and accomplished individuals among themselves to whom it is a matter of downright agony.

enforcements of that dispensation, ought never to have been perpetuated in the days of Christianity. There are distinct, and, we hold, valid reasons, for the national maintenance of an order of men in the capacity of religious instructors to the people. But maintenance in a way so obnoxious to nature, is alike adverse to a sound civil and a sound Christian policy. Both the cause of religion and the cause of loyalty have suffered by it. The alienation of the church's wealth, were a deadly blow to the best and highest interests of England; but there are few things which would conduce more to the strength and peace of our nation, than a fair and right commutation of it.

3. Our next very flagrant example of a mischievous collision between the legal and the possessory, is the English system of poor laws. By law each man who can make good his plea of necessity, has a claim for the relief of it, from the owners or occupiers of the soil, or from the owners and occupiers of houses; and never, till the end of time, will all the authority, and all the enactments of the statute-book, be able to divest them of the feeling, that their property is invaded. Law never can so counterwork the strong possessory feeling, as to reconcile the proprietors of England to this legalized enormity, or rid them of the sensation of a perpetual violence. It is this mal-adjustment between

the voice that nature gives forth on the right of property, and the voice that arbitrary law gives forth upon it—it is this, which begets something more than a painful insecurity as to the stability of their possessions. There is besides, a positive, and what we should call, a most natural irritation. That strong possessory feeling, by which each is wedded to his own domain in the relation of its rightful proprietor; and which they can no more help, because as much a part of their original constitution, than the parental feeling by which each is wedded to his own family in the relation of its natural protector—this strong possessory feeling, we say, is, under their existing economy, subject all over England to a perpetual and most painful annoyance. And accordingly we do find the utmost acerbity of tone and temper, among the upper classes of England, in reference to their poor. We are not sure, indeed, if there be any great difference, with many of them, between the feeling which they have towards the poor, and the feeling which they have towards poachers. It is true that the law is on the side of the one, and against the other. Yet it goes most strikingly to prove, how impossible it is for law to carry the acquiescence of the heart, when it contravenes the primary and urgent affections of nature—that paupers are in any degree assimilated to poachers in the

public imagination; and that the inroads of both upon property should be resented, as if both alike were a sort of trespass or invasion.

4. And it is further interesting to observe the effect of this unnatural state of things on the paupers themselves. Even in their deportment, we might read an unconscious homage to the possessory right. And whereas, it has been argued in behalf of a poor-rate, that, so far from degrading, it sustains an independence of spirit among the peasantry, by turning that which would have been a matter of beggary into a matter of rightful and manly assertion—there is none who has attended the meeting of a parish vestry, that will not readily admit, the total dissimilarity which obtains between the assertion to a right of maintenance, and the assertion of any other right whatever, whether in the field of war or of patriotism. There may be much of the insolence of beggary; but along with this, there is a most discernible mixture of its mean, and crouching, and ignoble sordidness. There is no common quality whatever between the clamorous onset of this worthless and dissipated crew, and the generous battle-cry *pro aris et focis*, in which the humblest of our population will join—when paternal acres, or the rights of any actually holden property are invaded. In the mind of the pauper, with all his challenging and all his boisterousness, there

is still the latent impression, that, after all, there is a certain want of firmness about his plea. He is not altogether sure of the ground upon which he is standing; and, in spite of all that law has done to pervert his imagination, the possessory right of those against whom he prefers his demand, stares him in the face, and disturbs him not a little out of that confidence, wherewith a man represents and urges the demands of unquestionable justice. In spite of himself, he cannot avoid having somewhat the look and the consciousness of a poacher. And so the effect of England's most unfortunate blunder, has been, to alienate on the one hand her rich from her poor; and on the other to debase into the very spirit and sordidness of beggary, a large and ever-increasing mass of her population. There is but one way, we can never cease to affirm, by which this grievous distemper of the body politic can be removed. And that is, by causing the law of property to harmonize with the strong and universal instincts of nature in regard to it; by making the possessory right to be at least as inviolable as the common sense of mankind would make it; and as to the poor, by utterly recalling the blunder that England made, when she turned into a matter of legal constraint, that which should ever be a matter of love and liberty, and when she aggravated ten-fold

the dependence and misery of the lower classes, by divorcing the cause of humanity from the willing generosities, the spontaneous and unforced sympathies of our nature.

5. But this brings into view another of our special affections—our compassion for the distress, including, as one of its most prominent and frequently recurring objects, our compassion for the destitution of others. We have already seen, how nature hath provided, by one of its implanted affections, for the establishment of property; and for the respect in which, amid all its inequalities, it is held by society. But helpless destitution forms one extreme of this inequality, which a mere system of property appears to leave out; and which, if not otherwise provided for by the wisdom of nature in the constitution of the human mind, would perhaps justify an attempt by the wisdom of man to provide for it in the constitution of human law. We do not instance, at present, certain other securities which have been instituted by the hand of nature, and which, if not traversed and enfeebled by a legislation wholly uncalled for, would of themselves, prevent the extensive prevalence of want in society. These are the urgent law of self-preservation, prompting to industry on the one hand and to economy on the other; and the strong law of relative affection—which laws, if not tampered with

and undermined in their force and efficacy by the law of pauperism, would not have relieved, but greatly better, would have prevented the vast majority of those cases which fill the workhouses, and swarm around the vestries of England. Still these, however, would not have prevented all poverty. A few instances, like those which are so quietly and manageably, but withal effectually met in the country parishes of Scotland, would still occur in every little community, however virtuous or well regulated. And in regard to these, there is another law of the mental constitution, by which nature hath made special provision for them—even the beautiful law of compassion, in virtue of which the sight of another in agony, (and most of all perhaps in the agony of pining hunger), would, if unrelieved, create a sensation of discomfort in the heart of the observer, scarcely inferior to what he should have felt, had the suffering and the agony been his own.

6. But in England, the state, regardless of all the indices which nature had planted in the human constitution, hath taken the regulation of this matter into its own hands. By its law of pauperism, it hath, in the first instance, ordained for the poor a legal property in the soil; and thereby, running counter to the strong possessory affection, it hath done violence to the natural and original distribution of the land, and loosened

the secure hold of each separate owner, on the portion which belongs to him. And in the second instance, distrustful of the efficacy of compassion, it, by way of helping forward its languid energies, hath applied the strong hand of power to it. Now it so happens, that nothing more effectually stifles compassion, or puts it to flight, than to be thus meddled with. The spirit of kindness utterly refuses the constraints of authority; and law in England, by taking the business of charity upon itself, instead of supplementing, hath well nigh destroyed the anterior provision made for it by nature—thus leaving it to be chiefly provided for, by methods and by a machinery of its own. The proper function of law is to enforce the rights of justice, or to defend against the violation of them; and never does it make a more flagrant or a more hurtful invasion, beyond the confines of its own legitimate territory—than, when confounding humanity with justice, it would apply the same enforcements to the one virtue as to the other. It should have taken a lesson from the strong and evident distinction which nature hath made between these two virtues, in her construction of our moral system; and should have observed a corresponding distinction in its own treatment of them—resenting the violation of the one; but leaving the other to the free interchanges of good-will on the side of the dispenser, and of gratitude on

the side of the recipient. When law, distrustful of the compassion that is in all hearts, enacted a system of compulsory relief, lest, in our neglect of others, the indigent should starve; it did incomparably worse, than if, distrustful of the appetite of hunger, it had enacted for the use of food a certain regimen of times and quantities, lest, neglectful of ourselves, our bodies might have perished. Nature has made a better provision than this for both these interests; but law has done more mischief by interference with the one, than it could ever have done by interference with the other. It could not have quelled the appetite of hunger, which still, in spite of all the law's officiousness, would have remained the great practical impellent to the use of food, for the well-being of our physical economy. But it has done much to quell and to overbear the affection of compassion—that never-failing impellent, in a free and natural state of things, to deeds of charity, for the well-being of the social economy. The evils which have ensued are of too potent and pressing a character to require description. They have placed England in a grievous dilemma, from which she can only be extricated, by the new modelling of this part of her statute book, and a nearer conformity of its provisions to the principles of natural jurisprudence. Meanwhile they afford an emphatic demonstration for the superior wisdom of nature, which is never

so decisively or so triumphantly attested, as by the mischief that is done, when her processes are contravened or her principles are violated.*

7. We are aware of a certain ethical system, that would obliterate the distinction between justice and humanity, by running or resolving the one into the other—affirming of the former more particularly, that all its virtue is founded on its utility; and that therefore justice, to which may be added truth, is no further a virtue, than as it is instrumental of good to men—thus making both truth and justice, mere species or modifications of benevolence. Now, as we have already stated, it is not with the theory of morals, but with the moral constitution of man that we have properly to do; and, most certain it is, that man does feel the moral rightness both of justice and truth, irrespective altogether of their consequences—or, at least, apart from any such view to these consequences at the time, as the mind is at all conscious of. There is an appetite of our sentient nature which terminates

* Without contending for the language of our older moralists, the distinction which they mean to express, by virtues of perfect and imperfect obligation, has a foundation in reality and in the nature of things—as between justice where the obligation on one side implies a counterpart right upon the other, and benevolence to which, whatever the obligation may be on the part of the dispenser, there is no corresponding right on the part of the recipient. The proper office of law is to enforce the former virtues. When it attempts to enforce the latter, it makes a mischievous extension of itself beyond its own legitimate boundaries.

in food, and that is irrespective of all its subsequent utilities to the animal economy; and there is an appetite for doing what is right which terminates in virtue, and which bears as little respect to its utilities—whether for the good of self or for the good of society. The man whom some temptation to what is dishonorable would put into a state of recoil and restlessness, has no other aim, in the resistance he makes to it, than simply to make full acquittal of his integrity. This is his landing place; and he looks no further. There may be a thousand dependent blessings to humanity, from the observation of moral rectitude. But the pure and simple appetency for rectitude, rests upon this as its object, without any onward reference to the consequences which shall flow from it. This consideration alone is sufficient to dispose of the system of utility—as being metaphysically incorrect in point of conception, and incorrect in the expression of it. If a man can do virtuously, when not aiming at the useful, and not so much as thinking of it—then to design and execute what is useful, may be and is a virtue; but it is not all virtue.*

* If our moral judgment tell that some particular thing is right, without our adverting to its utility—then though all that we hold to be morally right should be proved by observation to yield the maximum of utility, utility is not on that account the mind's criterion for the rightness of this particular thing. God hath given us the sense of what is right; and He hath besides so ordained the system of things, that what is right is generally that which is

8. There is one way in which a theorist may take refuge from this conclusion. It is quite palpable, that a man often feels himself to be doing virtuously—when, to all sense, he is not thinking of the utilities which follow in its train. But then it may be affirmed, that he really is so thinking—although he is not sensible of it. There can be little doubt of such being the actual economy of the world, such the existing arrangement of its laws and its sequences—that virtue and happiness are very closely associated; and that, no less in those instances, where the resulting happiness is not at all thought of, than in those where happiness is the direct and declared object of the virtue. Who can doubt that truth and justice bear as manifold and as important a subserviency to the good of the species as beneficence does?—and yet it is only with the latter, that this good is the object of our immediate contemplation. But then it is affirmed, that, when two terms are constantly associated in nature, there must be as constant an association of them in the mind of the observer of nature—an association at length so habitual, and therefore so rapid,

most useful—yet, in many instances, it is not the perceived usefulness, which makes us recognize it to be right. We agree too with Bishop Butler in not venturing to assume that God's sole end in creation was the production of the greatest happiness.

that we become utterly unconscious of it. Of this we have examples, in the most frequent and familiar operations of human life. In the act of reading, every alphabetical letter must have been present to the mind—yet how many thousands of them, in the course of a single hour, must have past in fleeting succession, without so much as one moment's sense of their presence, which the mind has any recollection of. And it is the same in listening to an acquaintance, when we receive the whole meaning and effect of his discourse, without the distinct consciousness of very many of those individual words which still were indispensable to the meaning. Nay, there are other and yet more inscrutable mysteries in the human constitution; and which relate, not to the thoughts that we conceive without being sensible of them, but even to the volitions that we put forth, and to very many of which we are alike insensible. We have only to reflect on the number and complexity of those muscles which are put into action, in the mere processes of writing or walking, or even of so balancing ourselves as to maintain a posture of stability. It is understood to be at the bidding of the will, that each of our muscles performs its distinct office; and yet, out of the countless volitions, which had their part and their play, in these complicated, and yet withal most familiar and

easily practicable operations—how many there are which wholly escape the eye of consciousness. And thus too, recourse may be had to the imagination of certain associating processes, too hidden for being the objects of sense at the time, and too fugitive for being the objects of remembrance afterwards. And on the strength of these it may be asked—how are we to know, that the utility of truth and justice is not present to the mind of man, when he discharges the obligation of these virtues; and how are we to know, that it is not the undiscoverable thought of this utility, which forms the impellent principle of that undiscoverable volition, by which man is urged to the performance of them?

9. Now we are precluded from replying to this question in any other way, than that the theory which requires such an argument for its support, may be said to fetch all its materials from the region of conjecture. It ventures on the affirmation of what is going on in a terra incognita; and we have not the means within our reach, for meeting it in the terms of a positive contradiction. But we can at least say, that a mere *argumentum ab ignorantia* is not a sufficient basis on which to ground a philosophic theory; and that thus to fetch an hypothesis from among the inscrutabilities of the mind, to speak of processes going on there so quick

and so evanescent that the eye of consciousness cannot discover them—is to rear a superstructure not upon the facts which lie within the limit of separation between the known and the unknown, but upon the fancies which lie without this limit. A great deal more is necessary for the establishment of an assertion, than that an adversary cannot disprove it. A thousand possibilities may be affirmed which are susceptible neither of proof nor of disproof; and surely it were the worst of logic to accept as proof, the mere circumstance that they are beyond the reach of disproof. They, in fact, lie alike beyond the reach of both; in which case they should be ranked among the figments of mere imagination, and not among the findings of experience. How are we to know but that, in the bosom of our great planetary amplitude, there do not float, and in elliptic orbits round the sun, pieces of matter vastly too diminutive for our telescopes; and that thus the large intermediate spaces between the known bodies of the system, instead of so many desolate blanks, are in fact peopled with little worlds—all of them teeming, like our own, with busy and cheerful animation. Now, in the powerlessness of our existing telescopes, we do not know but it may be so. But we will not believe that it is so, till a telescope of power enough be invented, for disclosing this scene of wonders

to our observation. And it is the same of the moral theory that now engages us. It rests, not upon what it finds among the arcana of the human spirit, but upon what it fancies to be there; and they are fancies too which we cannot deny, but which we will not admit—till, by some improved power of internal observation, they are turned into findings. We are quite sensible of the virtuousness of truth; but we have not yet been made sensible, that we always recognize this virtuousness, because of a glance we have had of the utility of truth—though only perhaps for a moment of time, too minute and microscopical for being noticed by the naked eye of consciousness. We can go no further upon this question than the light of evidence will carry us. And, while we both feel in our own bosoms and observe in the testimony of those around us, the moral deference which is due to truth and justice—we have not yet detected this to be the same with that deference, which we render to the virtue of benevolence. Or, in other words, we do venerate and regard these as virtues—while, *for aught we know*, the utility of them is not in all our thoughts. We agree with Dugald Stewart in thinking, that, "considerations of utility do not seem to us the only ground of the approbation we bestow on this disposition." He further observes, that, "abstracting from all regard to consequences,

there is something pleasing and amiable in sincerity, openness, and truth; something disagreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood. Dr. Hutcheson himself, the great patron of that theory which resolves all moral qualities into benevolence, confesses this—for he speaks of a *sense* which leads us to approve of veracity, distinct from the sense which approves of qualities useful to mankind."*

10. However difficult it may be, to resolve the objective question which respects the constitution of virtue in itself—in the subjective question, which respects the constitution of the mind, we cannot but acknowledge the broad and palpable distinction, which the Author of our moral frame hath made, between justice and truth on the one hand, and beneficence on the other. And it had been well, if law-givers had discriminated, as nature has done, between justice and humanity—although the mischief of their unfortunate deviation serves, all the more strikingly, to prove the adaptation of our moral constitution to the exigencies of human society. The law of pauperism hath assimilated beneficence to justice, by enacting the former, in the very way that it does the latter; and enforcing what it has thus enacted by penalties. Beneficence loses altogether its proper and original character—when, instead of moving on the impulse

* Stewart's "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," Art. Veracity.

of a spontaneous kindness that operates from within, it moves on the impulse of a legal obligation from without. Should law specify the yearly sum that must pass from my hands to the destitute around me—then, it is not beneficence which has to do with the matter. What I have to surrender, law hath already ordained to be the property of another; and I, in giving it up, am doing an act of justice and not an act of liberality. To exercise the virtue of beneficence, I must go beyond the sum that is specified by law; and thus law, in her attempts to seize upon beneficence, and to bring her under rule, hath only forced her to retire within a narrower territory, on which alone it is that she can put forth the free and native characteristics which belong to her. Law, in fact, cannot, with any possible ingenuity, obtain an imperative hold on beneficence at all—for her very touch transforms this virtue into another. Should law go forth on the enterprize of arresting beneficence upon her own domain, and there laying upon her its authoritative dictates—it would find that beneficence had eluded its pursuit; and that all which it could possibly do, was to wrest from her that part of the domain of which it had taken occupation, and bring it under the authority of justice. When it thought to enact for beneficence, it only, in truth, enacted a new division of property; and in so doing, it contravenes the possessory, one of

nature's special affections—while, by its attempts to force what should have been left to the free exercise of compassion, it has done much to supersede or to extinguish another of these affections. It hath so pushed forward the line of demarcation—as to widen the space which justice might call her own, and to contract the space which beneficence might call her own. But never will law be able to make a captive of beneficence, or to lay personal arrest upon her. It might lessen and limit her means, or even starve her into utter annihilation. But never can it make a living captive of her. It is altogether a vain and hopeless undertaking to legislate on the duties of beneficence; for the very nature of this virtue, is to do good freely and willingly with its own. But on the moment that law interposes to any given extent with one's property, to that extent it ceases to be his own; and any good that is done by it is not done freely. The force of law and the freeness of love cannot amalgamate the one with the other. Like water and oil they are immiscible. We cannot translate beneficence into the statute-book of law, without expunging it from the statute-book of the heart; and, to whatever extent we make it the object of compulsion, to that extent we must destroy it.

11. And in the proportion that beneficence is put to flight, is gratitude put to flight along with

it. The proper object of this emotion is another's good-will. But I do not hold as from the good-will of another, that which law hath enabled me to plea as my own right—nay to demand, with a front of hardy and resolute assertion. It is this which makes it the most delicate and dangerous of all ground—when law offers to prescribe rules for the exercise of beneficence, or to lay its compulsory hand on a virtue, the very freedom of which is indispensable to its existence. And it not only extinguishes the virtue; but it puts an end to all those responses of glad and grateful emotion, which its presence and its smile and the generosity of its free-will offerings awaken in society. It is laying an arrest on all the music of living intercourse, thus to forbid those beautiful and delicious echoes, which are reflected, on every visit of unconstrained mercy, from those families that are gladdened by her footsteps. And what is worse, it is substituting in their place, the hoarse and jarring discords of the challenge and the conflict and the angry litigation. We may thus see, that there is a province in human affairs, on which law should make no entrance—a certain department of human virtue wherein the moralities should be left to their own unfettered play, else they shall be frozen into utter apathy—a field sacred to liberty and good-will that should ever be kept beyond the reach of jurisprudence; or on which, if she once

obtain a footing, she will spoil it of all those unbought and unbidden graces that natively adorn it. So that while to law we would commit the defence of society from all the aggressions of violence, and confide the strict and the stern guardianship of the interests of justice—we should tremble for humanity lest it withered and expired under the grasp of so rough a protector; and lest before a countenance grave as that of a judge, and grim as that of a messenger-at-arms, this frail but loveliest of the virtues should be turned, as if by the head of Medusa, into stone.

12. But there are other moral ills in this unfortunate perversion, beside the extinction of good-will in the hearts of the affluent and of gratitude in the hearts of the poor—though it be no slight mischief to any community, that the tie of kindliness between these two orders should have been broken; and that the business of charity, which when left spontaneous is so fertile in all the amenities of life, should be transformed into a fierce warfare of rights, from its very nature incapable of adjustment, and, whether they be the encroached upon or the repelled, subjecting both parties to the sense of a perpetual violence. But over and above this, there are other distempers, wherewith it hath smitten the social economy of England, and of which experience will supply the English observer

with many a vivid recollection. The reckless but withal most natural improvidence of those whom the state has undertaken to provide for, seeing that law hath proclaimed in their favour a discharge from the cares and the duties of self-preservation—the headlong dissipation, in consequence—the dissolution of family ties, for the same public and proclaimed charity which absolves a man from attention to himself will absolve him also from attention to his relatives—the decay and interruption of sympathy in all the little vicinities of town and country, for each man under this system of an assured and universal provision feels himself absolved too from attention to his neighbours—These distempers both social and economic have a common origin; and the excess of them above what taketh place in a natural state of things, may all be traced to the unfortunate aberration, which, in this instance, the constitution of human law hath made from the constitution of human nature.

13. In our attempts to trace the rise of the possessory affection and of a sense of property, we have not been able to discover any foundation in nature, for a sentiment that we often hear impetuously urged by the advocates of the system of pauperism—that every man has a *right* to the means of subsistence. Nature does not connect this right with existence; but with continued occupation, and with another prin-

ciple to which it also gives the sanction of its voice—that, each man is legitimate owner of the fruits of his own industry. These are the principles on which nature hath drawn her landmarks over every territory that is peopled and cultivated by human beings. And the actual distribution of property is the fruit, partly of man's own direct aim and acquisition, and partly of circumstances over which he had no control. The right of man to the means of existence on the sole ground that he exists has been loudly and vehemently asserted; yet is a factitious sentiment notwithstanding—tending to efface the distinctness of nature's landmarks, and to traverse those arrangements, by which she hath provided far better for the peace and comfort of society, nay for the more sure and liberal support of all its members. It is true that nature, in fixing the principles on which man has a right to the fruits of the earth, to the materials of his subsistence, has left out certain individuals of the human family—some outcast stragglers, who, on neither of nature's principles, will be found possessed of any right, or of any property. It is for their sake that human law hath interposed, in some countries of the world; and, by creating or ordaining a right for them, has endeavoured to make good the deficiency of nature. But if justice alone could have ensured a right distribution for the supply of want, and if it must

be through the medium of a right that the destitute shall obtain their maintenance—then, would there have been no need for another principle, which stands out most noticeably in our nature; and compassion would have been a superfluous part of the human constitution. It is thus that nature provides for the unprovided—not by unsettling the limits which her previous education had established in all minds—not by the extension of a right to every man; but by establishing in behalf of those some men, whom accident or the necessity of circumstances or even their own misconduct had left without a right, a compassionate interest in the bosom of their fellows. They have no advocate to plead for them at the bar of justice; and therefore nature hath furnished them with a gentler and more persuasive advocate, who might solicit for them at the bar of mercy; and, for their express benefit, hath given to most men an ear for pity, to many a hand open as day for melting charity. But it is not to any rare, or romantic generosity, that she hath confided the relief of their wants. She hath made compassion one of the strongest, and, in spite of all the depravations to which humanity is exposed, one of the steadiest of our universal instincts. It were an intolerable spectacle even to the inmates of a felon's cell, did they behold one of their fellows in the agonies of hunger; and rather than

endure it, would they share their own scanty meal with them.* It were still more intolerable to the householders of any neighbourhood—insomuch that, where law had not attempted to supersede nature, every instance of distress or destitution would, whether in town or country, give rise to an internal operation of charity throughout every little vicinity of the land. The mischief which law hath done, by trying to mend the better mechanism which nature had instituted, is itself a most impressive testimony to the wisdom of nature. The perfection of her arrangements, is never more strikingly exhibited, than by those evils which the disturbance of them brings upon society—as when her law in the heart has been overborne by England's wretched law of pauperism; and this violation of the natural order has been followed up, in consequence, by a tenfold increase both of poverty and crime.

* The certainty of this operation is beautifully exemplified in a passage of Mr. Buxton's interesting book on prisons—from which it appears that there is no allowance of food to the debtors, and a very inferior allowance of food to the criminals, who are confined in the gaol at Bristol. The former live on their own means or the casual charity of the benevolent. Instances have occurred when both of these resources failed them—and starvation would have ensued, had not the criminals, rather than endure the neighbourhood of such a suffering, shared their own scanty pittance along with them—thus affording an argumentum a fortiore for a like strength of compassion throughout the land—seeing that it had survived the depraving process which leads to the malefactor's cell.

14. It is interesting to pursue the outgoings of such a system; and to ascertain whether nature hath vindicated her wisdom, by the evil consequences of a departure from her guidance on the part of man—for if so, it will supply another proof, or furnish us with another sight of the exquisite adaptation which she hath established between the moral and the physical, or between the two worlds of mind and matter. Certain, then, of the parishes of England have afforded a very near exemplification of the ultimate state to which one and all of them are tending—a state which is consummated, when the poor rates form so large a deduction from the rents of the land, that it shall at length cease to be an object to keep them in cultivation.* It is thus that some tracts of country are on the eve of being actually

* The following is an extract from the report of a select committee on the poor law printed in 1817. "The consequences which are likely to result from this state of things, are clearly set forth in the petition from the parish of Wombridge in Salop, which is fast approaching to this state. The petitioners state 'that the annual value of lands, mines and houses in this parish, is not sufficient to maintain the numerous and increasing poor, even if the same were set free of rent; and that these circumstances will inevitably compel the occupiers of lands and mines to relinquish them; and the poor will be without relief, or any known mode of obtaining it, unless some assistance be speedily afforded to them.' And your committee apprehend, from the petition before them, that this is one of many parishes that are fast approaching to a state of dereliction."

The inquiries of the present Poor law Commission have led to a still more aggravated and confirmed view of the evils of the system.

vacated by their proprietors; and as their place of superintendance cannot be vacated by others, who have no right of superintendance—the result might be, that whole estates shall be as effectually lost to the wealth and resources of the country, as if buried by an earthquake under water, or, as if some blight of nature had gone over them and bereft them of their powers of vegetation. Now we know not, if the whole history of the world furnishes a more striking demonstration than this, of the mischief that may be done, by attempting to carry into practice a theoretical speculation, which, under the guise and even with the real purpose of benevolence, has for its plausible object, to equalize among the children of one common humanity, the blessings and the fruits of one common inheritance. The truth is that we have not been conducted to the present state of our rights and arrangements respecting property, by any artificial process of legislation at all. The state of property in which we find ourselves actually landed, is the result of a natural process, under which, all that a man earns by his industry is acknowledged to be his own—or, when the original mode of acquisition is lost sight of, all that a man retains by long and undisturbed possession is felt and acknowledged to be his own also. Legislation ought to do no more than barely recognize these principles, and defend its subjects against the violation

of them. And when it attempts more than this —when it offers to tamper with the great arrangements of nature, by placing the rights and the securities of property on a footing different from that of nature—when, as in the case of the English poor-laws, it does so, under the pretence and doubtless too with the honest design of establishing between the rich and the poor a nearer equality of enjoyment; we know not in what way violated nature could have inflicted on the enterprize a more signal and instructive chastisement, than when the whole territory of this plausible but presumptuous experiment is made to droop and to wither under it as if struck by a judgment from heaven—till at length that earth out of which the rich draw all their wealth and the poor all their subsistence, refuses to nourish the children who have abandoned her; and both parties are involved in the wreck of one common and overwhelming visitation.

15. But we read the same lesson in all the laws and movements of political economy. The superior wisdom of nature is demonstrated in the mischief which is done by any aberration therefrom—when her processes are disturbed or intermeddled with by the wisdom of man. The philosophy of free trade is grounded on the principle, that society is most enriched or best served, when commerce is left to its own spontaneous evolutions; and is neither fostered by the artifi-

cial encouragements, nor fettered by the artificial restraints of human policy. The greatest economic good is rendered to the community, by each man being left to consult and to labour for his own particular good—or, in other words, a more prosperous result is obtained by the spontaneous play and busy competition of many thousand wills, each bent on the prosecution of its own selfishness, than by the anxious superintendance of a government, vainly attempting to medicate the fancied imperfections of nature, or to improve on the arrangements of her previous and better mechanism. It is when each man is left to seek, with concentrated and exclusive aim, his own individual benefit—it is then, that markets are best supplied; that commodities are furnished for general use, of best quality, and in greatest cheapness and abundance; that the comforts of life are most multiplied; and the most free and rapid augmentation takes place in the riches and resources of the commonwealth. Such a result, which at the same time not a single agent in this vast and complicated system of trade contemplates or cares for, each caring only for himself—strongly bespeaks a higher agent, by whose transcendental wisdom it is, that all is made to conspire so harmoniously and to terminate so beneficially. We are apt to recognize no higher wisdom than that of man, in those mighty concerts of human agency

a battle, or a revolution, or the accomplishment of some prosperous and pacific scheme of universal education; where each who shares in the undertaking is aware of its object, or acts in obedience to some master-mind who may have devised and who actuates the whole. But it is widely different, when, as in political economy, some great and beneficent end both unlooked and unlaboured for, is the result, not of any concert or general purpose among the thousands who are engaged in it—but is the compound effect, nevertheless, of each looking severally, and in the strenuous pursuit of individual advantage, to some distinct object of his own. When we behold the working of a complex inanimate machine, and the usefulness of its products—we infer, from the unconsciousness of all its parts, that there must have been a planning and a presiding wisdom in the construction of it. The conclusion is not the less obvious, we think it emphatically more so, when, instead of this, we behold in one of the animate machines of human society, the busy world of trade, a beneficent result, an optimism of public and economical advantage, wrought out by the free movements of a vast multitude of men, not one of whom had the advantage of the public in all his thoughts. When good is effected by a combination of unconscious agents incapable of all aim, we ascribe

the combination to an intellect that devised and gave it birth. When good is effected by a combination of conscious agents capable of aim, but that an aim wholly different with each from the compound and general result of their united operations—this bespeaks a higher will and a higher wisdom than any by which the individuals, taken separately, are actuated. When we look at each striving to better his own condition, we see nothing in this but the selfishness of man. When we look at the effect of this universal principle, in cheapening and multiplying to the uttermost all the articles of human enjoyment, and establishing a thousand reciprocities of mutual interest in the world—we see in this the benevolence and comprehensive wisdom of God.

16. The whole science of Political Economy is full of those exquisite adaptations to the wants and the comforts of human life, which bespeak the skill of a master-hand, in the adjustment of its laws, and the working of its profoundly constructed mechanism. We shall instance, first, that speciality in the law of prices, by which they oscillate more largely with the varieties in the supply of the necessaries, than they do in the mere comforts or luxuries of human life. The deficiency of one tenth in the imports of sugar, would not so raise the price of that article, as a similar deficiency in the supply of corn, which might rise even a

third in price, by the diminution of a tenth from the usual quantity brought to market. It is not with the reason, but with the beneficial effect of this phenomenon, that we at present have to do—not with its efficient, but with its final cause; or the great and obvious utilities to which it is subservient. Connected with this law of wider variation in the price than in the supply of first necessaries, is the reason why a population survive so well those years of famine, when the prices perhaps are tripled. This does not argue that they must be therefore three times worse fed than usual. The food of the country may only, for aught we know, have been lessened by a fourth part of its usual supply—or, in other words, the families may at an average be served with three-fourths of their usual subsistence, at the very time that the cost of it is three times greater than usual. And to make out this large payment, they have to retrench for the year in other articles—altogether, it is likely, to give up the use of comforts; and to limit themselves more largely in the second, than they can possibly do in the first necessaries of life—to forego perhaps many of the little seasonings, wherewith they wont to impart a relish to their coarse and humble fare—to husband more strictly their fuel; and be satisfied for a time with vestments more threadbare, and even more tattered, than

what in better times they would choose to appear in. It is thus that even although the first necessaries should be tripled in price for a season, and although the pecuniary income of the labouring classes should not at all be increased—yet they are found to weather the hardships of such a visitation. The food is still served out to them at a much larger proportion than the cost of it would in the first instance appear to indicate. And in the second instance they are enabled to purchase at this cost—because, and more especially if they be a well-habited and well-conditioned peasantry, with a pretty high standard of enjoyment in ordinary years, they have more that they can save and retrench upon in a year of severe scarcity. They can disengage much of that revenue which before went to the purchase of dress, and of various luxuries that might for a season be dispensed with; and so have the more to expend on the materials of subsistence. It is this which explains how roughly a population can bear to be handled, both by adverse seasons and by the vicissitudes of trade; and how after all, there is a stability about a people's means, which will keep its ground against many checks, and amidst many fluctuations. It is a mystery and a marvel to many an observer, how the seemingly frail and precarious interest of the labouring classes should after all, have

the stamina of such endurance, as to weather the most fearful reverses both of commerce and of the seasons; and that, somehow or other, we find after an interval of gloomy suffering and still gloomier fears, that the families do emerge again into the same state of sufficiency as before. We know not a fitter study for the philanthropist than the working of that mechanism, by which a process so gratifying is caused, or in which he will find greater reason to admire the exquisite skill of those various adaptations that must be referred to the providence of Him who framed society, and suited so wisely to each other the elements of which it is composed.

17. There is nought which appears more variable than the operation of those elements by which the annual supply of the national subsistence is regulated. How unlike in character is one season to another; and between the extremes of dryness and moisture, how exceedingly different may be the amount of that produce on which the sustenance of man essentially depends. Even after that the promise of abundance is well nigh realized, the hurricane of a single day, passing over the yet uncut but ripened corn; or the rain of a few weeks, to drench and macerate the sheaves that lie piled together on the harvest-field, were enough to destroy the food of millions. We are aware of a compensation, in the varieties

of soil and exposure, so that the weather which is adverse to one part of the country might be favourable to another; besides that the mischief of a desolating tempest in autumn must only be partial, from the harvest of the plains and uplands falling upon different months. Still, with all these balancing causes, the produce of different years is very far from being equalized; and its fluctuations would come charged with still more of distress and destitution to families—were there not a counterpoise to the laws of nature, in what may be termed the laws of political economy.

18. The price of human food does not immediately depend on the quantity of it that is produced, but on the quantity of it that is brought to market; and it is well that, in every year of scarcity, there should be instant causes put into operation for increasing the latter quantity to the uttermost—so as to repair as much as possible the deficiencies of the former. It is well that even a small short-coming in the crop should be so surely followed by a great advance of prices; for this has instantly the effect of putting the families of the land upon that shortness of allowance, which might cause the supply, limited as it is, to serve throughout the year. But, beside the wholesome restraint which is thus imposed on the general consumption of families, there is encouragement given

by this dearness to abridge the consumption upon farms, and by certain shifts in their management to make out the greatest possible surplus, for the object of sale and supply to the population at large. With a high price, the farmer feels it a more urgent interest, to carry as much of his produce to market as he can; and for this purpose, he will retrench to the uttermost at home. And he has much in his power. More particularly, he can and does retrench considerably upon the feed of his cattle, and in as far as this wont to consist of potatoes or grain, there must an important addition be gained in this way to the supplies of the market. One must often have been struck with the comparative cheapness of animal food in a year of scarcity. This is because of the greater slaughter of cattle which takes place in such a year, to save the heavy expense of maintaining them; and which, besides affording a direct accession to the sustenance of man, lightens still more the farm consumption, and disengages for sale a still greater amount of the necessaries of life. We do not say but that the farm suffers a derangement by this change of regimen, from which it might take years to recover fully. But the evil becomes more tolerable by being spread. The horrors of extreme scarcity are prevented. The extremity is weathered at its furthest point. The

country emerges from the visitation, and without, in all probability, the starvation of one individual; and all because, from the operation of the causes that we have now explained, the supply of the market is made to oscillate within smaller limits than the crop—insomuch that though the latter should be deficient by one-third of the whole, the former might not be deficient by one-fifth or one-sixth of what is brought to market annually.

19. This effect is greatly increased by the suspending of distillation in years of scarcity. And after all, should the supplies be yet very short, and the prices therefore far more than proportionally high, this will naturally and of itself, bring on the importation of grain from foreign parts. If such be the variety of weather and soil, even within the limits of a country, as in some measure to balance the scarcity which is experienced in one set of farms, by the comparative abundance of another set—this will apply with much greater force to a whole continent, or to the world at large. If a small deficiency in the home supply of grain induce a higher price than with other articles of commerce, this is just a provision for a securer and readier filling up of the deficiency by a movement from abroad—a thing of far greater importance with the necessaries than with the mere comforts or luxuries of life. That law of wider and more tremulous

oscillation in the price of corn, which we have attempted to expound, is in itself a security for a more equal distribution of it over the globe by man, in those seasons when nature has been partial—so as to diffuse the more certainly and the more speedily through the earth that which has been dropped upon it unequally from Heaven. It is well that greater efficacy should thus be given to that corrective force, by which the yearly supplies of food are spread over the world with greater uniformity than they at first descend upon it; and, however much it may be thought to aggravate a people's hardships, that a slight failure in their home supply should create such a rise in the cost of necessaries—yet certainly it makes the impulse all the more powerful, by which corn flows in from lands of plenty to a land of famine. But what we have long esteemed the most beautiful part of this operation, is the instant advantage, which a large importation from abroad gives to our export manufacturers at home. There is a limit in the rate of exchange to the exportation of articles from any country; but up to this limit, there is a class of labourers employed in the preparation of these articles. Now the effect of an augmented importation upon the exchange is such as to enlarge this limit—so that our export traders can then sell with a larger profit, and carry out a greater amount of goods than before, and thus enlist a

more numerous population in the service of preparing them. An increased importation always gives an impulse to exportation, so as to make employment spring up in one quarter, at the very time that it disappears in another. Or, rather, at the very time when the demand for a particular commodity is slackened at home, it is stimulated abroad. We have already adverted to the way in which families shift their expenditure in a year of scarcity, directing a far greater proportion of it than usual to the first necessaries of life, and withdrawing it proportionally from the comforts, and even second necessaries of life. Cloth may be regarded as one of the second necessaries; and it were woeful indeed, if on the precise year when food was dearest, the numerous workmen engaged in this branch of industry should find that employment was scarcest. But in very proportion as they are abandoned by customers at home, do they find a compensation in the more quickened demand of customers from abroad. It is in these various ways that a country is found to survive so well its hardest and heaviest visitations; and even under a triple price for the first articles of subsistence, it has been found to emerge into prosperity again, without an authentic instance of starvation throughout all its families.*

* It is right to mention that the four preceding paragraphs are taken in substance, and very much in language, from a former

20. When any given object is anxiously cared for by a legislature, and all its wisdom is put forth in devising measures for securing or extending it—it forms a pleasing discovery to find, that what may have hitherto been the laborious aim and effort of human policy, has already been provided for, with all perfection and entireness in the spontaneous workings of human nature; and that therefore, in this instance, the wisdom of the state has been anticipated by a higher wisdom—or the wisdom which presides over the ordinations of a human government, has been anticipated by the wisdom which ordained the laws of the human constitution. Of this there are manifold examples in political economy—as in the object of population, for the keeping up and increase of which, there was at one time a misplaced anxiety on the part of rulers; and the object of capital for the preservation and growth of which there is a like misplaced anxiety, and for the decay and disappearance of which there is an equally misplaced alarm. Both, in fact, are what may be termed self-regulating interests—or, in other words, interests which result with so much certainty from the checks and the principles that nature hath already instituted, as to supersede all

publication—as presenting a notable adaptation of external to human nature which offered itself, in the course of other investigations, and at a time when we were not in quest of it.

public or patriotic regulation in regard to either of them. This has now been long understood on the subject of population; but it holds equally true on the subject of capital. There is, on the one hand, throughout society, enough of the appetite for enjoyment, to secure us against its needless excess; and, on the other, enough of the appetite for gain, to secure us against its hurtful deficiency. And, by a law of oscillation as beautiful as that which obtains in the planetary system, and by which, amid all disturbances and errors, it is upheld in its mean state indestructible and inviolate—does capital, in like manner, constantly tend to a condition of optimism, and is never far from it, amid all the variations, whether of defect, or redundancy, to which it is exposed. When in defect, by the operation of high prices, it almost instantly recovers itself—when in excess, it, by the operation of low profits, or rather of losing speculations, almost instantly collapses into a right mediocrity. In the first case, the inducement is to trade rather than to spend; and there is a speedy accumulation of capital. In the second case, the inducement is to spend rather than to trade; and there is a speedy reduction of capital. It is thus that capital ever suits itself, in the way that is best possible, to the circumstances of the country—so as to leave uncalled for, any economic regulation by the wisdom of man; and

that precisely because of a previous moral and mental regulation by the wisdom of God.

21. But if any thing can demonstrate the hand of a righteous Deity in the nature and workings of what may well be termed a mechanism, the very peculiar mechanism of trade; it is the healthful impulse given to all its movements, wherever there is a reigning principle of sobriety and virtue in the land—so as to ensure an inseparable connection between the moral worth and the economic comfort of a people. Of this we should meet with innumerable verifications in political economy—did we make a study of the science, with the express design of fixing and ascertaining them. There is one very beautiful instance in the effect, which the frugality and foresight of workmen would have, to control and equalize the fluctuations of commerce—acting with the power of a fly in mechanics; and so as to save, or at least indefinitely to shorten, those dreary intervals of suspended work or miserable wages, which now occur so often, and with almost periodic regularity in the trading world. What constitutes a sore aggravation to the wretchedness of such a season, is the necessity of overworking—so as, if possible, to compensate by the amount of labour for the deficiency of its remuneration; and yet the inverse effect of this in augmenting and perpetuating that glut, or overproduction, which is the real origin of this

whole calamity. It would not happen in the hands of a people elevated and exempted above the urgencies of immediate want; and nothing will so elevate and exempt them, but their own accumulated wealth—the produce of a resolute economy and good management in prosperous times. Would they only save during high wages, what they might spend during low wages—so as when the depression comes, to slacken, instead of adding to their work, or even cease from it altogether—could they only afford to live, through the months of such a visitation, on their well husbanded means, the commodities of the overladen market would soon clear away; when, with the return of a brisk demand on empty warehouses, a few weeks instead of months would restore them to importance and prosperity in the commonwealth. This is but a single specimen from many others of that enlargement which awaits the labouring classes, after that by their own intelligence and virtue, they have won their way to it. With but wisdom and goodness among the common people, the whole of this economic machinery would work most beneficently for them—a moral ordination, containing in it most direct evidence for the wisdom and goodness of that Being by whose hands it is that the machinery has been framed and constituted; and who, the Preserver and Governor, as well as the Creator of His works, sits with presiding authority over all its evolutions.

22. But this is only one specimen out of the many—the particular instance of a quality that is universal, and which may be detected in almost all the phenomena and principles of the science; for throughout, political economy is but one grand exemplification of the alliance, which a God of righteousness hath established, between prudence and moral principle on the one hand, and physical comfort on the other. However obnoxious the modern doctrine of population, as expounded by Mr. Malthus, may have been, and still is, to weak and limited sentimentalists, it is the truth which of all others sheds the greatest brightness over the earthly prospects of humanity—and this in spite of the hideous, the yet sustained outcry which has risen against it. This is a pure case of adaptation, between the external nature of the world in which we live, and the moral nature of man, its chief occupier. There is a demonstrable inadequacy in all the material resources which the globe can furnish, for the increasing wants of a recklessly increasing species. But over and against this, man is gifted with a moral and a mental power by which the inadequacy might be fully countervailed; and the species, in virtue of their restrained and regulated numbers, be upholden on the face of our world, in circumstances of large and stable sufficiency, even to the most distant ages. The first origin of this blissful consum-

mation is in the virtue of the people; but carried into sure and lasting effect by the laws of political economy, through the indissoluble connection which obtains between the wages and the supply of labour—so that in every given state of commerce and civilization, the amount of the produce of industry and of the produce of the soil, which shall fall to the share of the work-men, is virtually at the determination of the work-men themselves, who, by dint of resolute prudence and resolute principle together, may rise to an indefinitely higher status than they now occupy, of comfort and independence in the commonwealth. This opens up a cheering prospect to the lovers of our race; and not the less so, that it is seen through the medium of popular intelligence and virtue—the only medium through which it can ever be realized. And it sheds a revelation, not only on the hopeful destinies of man, but on the character of God—in having instituted this palpable alliance between the moral and the physical; and so assorted the economy of outward nature to the economy of human principles and passions. The lights of modern science have made us apprehend more clearly, by what steps the condition and the character of the common people rise and fall with each other—insomuch, that, while on the one hand their general destitution is the inevitable result of their general worthlessness,

they, on the other, by dint of wisdom and moral strength, can augment indefinitely, not the produce of the earth, nor the produce of human industry, but that proportion of both which falls to their own share. Their economic is sure to follow by successive advances in the career of their moral elevation; nor do we hold it impossible, or even unlikely—that gaining, every generation, on the distance which now separates them from the upper classes of society, they shall, in respect both of decent sufficiency and dignified leisure, make perpetual approximations to the fellowships and the enjoyments of cultivated life.

Chapter VIII.

On the Relation in which the special Affections of our Nature stand to Virtue; and on the Demonstration given forth by it, both to the Character of Man and the Character of God.

1. There are certain broad and decisive indications of moral design, and so of a moral designer, in the constitution of our world, which instead of expounding at great length, we have only stated briefly or incidentally—because, however effec-

tive as proofs, they possess a character of such extreme obviousness, as to require no anxious or formal explanation; but, on the instant of being presented to their notice, are read and recognized by all men. One patent example of this in the constitution of man, is the force and prevalence of compassion—an endowment which could not have proceeded from a malignant being; but which evinces the Author of our nature to be himself compassionate and generous. Another example may be given alike patent and recognizable, if not of a virtuous principle in the human constitution, at least of such an adaptation of the external world to that constitution—that, with the virtuous practice which that principle would both originate and sustain, the outward and general prosperity of man is indispensably connected. We mean the manifest and indispensable subserviency of a general truth in the world, to the general well-being of society. It is difficult to imagine, that a God of infinite power, and consummate skill of workmanship, but withal a lover of falsehood, would have devised such a world; or rather, that he would not, in patronage to those of his own likeness, have ordered the whole of its system differently—so reversing its present laws and sequences, as that, instead of honour and integrity, duplicity disingenuousness and fraud, should have been the usual stepping-stones to the possession both of

this world's esteem and of this world's enjoyments. How palpably opposite this is to the actual economy of things, the whole experience of life abundantly testifies—making it evident, of individual examples, that the connection between honesty and success in the world is the rule; the connection between dishonesty and success is the exception. But perhaps, instead of attempting the induction of particular cases, we should observe a still more distinct avowal of the character of God, of his favour for truth, and of the discountenance which he has laid upon falsehood, by tracing, which could be easily done in imagination, the effect it would have in society, if, all things else remaining unaltered, there should this single difference be introduced, of a predominant falsehood, instead of a predominant truth in the world. The consequences of a universal distrust, in the almost universal stoppage that would ensue of the useful interchanges of life, are too obvious to be enumerated. The world of trade would henceforth break up into a state of anarchy, or rather be paralyzed into a state of cessation and stillness. The mutual confidence between man and man, if not the mainspring of commerce, is at least the oil, without which its movements were impracticable. And were truth to disappear, and all dependence on human testimony to be destroyed, this is not the only interest which would

be ruined by it. It would vitiate, and that incurably, every social and every domestic relationship; and all the charities as well as all the comforts of life would take their departure from the world.

2. Seeing then that the observation of honesty and truth is of such vital importance to society, that without it society would cease to keep together—it might be well to ascertain, by what special provision it is in the constitution of man, that the practice of these virtues is upheld in the world. Did it proceed in every instance, from the natural power and love of integrity in the heart—we should rejoice in contemplating this alliance between the worth of man's character, on the one hand; and the security, as well as the abundance of his outward comforts upon the other. And such, in fact, is the habitual disposition to truth in the world —that, in spite of the great moral depravation into which our species has obviously fallen, we probably do not overrate the proportion, when we affirm, that at least a hundred truths are uttered among men for one falsehood. But then, in the vast majority of cases, there is no temptation to struggle with, nothing by which to try or to estimate the strength of the virtue so that, without virtue being at all concerned—in it, man's words might spontaneously flow in the natural current of his ideas, of the know-

ledge or the convictions which belong to him. But more than this. Instead of selfishness seducing man, which it often does, from the observations of truth and honesty—it vastly oftener is on the side of these observations. Generally speaking, it is not more his interest that he should have men of integrity to deal with—than that he himself should, in his own dealings, be strictly observant of this virtue. To be abandoned by the confidence of his fellows, he would find to be not more mortifying to his pride, than ruinous to his prosperity in the world. We are aware that many an occasional harvest is made from deceit and injustice; but, in the vast majority of cases, men would cease to thrive when they ceased to be trusted. A man's actual truth is not more beneficial to others, than the reputation of it is gainful to himself. And therefore it is, that, throughout the mercantile world, men are as sensitive of an aspersion on their name, as they would be of an encroachment on their property. The one, in fact, is tantamount to the other. It is thus, that, under the constraints of selfishness alone, fidelity and justice may be in copious and current observation among men; and while, perhaps, the principle of these virtues is exceedingly frail and uncertain in all hearts—human society may still subsist by the literal and outward observation of them.

3. Here then is the example, not of a virtue in principle, but of a virtue in performance, with all the indispensable benefits of that performance, being sustained on the soil of selfishness. Were a profound observer of human life to take account of all the honesties of mercantile intercourse, he would find, that, in the general amount of them, they were mainly due to the operation of this cause; or that they were so prevalent in society, because each man was bound to their observance, by the tie of his own personal interest—insomuch, that if this particular tie were broken, it would as surely derange or break up the world of trade, as the world of matter would become an inert or turbid chaos, on the repeal or suspension of the law of gravitation. Confidence the very soul of commercial enterprize, and without which the transactions of merchandize were impossible, is the goodly result, not of that native respect which each man has for another's rights, but of that native regard which each man has for his own special advantage. This forms another example of a great and general good wrought out for society—while each component member is intently set, only on a distinct and specific good for himself—a high interest, which could not have been confided to human virtue; but which has been skilfully extracted from the workings of human selfishness. In as

far as truth and justice prevail in the world, not by the operation of principle but of policy, in so far the goodness of man has no share in it: but so beneficent a result out of such unpromising materials, speaks all the more emphatically both for the wisdom and the goodness of God.

4. But in this there is no singularity. Other examples can be named, of God placing us in such circumstances, as to enlist even our selfishness on the side of virtuous conduct; or implanting such special affections, as do, by their own impulse, lead to that conduct, although virtuousness is not in all our thoughts. We are often so actuated, as to do what is best for society, at the very time that the good of society is forming no part of our concern; and our footsteps are often directed in that very path, which a moral regard to the greatest happiness of the species would dictate—without any moral purpose having been conceived or any moral principle been in exercise within us. It is thus that our resentment operates as a check on the injuriousness of others, although our single aim be the protection of our own interests—not the diminution of violence or injustice in the world: And thus too our own dread of resentment from others, works the same outward effect, which honour or a respect for their rights would have had upon our transactions, which delicacy or

a respect for their feelings would have had upon our converse with those around us. It is in this way that God makes the wrath of man to praise Him; and the same is true of other affections of our nature, which have less the character of selfishness, than either anger or fear. It is not because prompted by a sense of duty, but under the force of a mere natural proneness, that mothers watch so assiduously over the helplessness, and fathers toil so painfully for the subsistence of their children. Even compassion, with the speed and the discrimination of its movements, does for human life, more than man is capable of doing with his highest efforts of morality and reason—yet, not in the shape of a principle, but in the shape of a strong constitutional propensity. The good is rendered, not by man acting as he thinks that he ought, or under the force of a moral suggestion; but man acting because he feels himself constrained, as if by the force of a physical necessity—not surely because, in the exercise of a sovereign liberty, he hath assumed a lordly ascendant over all the inferior passions of his nature; but because himself is lorded over by a law of his nature, having in it all the might and mastery of a passion. It is when, in the contemplation of phenomena like these, we are enabled to view man as an instrument, that we are also led more clearly to perceive who the agent is—not the being who is

endowed, but the Being who has endowed him. The instinct of animals is a substitute for their wisdom; but, at the same time, a palpable demonstration of the wisdom of God. Man also has his instincts, which serve as the substitutes of moral goodness in him; but which therefore mark all the more strongly, by their beneficial operation the goodness of his Maker.*

5. To see how widely these gifts or endowments of our nature by the hand of God, may stand apart from aught like proper goodness or virtue in the heart of man—we have only to witness the similar provision which has been made for the care and preservation of the inferior animals. The anger which arouses to defence against injury, and the fear which prompts to an escape from it, and the maternal affection which nourishes and rears forward the successive young into a condition of strength and independence for the protection of themselves—

Dr. Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments has well remarked that—"though in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind, we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God."

these all have their indispensable uses, for upholding and perpetuating the various tribes of living creatures, who at the same time are alike incapable of morality and reason. There is no *moral* purpose served by these implantations, so far at least as respects the creatures themselves, with whom virtue is a thing utterly incompetent and unattainable. In reference to them, they may be viewed simply as beneficent contrivances, and as bespeaking no other characteristic on the part of the Deity than that of pure kindness, or regard for the happiness and safety, throughout their respective generations, of the creatures whom He has made. This might help us to distinguish between those mental endowments of our own species, which have but for their object the comfort and protection; and those which have for their object the character of man. The former we have in common with the inferior animals; and so far they only discover to us the kindness of the divine nature, or the parental and benevolent concern which God takes in us. The latter are peculiar to our race, and are indicated by certain phenomena of our mental nature, in which the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air have no share with us—by the conscience within us, asserting its own rightful supremacy over all our affections and doings; by our capacities for virtue and vice, along with the pleasures or the pains which are

respectively blended with them; and finally by the operation of habit, whose office, like that of a schoolmaster, is to perfect our education, and to fix, in one way or other, but at length unmoveably, the character of its disciples. These present us with a distinct exhibition of the Deity, or a distinct and additional relation in which He stands to us—revealing to us, not Him only as the affectionate Father, and ourselves only as the fondlings of His regard; but Him also as the great moral Teacher, the Lawgiver, and moral Governor of man, and ourselves in a state of pupillage and probation, or as the subjects of a moral discipline.

6. And here it may be proper to remark, that we understand by the goodness of God, not His benevolence or His kindness alone. The term is comprehensive of all moral excellence. Truth, and justice, and that strong repugnance to moral evil which has received the peculiar denomination of Holiness—these are all good moral properties, and so enter into the composition of perfect moral goodness. There are some who have analyzed, or, in the mere force of their own wishfulness, would resolve the whole character of the Deity into but one attribute—that of a placid undistinguishing tenderness; and, in virtue of this tasteful or sentimental but withal meagre imagination, would they despoil Him of all sovereignty and of all sacredness—holding

Him forth as but the indulgent Father, and not also as the righteous Governor of men. But this analysis is as impracticable in the character of God, as we have already found it to be in the character of man.* Unsophisticated conscience speaks differently. The forebodings of the human spirit in regard to futurity, as well as the present phenomena of human life, point to truth and righteousness, as distinct and stable and independent perfections of the divine nature—however glossed or disguised they may have been, by the patrons of a mild and easy religion. In the various provisions of nature for the defence and security of the inferior animals, we may read but one lesson—the benevolence of its Author. In the like provisions, whether for the defence and prolongation of human life, or the maintenance of human society—we read that lesson too, but other lessons in conjunction with it. For in the larger capacities of man, and more especially in his possession of a moral nature, do we regard him as born for something ulterior and something higher than the passing enjoyments of a brief and ephemeral existence. And so when we witness in the provisions, whether of his animal or mental economy, a subserviency to the protection, or even to the enjoyments of his transition state—we cannot discon-

nect this with subserviency to the remoter objects of that ultimate state whither he is going. In the instinctive fondness of parents, and the affinities of kindness from the fellows of our species, and even the private affections of anger and fear,—we behold so many elements conjoined into what may be termed an apparatus of guardianship; and such an apparatus has been reared by Providence in behalf of every creature that breathes. But in the case of man, with his larger capacities and prospects, the terminating object, even of such an intermediate and temporary apparatus, is not to secure for him, the safety or happiness of the present life. It is to fulfil the period, and subserve the purposes of a moral discipline. For meanwhile character is ripening; and, whether good or bad, settling by the power and operation of habit into a state of inveteracy—and so, as to fix and prepare the disciples of a probationary state for their final destinations. What to the inferior animals are the provisions of a life, are to man the accommodations of a journey. In the one we singly behold the indications of a divine benevolence. With the other, we connect the purposes of a divine administration; and, beside the love and liberality of a Parent, we recognize the designs of a Teacher, and Governor, and Judge.

7. And these special affections, though their present and more conspicuous use be to uphold

the existing economy of life, are not without their influence and their uses in a system of moral discipline. And it is quite obvious, that, ere we can pronounce on the strict and essential virtuousness of any human being, they must be admitted into the reckoning. In estimating the precise moral quality of any beneficence which man may have executed, it is indispensable to know, in how far he was schooled into it at the bidding of principle, and in how far urged forward to it by the impulse of a special affection. To do good to another because he feels that he ought, is an essentially distinct exhibition from doing the same good, by the force of parental love, or of an instinctive and spontaneous compassion—as distinct as the strength of a constitutionally implanted desire is from the sense of a morally incumbent obligation. In as far as I am prompted to the relief of distress, by a movement of natural pity—in so far less is left for virtue to do. In as far as I am restrained from the out-breakings of an anger which tumultuates within, by the dread of a counter-resentment and retaliation from without—in so far virtue has less to resist. It is thus that the special affections may at once lighten the tasks and lessen the temptations of virtue; and, whether in the way of help at one time or of defence at another, may save the very existence of a principle, which in its own unaided frailty,

might, among the rude conflicts of life, have else been overborne. It is perhaps indispensable to the very being of virtue among men, that, by means of the special affections, a certain force of inclination has been superadded to the force of principle—we doubt not, in proportions of highest wisdom, of most exquisite skill and delicacy. But still the strength of the one must be deducted, in computing the real amount and strength of the other; and so the special affections of our nature not only subserve a purpose in time, but are of essential and intimate effect in the processes of our moral preparation, and will eventually tell on the high retributions and judgments of eternity.

8. Man is not a utilitarian either in his propensities or in his principles. When doing what he likes—it is not always, it is not generally, because of its perceived usefulness, that he so likes it. But his inclinations, these properties of his nature, have been so adapted both to the material world and to human society, that a great accompanying or great resulting usefulness, is the effect of that particular constitution which God hath given to him. And when doing what he feels that he ought, it is far from always because of its perceived usefulness, that he so feels. But God hath so formed our mental constitution, and hath so adapted the whole economy of external things to the stable and everlasting

principles of virtue, that; in effect and historical fulfilment, the greatest virtue and the greatest happiness are at one. But the union of these two does not constitute their unity. Virtue is not right, because it is useful; but God hath made it useful, because it is right. He both loves virtue, and wills the happiness of his creatures—this benevolence of will, being itself, not the whole, but one of the brightest moralities in the character of the Godhead. He wills the happiness of man, but wills his virtue more; and accordingly, hath so constructed both the system of humanity, and the system of external nature, that, only through the medium of virtue, can any substantial or lasting happiness be realized. The utilitarians have confounded these two elements, because of the inseparable yet contingent alliance, which a God of virtue hath established between them. The Cosmopolites are for merging all the particular affections into one; and would substitute in their place a general desire for the greatest possible amount of good to others, as the alone guide and impellent of human conduct. And the Utilitarians are for merging all the particular virtues into one; and would substitute in their place the greatest usefulness, as the alone principle to which every question respecting the morality of actions should be referred. The former would do away friendship, and patriotism, and all the

partialities or even instincts of relationship, from the system of human nature. The latter would at least degrade, if not do away, truth and justice from the place which they now hold in the system of Ethics. The desolating effect of such changes on the happiness and security of social life, would exhibit the vast superiority of the existent economy of things, over that speculative economy into which these theorists would transform it; or, in other words, would prove by how mighty an interval, the goodness and the wisdom of God transcended both the goodness and the wisdom of man.

9. The whole of this speculation, if followed out into its just and legitimate consequences, would serve greatly to humble and reduce our estimate of human virtue. Nothing is virtuous, but what is done under a sense of duty; or done, simply and solely because it ought. It is only in as far as this consideration is present to the mind, and is of practical and prevalent operation there—that man can be said to feel virtuously, or to act virtuously. We should not think of affixing this moral characteristic to any performance however beneficial, that is done under the mere impulse of a headlong sensibility, without any sense or any sentiment of a moral obligation. In every good action, that is named good because useful to society, we should subduct or separate all which is due to the force of a spe-

cial affection, that we might precisely ascertain how much or how little remains, which may be due to the force of principle. The inferior animals, destitute though they be of a moral nature and therefore incapable of virtue, share with us in some of the most useful and amiable instincts which belong to humanity; and when we stop to admire the workings of nature's sensibility—whether in the tears that compassion sheds over the miseries of the unfortunate, or in the smiles and endearments which are lavished by a mother upon her infant family, we seldom reflect how little of the real and proper character of virtue is there. We accredit man, as if they were his own principles, with those instincts which the divinity hath implanted within him; and it aggravates the error, or rather the guilt of so perverse a reckoning—that, while we offer this incense to humanity, we forget all the while the hand of Him, by whom it is that humanity is so bountifully gifted and so beauteously adorned

Chapter IX.

Miscellaneous Evidences of virtuous and benevolent Design, in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man.

1. It will be enough, if, after having led the way on a new territory of investigation, we shall select one or two out of the goodly number of instances, as specimens of the richness and fertility of the land. We have already endeavoured to prove, why a number of distinct benefits, even though reducible by analysis into one principle or law, still affords, not a solitary, but a multiple evidence, of the wise and benevolent Creator.* This evidence, in fact, is proportioned to the number, not of efficient but final causes in nature—so that each separate example of a good rendered to humanity, in virtue of its actual constitution, may be regarded as a separate and additional evidence, of its having been formed by an artificer, at once of intelligent device and kind purposes. The reduction of these examples into fewer laws does not extenuate the argument for His goodness; and it may enhance the argument for His wisdom.

* Introductory Chapter. Art. 27, 28, 29.

2. The first instance which occurs to us is that law of affection, by which its intensity or strength is proportioned to the helplessness of its object. It takes a direction downwards; descending, for example, with much greater force from parents to children, than ascending from children to parents back again—save when they lapse again into second infancy, and the duteous devoted attendance by the helpful daughters of a family, throughout the protracted ailments and infirmity of their declining years, instead of an exception, is in truth a confirmation of the law—as much so, as the stronger attraction of a mother's heart towards the youngest of the family; or, more impressive still, her more special and concentrated regard towards her sickly or decrepit or even idiot boy. It is impossible not to recognize in this beautiful determination of nature, the benevolence of nature's God.

3. Such instances could be greatly multiplied; and we invite the future explorers of this untrodden field to the task of collecting them. We hasten to instances of another kind, which we all the more gladly seize upon, as being cases of purest and strictest adaptation, not of the external mental, but of the external material world, to the moral constitution of man.

4. The power of speech is precisely such an adaptation. Whether we regard the organs of utterance and hearing in man, or the aerial

medium by which sounds are conveyed—do we behold a pure subserviency of the material to the mental system of our world. It is true that the great object subserved by it, is the action and reaction between mind and mind—nor can we estimate this object too highly, when we think of the mighty influence of language, both on the moral and intellectual condition of our species. Still it is by means of an elaborate material construction that this pathway has been formed, from one heart and from one understanding to another. And therefore it is, that the faculty of communication by words, with all the power and flexibility which belong to it, by which the countless benefits of human intercourse are secured, and all the stores of sentiment and thought are turned into a common property for the good of mankind, may well be ranked among the highest of the examples that we are now in quest of—it being indeed as illustrious an adaptation as can be named of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man. Of the converse of disembodied spirits we know nothing. But to man cased in materialism, certain material passages or ducts of conveyance, for the interchange of thought and feeling between one mind and another seem indispensable. The exquisite provision which has been made for these, both in the powers of articulation and hearing, as also in that inter-

mediate element, by the pulsations of which, ideas are borne forward, as on so many winged messengers from one intellect to another—bespeaks, and perhaps more impressively than any other phenomena in nature, the contrivance of a supreme artificer, the device and finger of a Deity.*

5. But articulate and arbitrary sound is not the only vehicle, either of meaning or sentiment. There is a natural as well as artificial language, consisting chiefly of expressive tones—though greatly reinforced both by expressive looks and expressive gestures. The voice, by its intonations alone, is a powerful instrument for the propagation of sympathy between man and man; and there is similarity enough between us and the inferior animals, in the natural signs of various of the emotions, as anger and fear and grief and cheerfulness, for the sympathy being extended beyond the limits of our own species, and over a great part of the sentient creation. We learn by experience and association the sig-

* It will at once be seen that the same observations may be extended to written language, and to the fitness of those materials which subserve through its means, the wide and rapid communication of human thoughts. We in truth could have multiplied indefinitely such instances of adaptation as we are now giving—but we judge it better to have confined ourselves throughout the volume, to matters of a more rudimental and general character—leaving the manifold detail and fuller developements of the argument to future labourers in the field.

nificancy of the merely vocal apart from vocables; for almost each shade of meaning, at least each distinct sensibility, has its own appropriate intonation—so that, without catching one syllable of the utterance, we can, from its melody alone, often tell what are the workings of the heart, and even what are the workings of the intellect. It is thus that music, even though altogether apart from words, is so powerfully fitted, both to represent and to awaken the mental processes—insomuch that, without the aid of spoken characters, many a story of deepest interest is most impressively told, many a noble or tender sentiment is most emphatically conveyed by it. It says much for the native and original predominance of virtue—it may be deemed another assertion of its designed pre-eminence in the world, that our best and highest music is that which is charged with loftiest principle, whether it breathes in orisons of sacredness, or is employed to kindle the purposes and to animate the struggles of resolved patriotism; and that never does it fall with more exquisite cadence on the ear of the delighted listener, than when attuned to the home sympathies of nature, it tells in accents of love or pity, of its woes and its wishes for all humanity. The power and expressiveness of music may well be regarded as a most beauteous adaptation of External Nature to the Moral Constitution of Man—for what can be

more adapted to his moral constitution, than that which is so helpful as music eminently is, to his moral culture? Its sweetest sounds are those of kind affection. Its sublimest sounds are those most expressive of moral heroism; or most fitted to solemnize the devotions of the heart, and prompt the aspirations and resolves of exalted piety.

6. A philosophy of taste has been founded on this contemplation; and some have contended that both the beauty and the sublimity of sounds are derived from their association with moral qualities alone. Without affirming that association is the only, or the universal cause, it must at least be admitted to have a very extensive influence over this class of our emotions. If each of the mental affections have its own appropriate intonation; and there be the same or similar intonations given forth, either by the inanimate creation or by the creatures having life which are inferior to man—then, frequent and familiar on every side of him, must be many of those sounds by which human passions are suggested, and the memory of things awakened which are fitted to affect and interest the heart. And thus it is, that, to the ear of a poet, all nature is vocal with sentiment; and he can fancy a genius or residing spirit, in the ocean, or in the tempest, or in the rushing waterfall, or in the

stream whose softer murmurs would lull him to repose—or in the mighty forest, when he hears the general sigh emitted by its innumerable leaves as they rustle in the wind, and from whose fitful changes he seems to catch the import of some deep and mysterious soliloquy. But the imagination will be still more readily excited by the notes and the cries of animals, as when the peopled grove awakens to harmony; or when it is figured, that, amid the amplitudes of savage and solitary nature, the lioness robbed of her whelps, calls forth the echoes of the wilderness—making it to ring with the proclamation of her wrongs. But, without conceiving any such rare or extreme sensibility as this, there is a common, an every-day enjoyment which all have in the sounds of nature; and, as far as sympathy with human emotions is awakened by them, and this forms an ingredient of the pleasure, it affords another fine example, of an adaptation in the external world to the mental constitution of its occupiers.

7. But the same philosophy has been extended to sights as well as sounds. The interchange of mind with mind is not restricted to language. There is an interchange by looks also; and the ever-varying hues of the mind are represented, not by the complexion of the face alone or the composition of its features,

but by the attitude and gestures of the body.* It is thus that human sentiment or passion may come to be expressed by the colour and form and even the motion of visible things; by a kindred physiognomy for all the like emotions on the part of the inferior animals—nay, by a certain countenance or shape in the objects of mute and unconscious nature. It is thus that a moral investment sits on the aspects of the purely material world; and we accordingly speak of the modesty of the violet, the innocence of the lily, the commanding mountain, the smiling landscape. Each material object has its character, as is amply set forth in the beautiful illustrations of Mr. Alison; and so to the poet's eye, the whole panorama of nature is one grand personification, lighted up throughout by consciousness and feeling. This is the reason why in all languages, material images and moral characteristics are so blended and identified. It is the law of association which thus connects the two worlds of sense and

* We may here state that as the air is the medium by which sounds are conveyed—so light may be regarded as standing in the same relation to those natural signs whether of colour gesture or attitude which are addressed to the eye. Much could be said respecting the adaptation of light to the moral constitution of man—arising from the power which the very observation of our fellow-men has in repressing, so long as we are under it, indecency or crime. The works of iniquity are called works of darkness.

of sentiment. Sublimity in the one is the counterpart to moral greatness in the other; and beauty in the one is the counterpart to moral delicacy in the other. Both the graceful and the grand of human character are as effectually embodied in the objects and scenery of nature, as in those immortal forms which have been transmitted by the hand of sculptors to the admiration of distant ages. It is a noble testimony to the righteousness of God, that the moral and the external loveliness are thus harmonized—as well as to the wisdom which has so adapted the moral and the material system to each other, that supreme virtue and supreme beauty are at one.

> "Mind, mind alone, bear witness earth and heaven!
> The living fountain, in itself contains
> Of beauteous and sublime.
> There hand in hand sit paramount the graces;
> There enthroned, celestial Venus with divinest airs
> Invites the soul to never fading joy."
>
> AKENSIDE.

8. And we may here remark a certain neglect of external things and external influences, which, however enlightened or transcendentally rational it may seem, is at variance with truth of principle and sound philosophy. We would instance the undervaluing of the natural signs in eloquence, although their effect

makes all the difference in point of impression and power between spoken and written language—seeing that, superadded to articulate utterance, the eye and the intonations and the gestures also serve as so many signals of conveyance for the transmission of sentiment from one mind to another. It is thus that indifference to manner or even to dress, may be as grievous a dereliction against the real philosophy of social intercourse—as indifference to the attitude and the drapery of figures would be against the philosophy of the fine arts. Both proceed on the forgetfulness of that adaptation, in virtue of which materialism is throughout instinct with principle, and both in its colouring and forms, gives forth the most significant expressions of it. On this ground too we would affirm, both of state ceremonial and professional costume, that neither of them is insignificant; and that he who in the spirit of rash and restless innovation would upset them, as if they were the relics of a gross and barbaric age, may be doing violence not only to the usages of venerable antiquity, but to the still older and more venerable constitution of human nature—weakening in truth the bonds of social union, by dispensing with certain of those influences which the Great Author of our constitution designed for the consolidation and good order of society. This is not accordant

with the philosophy of Butler, who wrote on the "use of externals in matters of religion,"—nor with the philosophy of those who prefer the findings of experience, however irreducible to system they may be, to all the subtleties or simplifications of unsupported theory.*

9. Before quitting this subject, we remark, that it is no proof against the theory which makes taste a derivative from morality, that our emotions of taste may be vivid and powerful, while our principles of morality are so weak as to have no ascendant or governing influence over the conduct. This is no unusual phenomenon of our mysterious nature. There is a general homage rendered to virtue in the world; but it is the homage, more of a dilettanti than of an obedient and practical devotee. This is not more surprising, than that the man of profligate habits should have a tasteful admiration of sacred pictures and sacred melodies; or that, with the heart of a coward, he should nevertheless catch the glow of at least a momentary inspiration from the music of war and patriotism. It seems the effect and evidence of some great moral derangement, that there

* The perusal of those works which treat scientifically of the fine arts, as Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, is well adapted to rebuke and rectify the light estimation, in which all sensible accompaniments are apt to be held by us.

should be such an incongruity in subjective man between his taste and his principles; and the evidence is not lessened but confirmed, when we observe a like incongruity in the objective nature by which he is surrounded—we mean, between the external mental and the external material world. We have only to open our eyes and see how wide, in point of loveliness, the contrast or dissimilarity is, between the moral and the material of our actual contemplation—the one coming immediately from the hand of God; the other tainted and transformed by the spirit of man. We believe with Alison and others, that, to at least a very great extent, much of the beauty of visible things lies in association; that it is this which gives its reigning expression to every tree and lake and waterfall, and which may be said to have impregnated with character the whole of the surrounding landscape. How comes it then, that, in the midst of living society, where we might expect to meet with the originals of all this fascination, we find scarcely any other thing than a tame and uninteresting level of the flat and the sordid and the ordinary—whereas, in that inanimate scenery, which yields but the faint and secondary reflection of moral qualities, there is, on every line and on every feature, so vivid an impress of loveliness and glory? One cannot go forth of the crowded

city to the fresh and the fair of rural nature, without the experience, that, while in the moral scene, there is so much to thwart and to revolt and to irritate—in the natural scene, all is gracefulness and harmony. It reminds us of the contrast which is sometimes exhibited, between the soft and flowery lawn of a cultivated domain, and the dark or angry spirit of its owner—of whom we might almost imagine, that he scowls from the battlements of his castle, on the intrusion of every unlicensed visitor. And again the question may be put—whence is it that the moral picturesque in our world of sense, as it beams upon us from its woods and its eminencies and its sweet recesses of crystal stream or of grassy sunshine, should yield a delight so unqualified—while the primary moral characteristics, of which these are but the imagery or the visible representation, should, in our world of human spirits, be so wholly obliterated, or at least so wofully deformed? Does it not look as if a blight had come over the face of our terrestrial creation, which hath left its materialism in a great measure untouched, while it hath inflicted on man a sore and withering leprosy? Do not the very openness and benignity which sit on the aspect of nature reproach him, for the cold and narrow and creeping jealousies that be at work in his own selfish and suspicious bosom; and most

impressively tell the difference between what man is, and what he ought to be?

10. There are certain other adaptations; but on which we forbear to expatiate.* Some of them indeed border on a territory distinct from our own, if they do not altogether belong to it. The relation between food and hunger, between the object and the appetite, is an instance of the adaptation between external nature and man's physical constitution—yet the periodical recurrence of the appetite itself, with its imperious demand to be satisfied, viewed as an impellent to labour even the most irksome and severe, has an important effect both on the moral constitution of the individual and on the

* It must be obvious that we cannot exhaust the subject, but only *exemplify* it, by means of a few specimens. There is an adaptation, which, had it occurred in time, might have been stated in the text—suggested by the celebrated question respecting the liberty of the human will. We cannot but admit how much it would have deteriorated the constitution of humanity, or rather destroyed one of its noblest and most essential parts, had it been so constructed, as that either man was not accountable for his own actions, or that these actions were free in the sense contended for by one of the parties in the controversy—that is, were so many random contingencies which had no parentage in any events or influences that went before them, or occupied no place in a train of causation. Of the reasoners on the opposite sides of this sorely agitated question—the one contending for the moral liberty, and the other for the physical necessity of human actions—it is clear that there are many who hold the one to be destructive of the other. But what the wisdom of man cannot argumentatively harmonize in the world of speculation, the power

state of society. The superfices of the human body, in having been made so exquisitely alive at every pore to the sensations of pain, may be regarded as nature's defensive covering against those exposures from without, which else might injure or destroy it. This is purely a physical adaptation, but it involves a moral adaptation also; for this shrinking and sensitive avoidance, at the first approaches of pain, affords a similar protection against certain hazards from within—as self-mutilation in the moment of the spirit's wantonness, or even self-destruction in the moment of its despair. But, without enlarging further on specific instances, we shall now advert to one subject, furnished by the history of moral science; and replete, we have long

and wisdom of God, have executively harmonized in the world of realities—so that man, on the one hand, irresistibly feels himself to be an accountable creature; and yet, on the other, his doings are as much the subject of calculation and of a philosophy, as many of those classes of phenomena in the material world, which, fixed and certain in themselves, are only uncertain to us, not because of their contingency but because of their complication. We are not sure if the evolutions of the will are more beyond the reach of prediction than the evolutions of the weather. It is this union of the moral character with the historical certainty of our volitions, which has proved so puzzling, to many of our controversialists; but in proportion to the difficulty felt by us in the adjustment of these two elements, should be our admiration of that profound and exquisite skill which has mastered the apparent incongruity—so that while every voluntary action of man is, in point of reckoning, the subject of a moral, it is, in point of result, no less the subject of a physical law.

thought, with the materials of a very strong and comprehensive argument.

11. We have already adverted to the objective nature of virtue, and the subjective nature of man, as forming two wholly distinct objects of contemplation. It is the latter and not the former which indicates the moral character of God. The mere system of ethical doctrine is no more fitted to supply an argument for this character, than would the system of geometry. It is not geometry in the abstract, but geometry as embodied in the Heavens, or in the exquisite structures of the terrestrial physics—which bespeaks the skill of the artificer who framed them. In like manner it is not moral science in the abstract—but the moral constitution of beings so circumstanced and so made, that virtue is the only element in which their permanent individual or social happiness can be realized, which bespeaks the great Parent of the human family to be Himself the lover and the exemplar of righteousness. In a word, it is not from an abstraction, but from the facts of a creation, that our lesson respecting the divine character, itself a fact, is to be learned; and it is by keeping this distinction in view, that we obtain one important help for drawing from the very conflict and diversity of moral theories on the nature of virtue, a clear, nay a cumulative argument for the virtuous nature of the Godhead.

12. The painful suspicion is apt to intrude upon us, that virtue may not be a thing of any substance or stability at all—when we witness the confusion and the controversy into which moralists have fallen, on the subject of its elementary principles. But, to allay this feeling, it should be observed, in the first place, that, with all the perplexity which obtains on the question of what virtue, in the abstract or in its own essential and constituting quality, is—there is a pretty general agreement among moralists, as to what the separate and specific virtues of the human character are. According to the selfish system, temperance may be a virtue, because of its subservience to the good of the individual; while by the system of utility it is a virtue, because through its observation, our powers and services are kept entire for the good of society. But again, beside this controversy which relates to the nature of virtue in itself, and which may be termed the objective question in morals—there is a subjective or an organic question which relates, not to the existence, but to the origin and formation of the notion or feeling of virtue in the human mind. The question, for example, whether virtue be a thing of opinion or a thing of sentiment, belongs to this class. Now, in regard to all those questions which respect the origin or the pedigree of our moral judgments, it should not be forgotten,

that, while the controvertists are at issue upon this, they are nearly unanimous, as to morality itself being felt by the mind as a matter of supreme obligation. They dispute about the moral sense in man, or about the origin and constitution of the court of conscience; but they have no dispute about the supreme authority of conscience—even as, in questions of civil polity and legislation, there may be no dispute about the rightful authority of some certain court, while there may be antiquarian doubts and differences on the subject of its origin and formation. Dr. Smith, for example, while he has his own peculiar views on the origin of our moral principles, never questions their authority. He differs from others, in regard to the rationale, or the anterior steps of that process, which at length terminates in a decision of the mind, on the merit or demerit of a particular action. The rightness and the supremacy of that decision are not in the least doubted by him. There may be a metaphysical controversy about the mode of arriving at our moral judgment, and at the same time a perfect concurrence in it as the guide and the regulator of human conduct—just as there may be an anatomical controversy about the structure of the eye or the terminations of the optic nerve, and a perfect confidence with all parties, in the correctness of those intimations which the eye gives, of the position of external

objects and their visible properties. By attending to this we obtain a second important help for eliciting from the diversity of theories on the nature of virtue, a cumulative argument for the virtuous nature of the Godhead.

13. When the conflict then of its opposing theories, would seem to bring fearful insecurity on moral science, let it not be forgotten, that the very multitude of props and securities, by which virtue is upholden, is that which has given rise to the conflict. There is little or no scepticism, in regard to the worth or substantive being of morality, but chiefly in regard to its sustaining principle; and it is because of so much to sustain it, or of the many distinct and firm props which it rests upon, that there has been such an amount of ethical controversy in the world. There has been many a combat, and many a combatant—not because of the baselessness of morality, but because it rests on a basis of so many goodly pillars, and because of such a varied convenience and beauty in the elevation of the noble fabric. The reason of so much controversy is, that each puny controversialist, wedded to his own exclusive view of an edifice too mighty and majestic for his grasp, has either selected but one of the upholding props, and affirmed it to be the only support of the architecture; or attended to but one of its graces and utilities, and affirmed it to be the alone pur-

pose of the magnificent building. The argument of each, whether on the foundation of virtue or on its nature, when beheld aright, will be found a distinct trophy to its worth—for each can plead some undoubted excellence or good effect of virtue in behalf of his own theory. Each may have so magnified the property which himself had selected—as that those properties of virtue which others had selected, were thrown into the shade, or at most but admitted as humble attendants, in the retinue of his own great principle. And so the controversy is not, whether morality be a solidly constituted fabric; but what that is which constitutes its solidity, and which should be singled out as the keystone of the fabric. Each of the champions in this warfare has fastened on a different keystone; and each pushes the triumph against his adversary by a demonstration of its firmness. Or in other words, virtue is compassed about with such a number of securities, and possesses such a superabundance of strength, as to have given room for the question that was raised about Samson of old—what that is, wherein its great strength lies. It is like the controversy which sometimes arises about a building of perfect symmetry—when sides are taken, and counter-explanations are advanced and argued, about the one characteristic or constituting charm, which hath conferred upon it so much gracefulness. It is even

so of morality. Each partisan hath advocated his own system; and each, in doing so, hath more fully exhibited some distinct property or perfection of moral rectitude. Morality is not neutralized by this conflict of testimonies; but rises in statelier pride, and with augmented security, from the foam and the turbulence which play around its base. To her, this conflict yields, not a balance, but a summation of testimonies; and, instead of an impaired, it is a cumulative argument, that may be reared out of the manifold controversies to which she has given rise. For when it is asserted by one party in the strife, that the foundation of all morality is the right of God to the obedience of his creatures—let God's absolute right be fully conceded to them. And when others reply, that, apart from such right, there is a native and essential rightness in morality, let this be conceded also. There is indeed such a rightness, which, anterior to law, hath had everlasting residence in the character of the Godhead; and which prompted him to a law, all whose enactments bear the impress of purest morality. And when the advocates of the selfish system affirm, that the good of self is the sole aim and principle of virtue; while we refuse their theory, let us at least admit the fact to which all its plausibility is owing—that nought conduces more surely to happiness, than the strict observation of all the recognised moralities

of human conduct. And when a fourth party affirms that nought but the useful is virtuous; and, in support of their theory, can state the unvarying tendencies of virtue in the world towards the highest good of the human family—let it forthwith be granted, that the same God, who blends in his own person both the rightness of morality and the right of law, that He hath so devised the economy of things and so directs its processes, as to make peace and prosperity follow in the train of righteousness. And when the position that virtue is its own reward, is cast as another dogma into the whirlpool of debate, let it be fondly allowed, that the God, who delights in moral excellence himself, hath made it the direct minister of enjoyment to him, who, formed after his own image, delights in it also. And when others, expatiating on the beauty of virtue, would almost rank it among the objects of taste rather than of principle—let this be followed up by the kindred testimony, that, in all its exhibitions, there is indeed a supreme gracefulness; and that God, rich and varied in all the attestations which He has given of His regard to it, hath so endowed His creatures, that, in moral worth, they have the beatitudes of taste as well as the beatitudes of conscience. And should there be philosophers who say of morality that it is wholly founded upon the emotions—let it at least be granted, that He whose hand did frame

our internal mechanism, has attuned it in the most correct and delicate respondency, with all the moralities of which human nature is capable. And should there be other philosophers who affirm that morality hath a real and substantive existence in the nature of things, so as to make it as much an object of judgment distinct from him who judges, as are the eternal and immutable truths of geometry —let it with gratitude be acknowledged that the mind is so constituted as to have the same firm hold of the moral which it has of the mathematical relations; and if this prove nothing else, it at least proves, that the Author of our constitution hath stamped there, a clear and legible impress on the side of virtue We should not exclude from this argument even the degrading systems of Hobbes and Mandeville; the former representing virtue as the creation of human policy, and the latter representing its sole principle to be the love of human praise—for even they tell thus much, the one that virtue is linked with the well-being of the community, the other that it has an echo in every bosom. We would not dissever all these testimonies; but bind them together into the sum and strength of a cumulative argument. The controversialists have lost themselves, but it is in a wilderness of sweets—out of which the materials might be gathered, of such an incense at

the shrine of morality, as should be altogether overpowering. Each party hath selected but one of its claims; and, in the anxiety to exalt it, would shed a comparative obscurity over all the rest. This is the contest between them—not whether morality be destitute of claims; but what, out of the number that she possesses, is the great and pre-eminent claim on which man should do her homage. Their controversy perhaps never may be settled; but to make the cause of virtue suffer on this account, would be to make it suffer from the very force and abundance of its recommendations.

14. But this contemplation is pregnant with another inference, beside the worth of virtue—even the righteous character of Him, who, for the sake of upholding it hath brought such a number of contingencies together. When we look to the systems of utility and selfishness, let us look upwardly to Him, through whose ordination alone it is, that virtue hath such power to prosper the arrangements of life and of society. Or when told of the principle that virtue is its own reward, let us not forget Him, who so constituted our moral nature, as to give the feeling of an exquisite charm, both in the possession of virtue and in the contemplation of it. Or when the theory of a moral sense offers itself to our regards, let us bear regard along with it to that God, who constructed this organ of the inner

man, and endowed it with all its perceptions and all its feelings. In the utility wherewith He hath followed up the various observations of moral rectitude; in the exquisite relish which He hath infused into the rectitude itself; in the law of conformity thereto which He hath written on the hearts of all men; in the aspect of eternal and unchangeable fitness, under which He hath made it manifest to every conscience—in these, we behold the elements of many a controversy, on the nature of virtue; but in these, when viewed aright, we also behold a glorious harmony of attestations to the nature of God. It is thus that the perplexities of the question, when virtue is looked to as but a thing of earthly residence, are all done away, when we carry the speculation upward to heaven. They find solution there; and cast a radiance over the character of Him who hath not only established in righteousness His throne, but, by means of a rich and varied adaptation, hath profusely shed over the universe that He hath formed, the graces by which He would adorn, and the beatitudes by which He would reward it.

15. Although the establishment of a moral theory is not now our proper concern, we may nevertheless take the opportunity of expressing our dissent from the system of those, who would resolve virtue, not into any native or independent rightness of its own, but unto the will of

Him who has a right to all our services. Without disparagement to the Supreme Being, it is not His law which constitutes virtue; but, far higher homage both to Him and to His law, the law derives all its authority and its being from a virtue of anterior residence in the character of the Divinity. It is not by the authority of any law over Him, that truth and justice and goodness and all the other perfections of supreme moral excellence, have, in His person, had their everlasting residence. He had a nature, before that He uttered it forth into a law. Previous to creation, there existed in His mind, all those conceptions of the great and the graceful, which He hath embodied into a gorgeous universe; and of which every rude sublimity of the wilderness, or every fair and smiling landscape, gives such vivid representation. And in like manner, previous to all government, there existed in His mind, those principles of righteousness, which afterwards, with the right of an absolute sovereign, He proclaimed into a law. Those virtues of which we now read on a tablet of jurisprudence were all transcribed and taken off from the previous tablet of the divine character. The law is but a reflection of this character. In the fashioning of this law, He pictured forth Himself; and we, in the act of observing His law, are only conforming ourselves to His likeness. It is there that we are to look for the

primeval seat of moral goodness. Or, in other words, virtue has an inherent character of her own—apart from law, and anterior to all jurisdiction.

16. Yet the right of God to command, and the rightness of His commandments, are distinct elements of thought, and should not be merged into one another. We should not lose sight of the individuality of each, nor identify these two things—because, instead of antagonists, they do in fact stand side by side, and act together in friendly cooperation. Because two influences are conjoined in agency, that is no reason why they should be confounded in thought. Their union does not constitute their unity—and though, in the conscience of man, there be an approbation of all rectitude; and all rectitude, be an obligation laid upon the conduct of man by the divine law—yet still, the approbation of man's moral nature is one thing, and the obligation of God's authority is another.

17. That there is an approval of rectitude, apart from all legal sanctions and legal obligations, there is eternal and unchangeable demonstration in the character of God Himself. He is under no law, and owns the authority of no superior. It is not by the force of sanctions, but by the force of sentiments that the divinity is moved. Morality with Him is not of prescription, but of spontaneous principle alone; and

He acts virtuously, not because He is bidden; but because virtue hath its inherent and eternal residence in His own nature. Instead of deriving morality from law, we should derive law, even the law of God, from the primeval morality of His own character; and so far from looking upwardly to His law as the fountain of morality, do we hold it to be the emanation from a higher fountain that is seated in the depths of His unchangeable essence, and is eternal as the nature of the Godhead.

18. The moral hath antecedency over the juridical, God acts righteously, not because of jurisdiction by another, but because of a primary and independent justice in Himself. It was not law which originated the moralities of the divine character; but these moralities are self-existent and eternal as is the being of the Godhead. The virtues had all their dwelling-place in the constitution of the Divinity—ere He stamped the impress of them on a tablet of jurisprudence. There was an inherent, before there was a preceptive morality; and righteousness, and goodness, and truth, which all are imperative enactments of law, were all prior characteristics, in the underived and uncreated excellence of the Lawgiver.

Chapter X.

On the Capacities of the World for making a virtuous Species happy; and the Argument deducible from this, both for the Character of God, and the Immortality of Man.

1. We have already stated the distinction, between the theology of those, who would make the divine goodness consist of all moral excellence; and of those, who would make it consist of benevolence alone. Attempts have been made to simplify the science of morals, by the reduction of its various duties or obligations into one element—as when it is alleged, that the virtuousness of every separate morality is reducible into benevolence, which is regarded as the central, or as the great master and generic virtue that is comprehensive of them all. There is a theoretic beauty in this imagination—yet it cannot be satisfactorily established, by all our powers of moral or mental analysis. We cannot rid ourselves of the obstinate impression, that there is a distinct and native virtuousness, both in truth and in justice, apart from their subserviency to the good of men; and accordingly, in the ethical systems of all our most orthodox ex-

pounders, they are done separate homage to—as virtues standing forth in their own independent character, and having their own independent claims both on the reverence and observation of mankind. Now, akin with this attempt to generalize the whole of virtue into one single morality, is the attempt to generalize the character of God into one single moral perfection. Truth and justice have been exposed to the same treatment, in the one contemplation as in the other—that is, regarded more as derivatives from the higher characteristic of benevolence, than as distinct and primary characteristics themselves. The love of philosophic simplicity may have led to this in the abstract or moral question; but something more has operated in the theological question. It falls in with a still more urgent affection than the taste of man; it falls in with his hope and his sense of personal interest, that the truth and justice of the Divinity should be removed, as it were, to the back-ground of his perspective. And accordingly, this inclination to soften, if not to suppress, the sterner perfections of righteousness and holiness, appears, not merely in the pleasing and poetic effusions of the sentimental, but also in the didactic expositions of the academic theism. It is thus that Paley, so full and effective, and able in his demonstrations of the natural, is yet so meagre in his demonstration of the moral attributes. It is, in truth, the general

defect, not of natural theology in itself—but of natural theology, as set forth at the termination of ethical courses, or as expounded in the schools. In this respect, the natural theology of the heart, is at variance, with the natural theology of our popular and prevailing literature. The one takes its lesson direct from conscience, which depones to the authority of truth and justice, as distinct from benevolence; and carries this lesson upwards, from that tablet of virtue which it reads on the nature of man below, to that higher tablet upon which it reads the character of God above. The other again, of more lax and adventurous speculation, would fain amalgamate all the qualities of the Godhead into one; and would make that one the beautiful and undistinguishing quality of tenderness. It would sink the venerable or the awful into the lovely; and to this it is prompted, not merely for the sake of theoretic simplicity—but in order to quell the alarms of nature, the dread and the disturbance which sinners feel, when they look to their sovereign in heaven, as a God of judgment and of unspotted holiness. Nevertheless the same conscience which tells what is sound in ethics, is ever and anon suggesting what is sound in theology—that we have to do with a God of truth, that we have to do with a God of righteousness; and this lesson is never perhaps obliterated in any breast, by the imagery, however pleasing, of a universal parent, throned in soft and smiling radiance, and

whose supreme delight is to scatter beatitudes innumerable through a universal family. We cannot forget, although we would, that justice and judgment are the habitation of His throne; and that His dwelling-place is not a mere blissful elysium or paradise of sweets, but an august and inviolable sanctuary. It is an elysium, but only to the spirits of the holy; and this sacredness, we repeat, is immediately forced upon the consciousness of every bosom, by the moral sense which is within it—however fearful a topic it may be of recoil to the sinner, and of *reticence* in the demonstrations of philosophy. The sense of heaven's sacredness is not a superstitious fear. It is the instant suggestion of our moral nature. What conscience apprehends virtue to be in itself, that also it will apprehend virtue to be in the Author of conscience; and if truth and justice be constituent elements in the one, these it will regard as constituent elements in the other also. It is by learning direct of God from the phenomena of human conscience; or taking what it tells us to be virtues in themselves, for the very virtues of the Godhead, realized in actual and living exemplification upon His character—it is thus that we escape from the illusion of poetical religionists, who, in the incense which they offer to the benign virtues of the parent, are so apt to overlook the virtues of the Lawgiver and Judge.

2. When we take this fuller view of God's moral nature—when we make account of the righteousness as well as the benevolence—when we yield to the suggestion of our own hearts, that to Him belongs the sovereign state, and, if needful, the severity of the lawgiver, as well as the fond affection of the parent—when we assign to Him the character, which, instead of but one virtue, is comprehensive of them all—we are then on firmer vantage-ground for the establishment of a Natural Theology, in harmony, both with the lessons of conscience, and with the phenomena of the external world. Many of our academic theists have greatly crippled their argument, by confining themselves to but one feature in the character of the Divinity—as if His only wish in reference to the creatures that He had made, was a wish for their happiness; or as if, instead of the subjects of a righteous and moral government, they were but the nurslings of His tenderness. They have exiled and put forth every thing like jurisprudence from the relation in which God stands to man; and by giving the foremost place in their demonstrations to the mere beneficence of the Deity, they have made the difficulties of the subject far more perplexing and unresolvable than they needed to have been. For with benevolence alone we cannot even extenuate and much less extricate ourselves, from the puzzling difficulty of

those physical sufferings to which the sentient creation, as far as our acquaintance extends with it, is universally liable. It is only by admitting the sanctities along with what may be termed the humanities of the divine character, that this enigma can be at all alleviated. Whereas, if, apart from the equities of a moral government, we look to God in no other light, than mere tasteful and sentimental religionists do, or as but a benign and indulgent Father whose sole delight is the happiness of His family—there are certain stubborn anomalies which stand in the way of this frail imagination, and would render the whole subject a hopeless and utterly intractable mystery.

3. A specimen of the weakness which attaches to the system of Natural Theology, when the infinite benevolence of the Deity is the only element which it will admit into its explanations and its reasonings, is the manner in which its advocates labour to dispose of the numerous ills, wherewith the world is infested. They have recourse to arithmetic—balancing the phenomena on each side of the question, as they would the columns of a ledger. They institute respective summations of the good and the evil; and by the preponderance of the former over the latter, hold the difficulty to be resolved. The computation is neither a sure nor an easy one; but even under the admission of its justness, it

remains an impracticable puzzle—why under a Being of infinite power and infinite benevolence, there should be suffering at all. This is an enigma which the single attribute of benevolence cannot un-riddle, or rather the very enigma which it has created—nor shall we even approximate to the solution of it, without the aid of other attributes to help the explanation.

4. It is under the pressure of these difficulties that refuge is taken in the imagination of a future state—where it is assumed that all the disorders of the present scene are to be repaired, and full compensation made for the sufferings of our earthly existence. It is affirmed, that although the body dies the soul is unperishable, and, after it hath burst its unfettered way from the prison-house of its earthly tabernacle, that it will expatiate for ever in the full buoyancy and delight of its then emancipated energies—that, even as from the lacerated shell of the inert chrysalis the winged insect rises in all the pride of its now expanded beauty among the fields of light and ether which are above it, so the human spirit finds its way through the opening made by death upon its corporeal framework among the glories of the upper Elysium. It is this immortality which is supposed to unriddle all the difficulties that attach to our present condition; which converts the evil that is in the world, into the instrument

of a greatly over-passing good; and affords a scene for the imagination to rest upon, where all the anomalies which now exercise us shall be rectified, and where, from the larger prospects we shall then have of the whole march and destiny of man, the ways of God to His creatures shall appear in all the lustre of their full and noble vindication.

5. But as the superiority of the happiness over the misery of the world, affords insufficient premises on which to conclude the benevolence of God, *so long as God is conceived of under the partial view of possessing but this as his alone moral attribute*—when that benevolence is employed as the argument for some ulterior doctrine in Natural Theology, it must impart to this latter the same inconclusiveness by which itself is characterized. The proof and the thing proved must be alike strong or alike weak. If the excess of enjoyment over suffering in the life that now is, be a matter of far too doubtful calculation, on which to rest a confident inference in favour of the divine benevolence; then, let this benevolence have no other prop to lean upon, and in its turn, it is far too doubtful a premise, on which to infer a coming immortality. Accordingly, to help out the argument, many of our slender and sentimental theists, who will admit of no other moral attribute for the divinity, than the paternal attribute of kind

affection for the creatures who have sprung from Him do, in fact, assume the thing to be proved, and reason in a circle. The mere balance of the pleasures and pains of the present life, is greatly too uncertain, for what may be called an initial footing to this argument. But let a future life be assumed, in which all the defects and disorders of the present are to be repaired; and this may reconcile the doctrine of the benevolence of God, with the otherwise stumbling fact of the great actual wretchedness that is now in the world. Out of the observed phenomena of life and an assumed immortality together, a tolerable argument may be raised for this most pleasing and amiable of all the moral characteristics; but it is obvious that the doctrine of immortality enters into the premises of this first argument. But how is the immortality itself proved? not by the phenomena of life alone, but by these phenomena taken in conjunction with the divine benevolence—which benevolence, therefore, enters into the premise of the second argument. In the one argument, the doctrine of immortality is required to prove the benevolence of God. In the other, this benevolence is required to prove the immortality. Each is used as an assumption for the establishment of the other; and this nullifies the reasoning for both. Either of these terms—that is, the divine bene-

volence, or a future state of compensation for the evils and inequalities of the present one—either of them, if admitted, may be held a very sufficient, or, at least, likely consideration on which to rest the other. But it makes very bad reasoning to vibrate between both—first to go forth with the assumption that God is benevolent, and therefore it is impossible that a scene so dark and disordered as that immediately before us can offer to our contemplation the full and final devolopement of all his designs for the human family; and then, feeling that this scene does not afford a sufficient basis on which to rest the demonstration of this attribute, to strengthen the basis and make it broader by the assertion, that it is not from a part of His ways, but from their complete and comprehensive whole, as made up both of time and eternity, that we draw the inference of a benevolent Deity. There is no march of argument. We swing as it were between two assumptions. It is like one of those cases in geometry, which remains indeterminate for the want of data. And the only effectual method of being extricated from such an ambiguity, would be the satisfactory assurance either of a benevolence independent of all considerations of immortality, or of an immortality independent of all the considerations of the benevolence.

6. But then it should be recollected that it is

the partiality of our contemplation, and it alone which incapacitates this whole argument. There is a sickly religion of taste which clings exclusively to the parental benevolence of God; and will not, cannot, brave the contemplation of His righteousness. It is this which makes the reasoning as feeble, as the sentiment is flimsy. It, in fact, leaves the system of natural theology without a ground-work—first to argue for immortality on the doubtful assumption of a supreme benevolence, and then to argue this immortality in proof of the benevolence. The whole fabric, bereft of argument and strength, is ready to sink under the weight of unresolved difficulties. The mere benevolence of the Deity is not so obviously or decisively the lesson of surrounding phenomena, as, of itself, to be the foundation of a solid inference regarding either the character of God or the prospects of man. If we would receive the full lesson—if we would learn all which these phenomena, when rightly and attentively regarded, are capable of teaching—if along with the present indications of a benevolence, we take the present indications of a righteousness in God—out of these blended characteristics, we should have materials for an argument of firmer texture. It is to the leaving out of certain data, even though placed within the reach of observation, that the infirmity of the argument is

owing—whereas, did we employ aright all the data in our possession, we might incorporate them together into the solid ground-work of a solid reasoning. It is by our sensitive avoidance of certain parts in this contemplation, that we enfeeble the cause. We should find a stable basis in existing appearances, did we give them a fair and full interpretation—as indicating not only the benevolence of God, but, both by the course of nature and the laws of man's moral economy, indicating His love of righteousness and hatred of iniquity. It might not resolve, but it would alleviate the mystery of things, could we within the sphere of actual observation, collect notices, not merely of a God who rejoiced in the physical happiness of His creatures, but of a God who had respect unto their virtue. Now the great evidence for this latter characteristic of the Divinity, lies near at hand—even among the intimacies of our own felt and familiar nature. It is not fetched by imagination from a distance, for every man has it within himself. The supremacy of conscience is a fact or phenomenon of man's moral constitution; and from this law of the heart, we pass, by direct and legitimate inference, to the character of Him who established it there. In a law, we read the character of the law-giver; and this, whether it be a felt or a written law. We learn from the pheno-

mena of conscience, that, however God may will the happiness of his creatures, His paramount and peremptory demand is for their virtue. He is the moral governor of a kingdom, as well as the father of a family; and it is a partial view that we take of Him, unless, along with the kindness which belongs to Him as a parent, we have respect unto that authority which belongs to Him as a sovereign and a judge. We have direct intimation of this in our own bosoms, in the constant assertion which is made there on the side of virtue, in the discomfort and remorse which attend its violation.

7. But though conscience be our original and chief instructor in the righteousness of God, the same lesson may be learned in another way. It may be gathered from the phenomena of human life—even those very phenomena, which so perplex the mind, so long as in quest of but one attribute and refusing to admit the evidence or even entertain the notion of any other,—it cherishes a partial and prejudiced view of the Deity. Those theists, who, in this spirit, have attempted to strike a balance between the pleasures and the pains of sentient nature, and to ground thereupon the very doubtful inference of the divine benevolence—seldom or never think of connecting these pleasures and pains with the moral causes, which, whether proximately or remotely,

go before them. Without adverting to these, they rest their conclusion on the affirmed superiority, however ill or uncertainly made out, of the physical enjoyments over the physical sufferings of life. Now we hold it of capital importance in this argument, that, in our own species at least, both these enjoyments and these sufferings are mainly resolvable into moral causes—insomuch that, in the vast majority of cases, the deviation from happiness, can be traced to an anterior deviation from virtue; and that, apart from death and accident and unavoidable disease, the wretchedness of humanity is due to a vicious and ill-regulated *morale*. When we thus look to the ills of life in their immediate origin, though it may not altogether dissipate, it goes far to reduce, and even to explain the mystery of their existence. Those evils which vex and agitate man, emanate, in the great amount of them, from the fountain of his own heart; and come forth, not of a distempered material, but of a distempered moral economy. Were each separate infelicity referred to its distinct source, we should, generally speaking, arrive at some moral perversity, whether of the affections or of the temper —so that but for the one, the other would not have been realized. It is true, that, perhaps in every instance, some external cause may be assigned, for any felt annoyance to which our nature is liable; but then, it is a cause without,

operating on a sensibility within. So that in all computations, whether of suffering or of enjoyment, the state of the subjective or recipient mind must be taken into account, as well as the influences which play upon it from the surrounding world; and what we affirm is, that, to a rightly conditioned mind, the misery would be reduced and the happiness augmented tenfold. When disappointment agonizes the heart; or a very slight, perhaps unintentional neglect, lights up in many a soul the fierceness of resentment; or coldness, and disdain, and the mutual glances of contempt and hatred, circulate a prodigious mass of infelicity through the world—these are to be ascribed, not to the untowardness of outward circumstances, but to the untowardness of man's own constitution, and are the fruits of a disordered spiritual system. And the same may be said of the poverty which springs from indolence or dissipation; of the disgrace which comes on the back of misconduct; of the pain or uneasiness which festers in every heart that is the prey, whether of licentious or malignant passions: in short, of the general restlessness and unhingement of every spirit, which, thrown adrift from the restraints of principle, has no well-spring of satisfaction in itself, but precariously vacillates, in regard to happiness, with the hazard and the casual fluctuation of outward things. There are, it is true, sufferings purely physical, which belong to the sentient and not to the moral

nature—as the maladies of infant disease, and the accidental inflictions wherewith the material frame is sometimes agonized. Still it will be found, that the vast amount of human wretchedness, can be directly referred to the waywardness and morbid state of the human will—to the character of man, and not to the condition which he occupies.

8. Now what is the legitimate argument for the character of God, not from the mere existence of misery, but from the existence of misery thus originated? Wretchedness, of itself, were fitted to cast an uncertainty, even a suspicion, on the benevolence of God. But wretchedness as the result of wickedness, may not indicate the negation of this one attribute. It may only indicate the reality or the presence of another. Suffering without a cause and without an object, may be the infliction of a malignant being. But suffering in alliance with sin, should lead to a very different conclusion. When thus related it may cast no impeachment on the benevolence, and only bespeak the righteousness of God. It tells us that however much He may love the happiness of His creatures, He loves their virtue more. So that, instead of extinguishing the evidence of one perfection, it may leave this evidence entire, and bring out into open manifestation another perfection of the Godhead.

9. In attempting to form our estimate of the divine character from the existing phenomena, the fair proceeding would be, not to found it on the actual miseries which abound in the world, peopled with a depraved species—but on the fitnesses which abound in the world, to make a virtuous species happy. We should try to figure its result on human life, were perfect virtue to revisit earth, and take up its abode in every family. The question is, are we so constructed and so accommodated, that, in the vast majority of cases we, if morally right, should be physically happy. What, we should ask, is the real tendency of nature's laws—whether to minister enjoyment to the good or the evil? It were a very strong, almost an unequivocal testimony to the righteousness of Him, who framed the system of things and all its adaptations—if, while it secured a general harmony between the virtue of mankind and their happiness or peace, it as constantly impeded either the prosperity or the heart's ease of the profligate and the lawless. Now of this we might be informed by an actual survey of human life. We can justly imagine the consequences upon human society—were perfect uprightness and sympathy and goodwill to obtain universally; were every man to look to his fellow with a brother's eye; were a universal courteousness to reign in our streets and our houses and our market-places, and this

to be the spontaneous emanation of a universal cordiality; were each man's interest and reputation as safe in the custody of another, as he now strives to make them by a jealous guardianship of his own; were, on the one hand, a prompt and eager benevolence on the part of the rich, ever on the watch to meet, nay, to overpass all the wants of humanity, and, on the other hand, an honest moderation and independence on the part of the poor, to be a full defence for their superiors against the encroachments of deceit and rapacity; were liberality to walk diffusively abroad among men, and love to settle pure and unruffled in the bosom of families; were that moral sunshine to arise in every heart, which purity and innocence and kind affection are ever sure to kindle there; and, even when some visitation from without was in painful dissonance with the harmony within, were a thousand sweets ready to be poured into the cup of tribulation from the feeling and the friendship of all the good who were around us—on this single transition from vice to virtue among men, does there not hinge the alternative between a pandæmonium and a paradise? If the moral elements were in place and operation amongst us, should we still continue to fester and be unhappy from the want of the physical? Or, is it not rather true, that all nature smiles in beauty, or wantons in bounteousness for our enjoyment

—were but the disease of our spirits medicated, were there but moral soundness in the heart of man?

10. And what must be the character of the Being who formed such a world, where the moral and the physical economies are so adjusted to each other, that virtue, if universal, would bring ten thousand blessings and beatitudes in its train, and turn our earth into an elysium—whereas nothing so distempers the human spirit, and so multiplies distress in society, as the vice and the violence and the varieties of moral turpitude wherewith it is infested. Would a God who loved iniquity and who hated righteousness have created such a world? Would He have so attuned the organism of the human spirit, that the consciousness of worth should be felt through all its recesses, like the oil of gladness? Or would He have so constructed the mechanism of human society, that it should never work prosperously for the general good of the species, but by means of truth and philanthropy and uprightness? Would the friend and patron of falsehood have let such a world out of his hands? Or would an unholy being have so fashioned the heart of man—that, wayward and irresolute as he is, he never feels so ennobled, as by the high resolve that would spurn every base allurement of sensuality away from him; and never breathes so etherially, as

when he maintains that chastity of spirit which would recoil even from one unhallowed imagination; and never rises to such a sense of grandeur and godlike elevation, as when principle hath taken the direction, and is vested with full ascendency over the restrained and regulated passions? What other inference can be drawn from such sequences as these, but that our moral architect loves the virtue He thus follows up with the delights of a high and generous complacency; and execrates the vice He thus follows up with disgust and degradation? If we look but to misery unconnected and alone, we may well doubt the benevolence of the Deity. But should it not modify the conclusion, to have ascertained—that, in proportion as virtue made entrance upon the world, misery would retire from it? There is nothing to spoil Him of this perfection, in a misery so originated; but, leaving this perfection untouched, it attaches to Him another, and we infer, that He is not merely benevolent, but benevolent and holy. After that the moral cause has been discovered for the unhappiness of man, we feel Him to be a God of benevolence still; that He wills the happiness of his creatures, but with this reservation, that the only sound and sincere happiness He awards to them, is happiness through the medium of virtue; that still He is willing to be the dispenser of joy substantial and un-

fading, but of no such joy apart from moral excellence; that He loves the gratification of His children, but He loves their righteousness more; that dear to Him is the happiness of all His offspring, but dearer still their worth; and that therefore He, the moral governor will so conduct the affairs of His empire, as that virtue and happiness, or that vice and misery shall be associated.

11. We have already said, that, by inspecting a mechanism, we can infer both the original design of Him who framed it, and the derangement it has subsequently undergone—even as by the inspection of a watch, we can infer, from the place of command which its regulator occupies, that it was made for the purpose of moving regularly; and that, notwithstanding the state of disrepair and aberration into which it may have fallen. And so, from the obvious place of rightful supremacy which is occupied by the conscience of man in his moral system, we can infer that virtue was the proper and primary design of his creation; and that, notwithstanding the actual prevalence of obviously inferior principles, over the habits and history of his life. Connect this with the grand and general adaptation of External Nature for which we have now been contending—even the capacity of that world in which we are placed for making a virtuous species happy; and it were surely far

juster, in arguing for the divine character, that we founded our interpretation on the happiness which man's original constitution is fitted to secure for him, than on the misery which he suffers by that constitution having been in some way perverted. It is from the native and proper tendency of aught which is made, that we conclude as to the mind and disposition of the maker; and not from the actual effect, when that tendency has been rendered abortive, by the extrinsic operation of some disturbing force on an else goodly and well-going mechanism. The original design of the Creator may be read in the natural, the universal tendency of things; and surely, it speaks strongly both for His benevolence and His righteousness that nothing is so fitted to ensure the general happiness of society as the general virtue of them who compose it. And if, instead of this, we behold a world, ill at ease, with its many heart-burnings and many disquietudes—the fair conclusion is, that the beneficial tendencies which have been established therein, and which are therefore due to the benevolence of God, have all been thwarted by the moral perversity of man. The compound lesson to be gathered from such a contemplation is, that God is the friend of human happiness but the enemy of human vice—seeing, He hath set up an economy in which the former would

have grown up and prospered universally, had not the latter stepped in and overborne it.

12. We are now on a ground work of more firm texture, for an argument in behalf of man's immortality. But it is only by a more comprehensive view both of the character of God, and the actual state of the world—that we obtain as much evidence both for His benevolence and His righteousness, as might furnish logical premises for the logical inference of a future state.

13. We have already stated that the miseries of life, in their great and general amount, are resolvable into moral causes; and did each man suffer here, accurately in proportion to his own sins, there might be less reason for the anticipation of another state hereafter. But this proportion is, in no individual instance perhaps, ever realized on this side of death. The miseries of the good are still due to a moral perversity—though but to the moral perversity of others, not of his own. He suffers from the injustice and calumny and violence and evil tempers of those who are around him. On the large and open theatre of the world, the cause of oppression is often the triumphant one; and, in the bosom of families, the most meek and innocent of the household, are frequently the victims for life, of a harsh and injurious though unseen tyranny.

It is this inequality of fortune, or rather of enjoyment, between the good and the evil, which forms the most popular, and enters as a constituent part at least, into the most powerful argument, which nature furnishes, for the immortality of the soul. We cannot imagine of a God of righteousness, that He will leave any question of justice unsettled; and there is nothing which more powerfully suggests to the human conscience the apprehension of a life to come, than that in this life, there should be so many unsettled questions of justice—first between man and man, secondly between man and his Maker.

14. The strength of the former consideration lies in the multiplicity, and often the fearful aggravation, of the unredressed wrongs inflicted every day by man upon his fellows. The history of human society teems with these; and the unappeased cry, whether for vengeance or reparation, rises to heaven because of them. We might here expatiate on the monstrous, the wholesale atrocities, perpetrated on the defenceless by the strong; and which custom has almost legalized—having stood their ground against the indignation of the upright and the good for many ages. Perhaps for the most gigantic example of this, in the dark annals of our guilty world, we should turn our eyes upon injured Africa—that devoted region, where the lust of gain has

made the fiercest and fellest exhibition of its hardihood; and whose weeping families are broken up in thousands every year, that the families of Europe might the more delicately and luxuriously regale themselves. It is a picturesque, and seems a powerful argument for some future day of retribution, when we look, on the one hand, to the prosperity of the lordly oppressor, wrung from the sufferings of a captive and subjugated people; and look, on the other, to the tears and the untold agony of the hundreds beneath him, whose lives of dreariness and hard labour are ten fold embittered, by the imagery of that dear and distant land, from which they have been irrecoverably torn. But, even within the confines of civilized society, there do exist materials for our argument. There are cruelties and wrongs innumerable, in the conduct of business; there are even cruelties and wrongs, in the bosom of families. There are the triumphs of injustice; the success of deep-laid and malignant policy on the one side, on the other the ruin and the overthrow of unprotected weakness. Apart from the violence of the midnight assault, or the violence of the high way—there is, even under the forms of law, and amid the blandness of social courtesies, a moral violence that carries as grievous and substantial iniquity in its train; by which friendless and confiding simplicity may at once be bereft of its

rights, and the artful oppressor be enriched by the spoliation. Have we never seen the bankrupt rise again with undiminished splendour, from amid the desolation and despair of the families that have been ruined by him? Or, more secret though not less severe, have we not seen the inmates of a wretched home doomed to a hopeless and unhappy existence, under the sullen brow of the tyrant who lorded over them? There are sufferings from which there is no redress or rectification upon earth; inequalities between man and man, of which there is no adjustment here—but because of that very reason, there is the utmost desire, and we might add expectancy of our nature, that there shall be an adjustment hereafter. In the unsated appetency of our hearts for justice, there is all the force of an appeal to the Being who planted the appetite within us; and we feel that if Death is to make sudden disruption, in the midst of all these unfinished questions, and so to leave them eternally—we feel a violence done both to our own moral constitution, and to the high jurisprudence of Him who framed us.

15. But there are furthermore, in this life, unfinished questions between man and his Maker. The same conscience which asserts its own supremacy within the breast, suggests the God and the Moral Governor who placed

it there. It is thus that man not only takes cognizance of his own delinquencies; but he connects them with the thought of a law-giver to whom he is accountable. He passes by one step, and with rapid inference, from the feeling of a judge who is within, to the fear of a Judge who sits in high authority over him. With the sense of a reigning principle in his own constitution, there stands associated the sense of a reigning power in the universe—the one challenging the prerogatives of a moral law, the other avenging the violation of them. Even the hardiest in guilt are not insensible to the force of this sentiment. They feel it, as did Catiline and the worst of Roman emperors, in the horrors of remorse. There is, in spite of themselves, the impression of an avenging God—not the less founded upon reasoning, that it is the reasoning of but one truth or rather of but one transition, from a thing intimately known to a thing immediately concluded, from the reckoning of a felt and a present conscience within, to the more awful reckoning of a God who is the author of conscience and who knoweth all things. Now, it is thus, that men are led irresistibly to the anticipation of a future state —not by their hopes, we think, but by their fears; not by a sense of unfulfilled promises, but by the sense and the terror of unfulfilled

penalties; by their sense of a judgment not yet executed, of a wrath not yet discharged upon them. Hence the impression of a futurity upon all spirits, whither are carried forward the issues of a jurisprudence, which bears no marks but the contrary of a full and final consummation on this side of death. The prosperity of many wicked who spend their days in resolute and contemptuous irreligion; the practical defiance of their lives to the bidding of conscience, and yet a voice of remonstrance and of warning from this said conscience which they are unable wholly to quell; the many emphatic denunciations, not uttered in audible thunder from above, but uttered in secret and impressive whispers from within—these all point to accounts between God and His creatures that are yet unfinished. If there be no future state, the great moral question between heaven and earth, broken off at the middle, is frittered into a degrading mockery. There is violence done to the continuity of things. The moral constitution of man is stript of its significancy and the Author of that constitution is stript of His wisdom and authority and honour. That consistent march which we behold in all the cycles, and progressive movements of the natural economy, is, in the moral economy, brought to sudden arrest and disruption—if death annihilate the man, instead of only transforming him.

And it is only the doctrine of his immortality by which all can be adjusted and harmonized.*

16. And there is one especial proof for the immortality of the soul, founded on adaptation; and therefore so identical in principle with the subject and main argument of our essay—that we feel its statement to be our best and most appropriate termination of this especial enquiry. The argument is this. For every desire or every faculty, whether in man or in the inferior animals, there seems a counterpart object in external nature. Let it be either an appetite or a power; and let it reside either in the sentient or in the intellectual or in the moral economy—still there exists a something without that is altogether suited to it, and which seems to be expressly provided for its gratification. There is light for the eye; there is air for the lungs; there is food for the ever-recurring appetite of hunger; there is water for the appetite of thirst; there is society for the love, whether of fame or of fellowship; there is a boundless field in all the objects of all the sciences for the exercise of curiosity—in a word, there seems not one affection in the

* It is well said by Mr. Davison, in his profound and original work on Prophecy—that "Conscience and the *present* constitution of things are not corresponding terms. The one is not the object of perception to the other. It is conscience and the issue of things which go together."

living creature, which is not met by a counterpart and a congenial object in the surrounding creation. It is this, in fact, which forms an important class of those adaptations, on which the argument for a Deity is founded. The adaptation of the parts to each other within the organic structure, is distinct from the adaptation of the whole to the things of circumambient nature; and is well unfolded in a separate chapter by Paley, on the relation of inanimate bodies to animated nature. But there is another chapter on prospective contrivances, in which he unfolds to us other adaptations, that approximate still more nearly to our argument. They consist of embryo arrangements or parts, not of immediate use, but to be of use eventually—preparations going on in the animal economy, whereof the full benefit is not to be realized, till some future and often considerably distant developement shall have taken place; such as the teeth buried in their sockets, that would be inconvenient during the first months of infancy, but come forth when it is sufficiently advanced for another and a new sort of nourishment; such as the manifold preparations, anterior to the birth, that are of no use to the fœtus, but are afterwards to be of indispensable use in a larger and freer state of existence; such as the instructive tendencies to action that appear before even the

instruments of action are provided, as in the calf of a day old to butt with its head before it has been furnished with horns. Nature abounds, not merely in present expedients for an immediate use, but in providential expedients for a future one; and, as far as we can observe, we have no reason to believe, that, either in the first or second sort of expedients, there has ever aught been noticed, which either bears on no object now, or lands in no result afterwards. We may perceive in this, the glimpse of an argument for the soul's immortality. We may enter into the analogy, as stated by Dr. Ferguson, when he says—"whoever considers the anatomy of the fœtus, will find, in the strength of bones and muscles, in the organs of respiration and digestion, sufficient indications of a design to remove his being into a different state. The observant and the intelligent may perhaps find in the mind of man parallel signs of his future destination.*

* Dr. Ferguson's reasoning upon this subject is worthy of being extracted more largely than we have room for in the text—"If the human fœtus," he observes, "were qualified to reason of his prospects in the womb of his parent, as he may afterwards do in his range on this terrestrial globe, he might no doubt apprehend in the breach of his umbilical chord, and in his separation from the womb a total extinction of life, for how could he conceive it to continue after his only supply of nourishment from the vital stock of his parent had ceased? He might indeed observe many parts of his organization and frame which should

17. Now what inference shall we draw from this remarkable law in nature, that there is nothing waste and nothing meaningless in the feelings and faculties wherewith living creatures are endowed? For each desire there is a counterpart object, for each faculty there is room and opportunity of exercise—either in the present, or in the coming futurity. Now, but for the doctrine of immortality, man would be an exception to this law. He would stand forth as an anomaly in nature—with aspirations in his heart for which the universe had no antitype to offer, with capacities of understanding and thought, that never

seem to have no relation to his state in the womb. For what purpose, he might say, this duct which leads from the mouth to the intestines? Why these bones that each apart become hard and stiff, while they are separated from one another by so many flexures or joints? Why these joints in particular made to move upon hinges, and these germs of teeth, which are pushing to be felt above the surface of the gums? Why the stomach through which nothing is made to pass? And these spungy lungs, so well fitted to drink up the fluids, but into which the blood that passes every where else is scarcely permitted to enter?

"To these queries, which the fœtus was neither qualified to make nor to answer, we are now well apprized the proper answer would be—the life which you now enjoy is but temporary; and those particulars which now seem to you so preposterous, are a provision which nature has made for a future course of life which you have to run, and in which their use and propriety will appear sufficiently evident.

"Such are the prognostics of a future destination that might be collected from the state of the fœtus; and similar prognostics of a destination still future might be collected from present appearances in the life and condition of man."

were to be followed, by objects of corresponding greatness, through the whole history of his being. It were a violence to the harmony of things, whereof no other example can be given; and, in as far as an argument can be founded on this harmony for the wisdom of Him who made all things—it were a reflection on one of the conceived, if not one of the ascertained attributes of the Godhead. To feel the force of this argument, we have only to look to the obvious adaptation of his powers to a larger and more enduring theatre—to the dormant faculties which are in him for the mastery and acquisition of all the sciences, and yet the partial ignorance of all, and the profound or total ignorance of many, in which he spends the short-lived years of his present existence—to the boundless, but here, the unopened capabilities which lie up in him, for the comprehension of truths that never once draw his attention on this side of death, for the contemplative enjoyment both of moral and intellectual beauties which have never here revealed themselves to his gaze. The whole labour of this mortal life would not suffice, for traversing in full extent any one of the sciences; and yet, there may lie undeveloped in his bosom, a taste and talent for them all—none of which he can even singly overtake; for each science, though definite in its commencement, has its out-goings in the infinite and the eternal. There

is in man, a restlessness of ambition; an interminable longing after nobler and higher things, which nought but immortality and the greatness of immortality can satiate; a dissatisfaction with the present, which never is appeased by all that the world has to offer; an impatience and distaste with the felt littleness of all that he finds, and an unsated appetency for something larger and better, which he fancies in the perspective before him—to all which there is nothing like among any of the inferior animals, with whom, there is a certain squareness of adjustment, if we may so term it, between each desire and its correspondent gratification. The one is evenly met by the other; and there is a fullness and definiteness of enjoyment, up to the capacity of enjoyment. Not so with man, who both from the vastness of his propensities and the vastness of his powers, feels himself straitened and beset in a field too narrow for him. He alone labours under the discomfort of an incongruity between his circumstances and his powers; and, unless there be new circumstances awaiting him in a more advanced state of being, he, the noblest of Nature's products here below, would turn out to be the greatest of her failures.

PART II.

ON THE ADAPTATION OF EXTERNAL NATURE TO THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

CHAPTER I.

Chief Instances of this Adaptation.

1. (1.) THE law of most extensive influence over the phenomena and processes of the mind, is the law of association, or, as denominated by Dr. Thomas Brown, the law of suggestion. If two objects have been seen in conjunction, or in immediate succession, at any one time—then the sight or thought of one of them afterwards, is apt to suggest the thought of the other also; and the same is true of the objects of all the senses. The same smells or sounds or tastes which have occurred formerly, when they occur again, will often recal the objects from which they then proceeded, the occasions or other objects with which they were then associated. When one meets with a fragrance of a particular sort, it may often instantly suggest a fragrance of the same kind experienced months or years ago;

the rose-bush from which it came; the garden where it grew; the friend with whom we then walked; his features, his conversation, his relatives, his history. When two ideas have been once in juxta-position, they are apt to present themselves in juxta-position over again—an aptitude which ever increases the oftener that the conjunction has taken place, till, as if by an invincible necessity, the antecedent thought is sure to bring its usual consequent along with it; and, not only single sequences, but lengthened trains or progressions of thought, may in this manner be explained.

2. And such are the great speed and facility of these successions, that many of the intermediate terms, though all of them undoubtedly present to the mind, flit so quickly and evanescently, as to pass unnoticed. This will the more certainly happen, if the antecedents are of no further use than to introduce the consequents; in which case, the consequents remain as the sole objects of attention, and the antecedents are forgotten. In the art of reading, the ultimate object is to obtain possession of the author's sentiments or meaning; and all memory of the words, still more of the component letters, though each of them must have been present to the mind, pass irrecoverably away from it. In like manner, the anterior steps of many a mental process may actually

be described, yet without consciousness—the attention resting, not on the fugitive means, but on the important end in which they terminate. It is thus that we seem to judge, on the instant, of distances, as if under a guidance that was immediate and instinctive, and not by the result of a derivative process—because insensible to the rapid train of inference which led to it. The mind is too much occupied with the information itself, for looking back on the light and shadowy footsteps of the messenger who brought it, which it would find difficult if not impossible to trace—and besides, having no practical call upon it for making such a retrospect. It is thus that, when looking intensely on some beautiful object in Nature, we are so much occupied with the resulting enjoyment, as to overlook the intermediate train of unbidden associations, which connects the sight of that which is before us, with the resulting and exquisite pleasure, that we feel in the act of beholding it. The principle has been much resorted to, in expounding that process, by which the education of the senses is carried forward; and, more especially, the way in which the intimations of sight and touch are made to correct and to modify each other. It has also been employed with good effect, in the attempt to establish a philosophy of taste. But these rapid and fugitive associations, while they form

a real, form also an unseen process; and we are not therefore to wonder, if, along with many solid explanations, they should have been so applied in the investigation of mental phenomena, as occasionally to have given rise to subtle and fantastic theories.

3. But our proper business at present is with results, rather than with processes; and instead of entering on the more recondite inquiries of the science, however interesting and however beautiful or even satisfactory the conclusions may be to which they lead—it is our task to point out those palpable benefits and subserviencies of our intellectual constitution, which demonstrate, without obscurity, the benevolent designs of Him who framed us. There are some of our mental philosophers, indeed, who have theorised and simplified beyond the evidence of those facts which lie before us; and our argument should be kept clear, for in reality it does not partake, in the uncertainty or error of their speculations. The law of association, for example, has been of late reasoned upon, as if it were the sole parent and predecessor of all the mental phenomena. Yet it does not explain, however largely it may influence, the phenomena of memory. When by means of one idea, anyhow awakened in the mind, the whole of some past transaction or scene is brought to recollection, it is association which recalls to our thoughts this portion

of our former history. But association cannot explain our recognition of its actual and historical truth—or what it is, which, beside an act of conception, makes it also an act of remembrance. By means of this law we may understand how it is, that certain ideas, suggested by certain others which came before it, are now present to the mind. But superadded to the mere presence of these ideas, there is such a perception of the reality of their archetypes, as distinguishes a case of remembrance from a case of imagination—insomuch that over and above the conception of certain objects, there is also a conviction of their substantive being at the time which we connect with the thought of them; and this is what the law of association cannot by itself account for. It cannot account for our reliance upon memory—not as a conjurer of visions into the chamber of imagery, but as an informer of stable and objective truths which had place and fulfilment in the actual world of experience.

4. And the same is true of our believing anticipations of the future, which we have now affirmed to be true of our believing retrospects of the past. The confidence wherewith we count on the same sequences in future, that we have observed in the course of our past experience, has been resolved by some philosophers, into the principle of association

alone. Now when we have seen a certain antecedent followed up by a certain consequent, the law of association does of itself afford a sufficient reason, why the idea of that antecedent should be followed up by the idea of its consequent; but it contains within it no reason, why, on the actual occurrence again of the antecedent, we should believe that the consequent will occur also. That the thought of the antecedent should suggest the thought of the consequent, is one mental phenomenon. That the knowledge of the antecedent having anew taken place, should induce the certainty, that the consequent must have taken place also, is another mental phenomenon. We cannot confound these two, without being involved in the idealism of Hume or Berkeley. Were the mere thought of the consequent all that was to be accounted for, we need not go farther than to the law of association. But when to the existence of this thought, there is superadded a belief in the reality of its archetype, a distinct mental phenomenon comes into view, which the law of association does not explain; and which, for aught that the analysts of the mind have yet been able to trace or to discover, is an ultimate principle of the human understanding. This belief, then, is one thing. But ere we can make out an adaptation, we must be able to allege at least two things. And they are ready to our hands—for, in addition to the

belief in the subjective mind, there is a correspondent and counterpart reality in objective nature. If we have formerly observed that a given antecedent is followed by a certain consequent, then, not only does the idea of the antecedent suggest the idea of the consequent; but there is a belief, that, on the actual occurrence of the same antecedent, the same consequent will follow over again. And the consequent does follow; or, in other words, this our instinctive faith meets with its unexcepted fulfilment, in the actual course and constancy of nature. The law of association does of itself, and without going further, secure this general convenience—that the courses of the mind are thereby conformed, or are made to quadrate and harmonize with the courses of the outer world. It is the best possible construction for the best and most useful guidance of the mind, as in the exercise of memory for example, that thought should be made to follow thought, according to the order in which the objects and events of nature are related to each other. But a belief in the certainty and uniformity of this order, with the counterpart verification of this belief in the actual history of things, is that which we now are especially regarding. It forms our first instance, perhaps the most striking and marvellous of all, of the adaptation of external nature to the intellectual constitution of man.

5. This disposition to count on the uniformity of Nature, or even to anticipate the same consequents from the same antecedents—is not the fruit of experience, but anterior to it; or at least anterior to the very earliest of those of her lessons, which can be traced backward in the history of an infant mind. Indeed it has been well observed by Dr. Thomas Brown, that the future constancy of Nature, is a lesson, which no observation of its past constancy, or no experience could have taught us. Because we have observed A a thousand times to be followed in immediate succession by B, there is no greater logical connection between this proposition and the proposition that A will always be followed by B; than there is between the propositions that we have seen A followed once by B, and therefore A will always be followed by B. At whatever stage of the experience, the inference may be made, whether longer or shorter, whether oftener or seldomer repeated—the conversion of the past into the future seems to require a distinct and independent principle of belief; and it is a principle which, to all appearance, is as vigorous in childhood, as in the full maturity of the human understanding. The child who strikes the table with a spoon for the first time, and is regaled by the noise, will strike again, with as confident an expectation of the same result, as if the succession had been familiar to it for

years. There is the expectation before the experience of Nature's constancy; and still the topic of our wonder and gratitude is, that this instinctive and universal faith in the heart, should be responded to by objective nature, in one wide and universal fulfilment.

6. The proper office of experience, in this matter, is very generally misapprehended; and this has mystified the real principle and philosophy of the subject. Her office is not to tell, or to reassure us of the constancy of Nature; but to tell, what the terms of her unalterable progressions actually are. The human mind from its first outset, and in virtue of a constitutional bias coeval with the earliest dawn of the understanding, is prepared, and that before experience has begun her lessons, to count on the constancy of nature's sequences. But at that time, it is profoundly ignorant of the sequences in themselves. It is the proper business of experience to give this information; but it may require many lessons before that her disciples be made to understand, what be the distinct terms even of but one sequence. Nature presents us with her phenomena in complex assemblages; and it is often difficult, in the work of disentangling her trains from each other, to single out the proper and causal antecedent with its resulting consequent, from among the crowd of accessary or accidental circum-

stances by which they are surrounded. There is never any uncertainty, as to the invariableness of nature's successions. The only uncertainty is as to the steps of each succession; and the distinct achievement of experience, is to ascertain these steps. And many mistakes are committed in this course of education, from our disposition to confound the similarities with the samenesses of Nature. We never misgive in our general confidence, that the same antecedent will be followed by the same consequent; but we often mistake the semblance for the reality, and are as often disappointed in the expectations that we form. This is the real account of that growing confidence, wherewith we anticipate the same results in the same apparent circumstances, the oftener that that result has in these circumstances been observed by us—as of a high-water about twice every day, or of a sun-rise every morning. It is not that we need to be more assured than we are already of the constancy of Nature, in the sense that every result must always be the sure effect of its strict and causal antecedent. But we need to be assured of the real presence of this antecedent, in that mass of contemporaneous things under which the result has taken place hitherto; and of this we are more and more satisfied, with every new occurrence of the same event in the same apparent circumstances. This too is our real object in

the repetition of experiments. Not that we suspect that Nature will ever vacillate from her constancy—for if by one decisive experiment we should fix the real terms of any succession, this experiment were to us as good as a thousand. But each succession in nature is so liable to be obscured and complicated by other influences, that we must be quite sure, ere we can proclaim our discovery of some new sequence, that we have properly disentangled her separate trains from each other. For this purpose, we have often to question Nature in many different ways; we have to combine and apply her elements variously; we have sometimes to detach one ingredient, or to add another, or to alter the proportions of a third—and all in order, not to ascertain the invariableness of Nature, for of this we have had instinctive certainty from the beginning; but, in order to ascertain what the actual footsteps of her progressions are, so as to connect each effect in the history of Nature's changes with its strict and proper cause. Meanwhile, amid all the suspense and the frequent disappointments which attend this search into the processes of nature, our confidence in the rigid and inviolable uniformity of these processes remains unshaken—a confidence not learned from experience, but amply confirmed and accorded to by experience. For this instinctive expectation is never once refuted, in the

whole course of our subsequent researches. Nature though stretched on a rack, or put to the torture by the inquisitions of science, never falters from her immutability; but persists, unseduced and unwearied, in the same response to the same question; or gives forth, by a spark, or an explosion, or an effervescence, or some other definite phenomenon, the same result to the same circumstances or combination of data. The anticipations of infancy meet with their glorious verification, in all the findings of manhood; and a truth which would seem to require Omniscience for its grasp, as coextensive with all Nature and all History, is deposited by the hand of God, in the little cell of a nursling's cogitations.

7. Yet the immutability of Nature has ministered to the atheism of some spirits, as impressing on the universe a character of blind necessity, instead of that spontaneity, which might mark the intervention of a willing and a living God. To refute this notion of an unintelligent fate, as being the alone presiding Divinity, the common appeal is to the infinity and exquisite skill of nature's adaptations. But to attack this infidelity in its fortress, and dislodge it thence, the more appropriate argument would be the very, the individual adaptation on which we have now insisted—the immutability of Nature, in conjunction with the universal sense and expec-

tation, even from earliest childhood, that all men have of it; being itself one of the most marvellous and strikingly beneficial of these adaptations. When viewed aright, it leads to a wiser and sounder conclusion than that of the fatalists. In the instinctive, the universal faith of Nature's constancy, we behold a promise. In the actual constancy of Nature, we behold its fulfilment. When the two are viewed in connection, then, to be told that Nature never recedes from her constancy, is to be told that the God of Nature never recedes from his faithfulness. If not by a whisper from His voice, at least by the impress of His hand, He hath deposited a silent expectation in every heart; and He makes all Nature and all History conspire to realize it. He hath not only enabled man to retain in his memory a faithful transcript of the past; but by means of this constitutional tendency, this instinct of the understanding as it has been termed, to look with prophetic eye upon the future. It is the link by which we connect experience with anticipation—a power or exercise of the mind coeval with the first dawnings of consciousness or observation, because obviously that to which we owe the confidence so early acquired and so firmly established, in the information of our senses.*

* It is from our tactual sensations that we obtain our first original perceptions of distance and magnitude; and it is only because of

This disposition to presume on the constancy of nature, commences with the faculty of thought, and keeps by it through life, and enables the mind to convert its stores of memory into the treasures of science and wisdom; and so to elicit from the recollections of the past, both the doctrines of a general philosophy, and the lessons of daily and familiar conduct—and that,

the invariable connection which subsists between the same tactual and the same visual sensations, that by means of the latter we obtain secondary or acquired perceptions of distance and magnitude. It is obvious that without a faith in the uniformity of nature, this rudimental education could not have taken effect; and from the confidence wherewith we proceed in very early childhood on the intimations of the eye, we may infer how strongly this principle must have been at work throughout the anterior stage of our still earlier infancy. The lucid and satisfactory demonstration upon this subject in that delightful little work, the Theory of Vision, by Bishop Berkeley, has not been superseded, because it has not been improved upon, by the lucubrations of any subsequent author. The theology which he would found on the beautiful process which he has unfolded so well, is somewhat tinged with the mysticism of that doctrine which represents our seeing all things in God. Certain it is, however, that the process could not have been advanced or consummated, without an aboriginal faith on the part of the infant mind in the uniformity of nature's sequences, a disposition to expect the same consequents from the same antecedents—an inference which is at length made, and that in very early childhood, with such rapidity as well as confidence, that it leads all men to confound their acquired with their original perceptions; and it requires a subtle analysis to disentangle the two from each other. Without partaking in the metaphysics of Berkeley, we fully concur in the strength and certainty of those theistical conclusions which are expressed by him in the following sentences—"Something there is of divine

by means of prognostics, not one of which can fail, for, in respect of her steadfast uniformity, Nature never disappoints, or, which is equivalent to this, the Author of Nature never deceives us. The generality of Nature's laws is indispensable, both to the formation of any system of truth for the understanding, and to the guidance of our actions. But ere we can make such use

and admirable in this language addressed to our eyes, that may well awaken the mind, and deserve its utmost attention; it is learned with so little pains, it expresses the difference of things so clearly and aptly, it instructs with such facility and dispatch, by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of advices, and a more distinct knowledge of things, than could be got by a discourse of several hours: and, while it informs, it amuses and entertains the mind with such singular pleasure and delight; it is of such excellent use in giving a stability and permanency to human discourse, in recording sounds and bestowing life on dead languages, enabling us to converse with men of remote ages and countries; and it answers so apposite to the uses and necessities of mankind, informing us more distinctly of those objects, whose nearness or magnitude qualify them to be of greatest detriment or benefit to our bodies, and less exactly in proportion as their littleness or distance make them of less concern to us. But these things are not strange, they are familiar, and that makes them to be overlooked. Things which rarely happen strike; whereas frequency lessens the admiration of things, though in themselves ever so admirable. Hence a common man who is not used to think and make reflections, would probably be more convinced of the being of a God by one single sentence heard once in his life from the sky, than by all the experience he has had of this visual language, contrived with such exquisite skill, so constantly addressed to his eyes, and so plainly declaring the nearness, wisdom, and providence of Him with whom we have to do." Minute Philosopher. Dialogue IV. Art. XV.

of it, the sense and the confident expectation of this generality must be previously in our minds; and the concurrence, the contingent harmony of these two elements; the exquisite adaptation of the objective to the subjective, with the manifest utilities to which it is subservient; the palpable and perfect meetness which subsists, between this intellectual propensity in man, and all the processes of the outward universe—while they afford incontestable evidence to the existence and unity of that design, which must have adjusted the mental and the material formations to each other, speak most decisively in our estimation both for the truth and the wisdom of God.

8. We have long felt this close and unexcepted, while at the same time, contingent harmony, between the actual constancy of Nature and man's faith in that constancy, to be an effectual preservative against that scepticism, which would represent the whole system of our thoughts and perceptions to be founded on an illusion. Certain it is, that beside an indefinite number of truths received by the understanding as the conclusions of a proof more or less lengthened, there are truths recognized without proof by an instant act of intuition—not the results of a reasoning process, but themselves the first principles of all reasoning. At every step in the train of argumentation, we affirm

one thing to be true, because of its logical connection with another thing known to be true; but as this process of derivation is not eternal, it is obvious, that, at the commencement of at least some of these trains, there must be truths, which, instead of borrowing their evidence from others, announce themselves immediately to the mind in an original and independent evidence of their own. Now they are these primary convictions of the understanding, these cases of a belief without reason, which minister to the philosophical infidelity of those, who, professing to have no dependance on an instinctive faith, do in fact alike discard all truth, whether demonstrated or undemonstrated—seeing that underived or unreasoned truth must necessarily form the basis, as well as the continuous cement of all reasoning. They challenge us to account for these native and original convictions of the mind; and affirm that they may be as much due to an arbitrary organization of the percipient faculty, as to the objective trueness of the things which are perceived. And we cannot dispute the possibility of this. We can neither establish by reasoning those truths, whose situation is, not any where in the stream, but at the fountain of ratiocination; nor can we deny that beings might have been so differently constituted, as that, with reverse intuitions to our own, they

might have recognized as truths what we instantly recoil from as falsehoods, or felt to be absurdities our first and foremost principles of truth. And when this suspicion is once admitted, so as to shake our confidence in the judgments of the intellect, it were but consistent that it should be extended to the departments both of morality and taste. Our impressions of what is virtuous or of what is fair, may be regarded as alike accidental and arbitrary with our impressions of what is true—being referable to the structure of the mind, and not to any objective reality in the things which are contemplated. It is thus that the absolutely true, or good, or beautiful, may be conceived of, as having no stable or substantive being in nature; and the mind, adrift from all fixed principle, may thus lose itself in universal pyrrhonism.

9. Nature is fortunately too strong for this speculation; but still there is a comfort in being enabled to vindicate the confidence which she has inspired—as in those cases, where some original principle of hers admits of being clearly and decisively tested. And it is so of our faith in the constancy of nature, met and responded to, throughout all her dominions by nature's actual constancy—the one being the expectation, the other its rigid and invariable fulfilment. This perhaps is the most palpable instance

which can be quoted, of a belief anterior to experience, yet of which experience affords a wide and unexcepted verification. It proves at least of one of our implanted instincts, that it is unerring; and that, over against a subjective tendency in the mind, there is a great objective reality in circumambient nature to which it corresponds. This may well convince us, that we live, not in a world of imaginations—but in a world of realities. It is a noble example of the harmony which obtains, between the original make and constitution of the human spirit upon the one hand, and the constitution of external things upon the other; and nobly accredits the faithfulness of Him, who, as the Creator of both, ordained this happy and wondrous adaptation. The monstrous suspicion of the sceptics is, that we are in the hands of a God, who, by the insertion of falsities into the human system, sports himself with a laborious deception on the creatures whom He has made. The invariable order of nature, in conjunction with the apprehension of this invariableness existing in all hearts; the universal expectation with its universal fulfilment, is a triumphant refutation of this degrading mockery —evincing, that it is not a phantasmagoria in which we dwell, but a world peopled with realities. That we are never misled in our instinctive belief of nature's uniformity, demonstrates

the perfect safety wherewith we may commit ourselves to the guidance of our original principles, whether intellectual or moral—assured, that, instead of occupying a land of shadows, a region of universal doubt and derision, they are the stabilities, both of an everlasting truth and an everlasting righteousness with which we have to do.

10. This lesson obtains a distinct and additional confirmation from every particular instance of adaptation, which can be found, of external nature, either to the moral or intellectual constitution of man.

11. (2.) To understand our second adaptation we must advert to the difference that obtains between those truths which are so distinct and independent, that each can only be ascertained by a separate act of observation; and those truths which are either logically or mathematically involved in each other.* For example,

* See this distinction admirably expounded in Whately's Logic —a work of profound judgment, and which effectually vindicates the honours of a science, that since the days of Bacon, or rather (which is more recent) since the days of his extravagant because exclusive authority, it has been too much the fashion to depreciate. The author, if I might use the expression without irreverence, has given to Bacon the things which are Bacon's, and to Aristotle the things which are Aristotle's. He has strengthened the pretensions of logic by narrowing them—that is, instead of placing all the intellectual processes under its direction, by assigning to it as its proper subject the art of deduction alone. He has made most

there is no such dependence between the colour of a flower and its smell, as that the one can be reasoned from the other; and, in every different specimen therefore, we, to ascertain the two facts of the colour and the smell, must have recourse to two observations. On the other hand, there is such a dependence between the proposition that self-preservation is the strongest and most general law of our nature, and the proposition that no man will starve if able and in circumstances to work for his own maintenance—that the one proposition can be deduced by inference from the other, as the conclusion from the premises of an argument. And still more there is such a dependence between the proposition, that the planet moves in an elliptical orbit round the sun, having its focus in the centre of that luminary, and a thousand other propositions—so that without a separate obser-

correct distinction between the inductive and the logical; and it is by attending to the respective provinces of each, that we come to perceive the incompetency of mere logic for the purpose of discovery strictly so called. The whole chapter on discovery is particularly valuable—leading us clearly to discriminate between that which logic can, and that which it cannot achieve. It is an instrument, not for the discovery of truth properly new, but for the discovery of truths which are enveloped or virtually contained in propositions already known. It instructs but does not inform; and has nought to do in syllogism with the truth of the premises, but only with the truth of the connection between the premises and the conclusion.

vation for each of the latter, they can be reasoned from the former; just as an infinity of truths and properties can, without observation, be satisfactorily demonstrated of many a curve from the simple definition of it. We do not affirm, that, in any case, we can establish a dogma, or make a discovery independently of all observation—any more than in a syllogism we are independent of observation for the truth of the premises—both the major and the minor propositions being generally verified in this way; while the connection between these and the conclusion, is all, in the syllogism, wherewith the art of logic has properly to do. In none of the sciences, is the logic of itself available for the purposes of discovery; and it can only contribute to this object, when furnished with sound data, the accuracy of which is determined by observation alone. This holds particularly true of the mixed mathematics, where the conclusions are sound, only in as far as the first premises are sound—which premises, in like manner, are not reasoned truths, but observed truths. Even in the pure mathematics, some obscurely initial or rudimental process of observation may have been necessary, ere the mind could arrive at its first conceptions, either of quantity or number. Certain it is, however, that, in all the sciences, however dependent on observation for the original data, we can,

by reasoning on the data, establish an indefinite number of distinct and important and useful propositions—which, if soundly made out, observation will afterwards verify; but which, anterior to the application of this test, the mind, by its own excogitations, may have made the objects of its most legitimate conviction. It is thus that, on the one hand, we, by the inferences of a sound logic, can, on an infinity of subjects, discover what should for ever have remained unknown, had it been left to the findings of direct observation; and that, on the other hand, though observation could not have made the discovery, it never fails to attest it. Visionaries, on the one hand, may spurn at the ignoble patience and drudgery of observers; and ignorant practitioners, whether in the walks of business or legislation, may, on the other, raise their senseless and indiscriminate outcry against the reasoners—but he who knows to distinguish between an hypothesis based on imagination, and a theory based on experience, and perceives how helpless either reason or observation is, when not assisted by the other, will know how to assign the parts, and to estimate the prerogatives of both.

12. When the mind has retired from direct converse with the external world, and brought to its own inner chamber of thought the materials which it has collected there, it then delivers

itself up to its own processes—first ascending analytically from observed phenomena to principles, and then descending synthetically from principles to yet unobserved phenomena. We cannot but recognize it as an exquisite adaptation between the subjective and the objective, between the mental and the material systems—that the results of the abstract intellectual process and the realities of external nature should so strikingly harmonize.* It is exemplified in all the sciences, in the economical, and the mental, and the physical, and most of all in the physico-mathematical—as when Newton, on the calculations and profound musings of his solitude, predicted the oblate spheroidal figure of the earth, and the prediction was confirmed by the mensurations of the academicians, both in the polar and equatorial

* There are some fine remarks by Sir John Herschell in his preliminary discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy on this adaptation of the abstract ideas to the concrete realities, of the discoveries made in the region of pure thought to the facts and phenomena of actual nature—as when the properties of conic sections, demonstrated by a laborious analysis, remained inapplicable till they came to be embodied in the real masses and movements of astronomy.

"These marvellous computations might almost seem to have been devized on purpose to show how closely the extremes of speculative refinement and practical utility can be brought to approximate." Herschell's Discourse, p. 28.

"They show how large a part pure reason has to perform in the examination of nature, and how implicit our reliance ought to be on that powerful and methodical system of rules and processes,

regions; or as, when abandoning himself to the devices and the diagrams of his own construction, he thence scanned the cycles of the firmament, and elicited from the scroll of enigmatical characters which himself had framed, the secrets of a sublime astronomy, that high field so replete with wonders, yet surpassed by this greatest wonder of all, the intellectual mastery which man has over it. That such a feeble creature should have made this conquest —that a light struck out in the little cell of his own cogitations should have led to a disclosure so magnificent—that by a calculus of his own formation, as with the power of a talisman, the heavens, with their stupendous masses and untrodden distances, should have thus been opened to his gaze—can only be explained by the intervention of a Being having supremacy over all, and who has adjusted the

which constitute the modern mathematical analysis, in all the more difficult applications of exact calculation to her phenomena." p. 33.

"Almost all the great combinations of modern mechanism and many of its refinements and nicer improvements, are creations of pure intellect, grounding its exertion upon a very moderate number of elementary propositions, in theoretical mechanics and geometry." p. 63.

The discovery of the principle of the achromatic telescope, is termed by Sir John "a memorable case in science, though not a singular one, where the speculative geometer in his chamber, apart from the world, and existing among abstractions, has originated views of the noblest practical application." p. 255.

laws of matter and the properties of mind to each other. It is only thus we can be made to understand, how man by the mere workings of his spirit, should have penetrated so far into the workmanship of Nature; or that, restricted though he be to a spot of earth, he should nevertheless tell of the suns and the systems that be afar—as if he had travelled with the line and plummet in his hand to the outskirts of creation, or carried the torch of discovery round the universe.

13. (3.) Our next adaptation is most notably exemplified in those cases, when some isolated phenomenon, remote and having at first no conceivable relation to human affairs, is nevertheless converted by the plastic and productive intellect of man, into some application of mighty and important effect on the interests of the world. One example of this is the use that has been made of the occultations and emersions of Jupiter's satellites, in the computation of longitudes, and so the perfecting of navigation. When one contemplates a subserviency of this sort fetched to us from afar, it is difficult not to imagine of it as being the fruit of some special adjustment, that came within the purpose of Him, who, in constructing the vast mechanism of Nature, overlooked not the humblest of its parts—but incorporated the good of our species, with the wider generalities and laws of a universal

system.* The conclusion is rather enhanced than otherwise by the seemingly incidental way in which the telescope was discovered. The observation of the polarity of the magnet is an example of the same kind—and with the same result, in multiplying, by an enlarged commerce the enjoyments of life, and speeding onward the science and civilization of the globe. There cannot a purer instance be given, of adaptation between external nature and the mind of man—

* The author of the Natural History of Enthusiasm, in his edition of Edward's treatise on the will, presents us with the following energetic sentences on this subject.

" Every branch of modern science abounds with instances of remote correspondences between the great system of the world, and the artificial (*the truly natural*) condition to which knowledge raises him. If these correspondences were single or rare they might be deemed merely fortuitous; like the drifting of a plank athwart the track of one who is swimming from a wreck. But when they meet us on all sides and invariably, we must be resolute in atheism not to confess that they are emanations from one and the same centre of wisdom and goodness. Is it nothing more than a lucky accommodation which makes the polarity of the needle to subserve the purposes of the mariner? or may it not safely be affirmed, both that the magnetic influence (whatever its primary intention may be) had reference to the business of navigation—a reference incalculably important to the spread and improvement of the human race; and that the discovery and the application of this influence arrived at the destined moment in the revolution of human affairs, when in combination with other events, it would produce the greatest effect? Nor should we scruple to affirm that the relation between the inclination of the earth's axis and the conspicuous star which, without a near rival, attracts even the eye of the vulgar, and shows the north to the wanderer on the wilder-

than when some material, that would have remained for ever useless in the hands of the unintelligent and unthoughtful, is converted, by the fertility and power of the human understanding, into an instrument for the further extension of our knowledge or our means of gratification. The prolongation of their eyesight to the aged by means of convex lenses, made from a substance at once transparent and colourless—the

ness or on the ocean, is in like manner a beneficent arrangement. Those who would spurn the supposition that the celestial locality of a sun immeasurably remote from our system, should have reference to the accommodation of the inhabitants of a planet so inconsiderable as our own, forget the style of the Divine Works, which is, to serve some great or principal end, compatibly with ten thousand lesser and remote interests. Man if he would secure the greater, must neglect or sacrifice the less; not so the Omnipotent Contriver. It is a fact full of meaning, that those astronomical phenomena (and so others) which offer themselves as available for the purposes of art, as for instance of navigation, or geography, do not fully or effectively yield the end they promise, until after long and elaborate processes of calculation have disentangled them from variations, disturbing forces and apparent irregularities. To the rude fact, if so we might designate it, a mass of recondite science must be appended, before it can be brought to bear with precision upon the arts of life. Thus the polarity of the needle or the eclipses of Jupiter's moons are as nothing to the mariner, or the geographer, without the voluminous commentary furnished by the mathematics of astronomy. The fact of the expansive force of steam must employ the intelligence and energy of the mechanicians of an empire, during a century, before the whole of its beneficial powers can be put in activity. Chemical, medical, and botanical science is filled with parallel instances; and they all affirm, in an articulate manner, the two-fold purpose of the Creator—to benefit man and to educate him.

force of steam with the manifold and ever growing applications which are made of it—the discovery of platina, which, by its resistance to the fiercest heats, is so available in prosecuting the ulterior researches of chemistry*—even the very abundance and portability of those materials by which written characters can be multiplied, and, through the impulse thus given to the quick and copious circulation of human thoughts, mind acts with rapid diffusion upon mind though at the distance of a hemisphere from each other, conceptions and informations and reasonings these products of the intellect alone being made to travel over the world by the intervention of material substances—these, while but themselves only a few taken at random from the multitude of strictly appropriate specimens which could be alleged of an adaptation between the systems

* This among many such lessons will teach us that the most important uses of natural objects are not those which offer themselves to us most obviously. The chief use of the moon for man's immediate purposes remained unknown to him for five thousand years from his creation. And since it cannot but be that innumerable and most important uses remain to be discovered among the materials and objects already known to us, as well as among those which the progress of science must hereafter disclose, we may here conceive a well grounded expectation, not only of constant increase in the physical resources of mankind, and the consequent improvement of their condition, but of continual accessions to our power of penetrating into the arcana of nature, and becoming acquainted with her highest laws. Sir John Herschell's Discourse, p. 308, 309.

of mind and matter, are sufficient to mark an obvious contrivance and forth-putting of skill in the adjustment of the systems to each other. Enough has been already done to prove of mind, with its various powers, that it is the fittest agent which could have been employed for working upon matter; and of matter, with its various properties and combinations, that it is the fittest instrument which could have been placed under the disposal of mind. Every new triumph achieved by the human intellect over external nature, whether in the way of discovery or of art, serves to make the proof more illustrious. In the indefinite progress of science and invention, the mastery of man over the elements which surround him is every year becoming more conspicuous—the pure result of adaptation, or of the way in which mind and matter have been conformed to each other; the first endowed by the Creator with those powers which qualify it to command; the second no less evidently endowed with those corresponding susceptibilities which cause it to obey.

14. (4.) The way is now prepared for our next adaptation which hinges upon this—that the highest efforts of intellectual power, and to which few men are competent; the most difficult intellectual processes, requiring the utmost abstraction and leisure for their developement, are often indispensable to discoveries, which,

when once made, are found capable of those useful applications, the value of which is felt and recognized by all men. The most arduous mathematics had to be put into requisition, for the establishment of the lunar theory—without which our present lunar observations could have been of no use for the determination of the longitude. This dependence of the popular and the practical on an anterior profound science runs through much of the business of life, in the mechanics and chemistry of manufactures as well as in navigation; and indeed is more or less exemplified so widely, or rather universally, throughout the various departments of human industry and art, that it most essentially contributes to the ascendancy of mind over muscular force in society—beside securing for mental qualities, the willing and reverential homage of the multitude. This peculiar influence stands complicated with other arrangements, requiring a multifarious combination, that speaks all the more emphatically for a presiding intellect, which must have devised and calculated the whole. We have already stated,* by what peculiarity in the soil it was, that a certain number of the species was exempted from the necessity of labour; and without which, in fact, all science and civilization would have been im-

* Part I. c. VI. 29.

possible. We have also expounded in some degree the principle, which both originated the existing arrangements of property, and led men to acquiesce in them. But still it is a precarious acquiescence, and liable to be disturbed by many operating causes of distress and discontent in society. If there be influences on the side of the established order of things, there are also counteractive influences on the opposite side, of revolt and irritation against it; and by which, the natural reverence of men for rank and station, may at length be overborne. In the progress of want and demoralization among the people, in the pressure of their increasing numbers, by which, they at once outgrow the means of instruction, and bear more heavily on the resources of the land than before; in the felt straitness of their condition, and the proportionate vehemence of their aspirations after enlargement—nothing is easier than to give them a factitious sense of their wrongs, and to inspire them with the rankling imagination of a heartless and haughty indifference on the part of their lordly superiors towards them, whose very occupation of wealth, they may be taught to regard as a monopoly, the breaking down of which were an act of generous patriotism. Against these brooding elements of revolution in the popular mind, the most effectual preservative certainly, were the virtue of the upper

classes,—or that our great men should be good men. But a mighty help to this, and next to it in importance were, that to the power which lies in wealth, they should superadd the power which lies in knowledge—or that the vulgar superiority of mere affluence and station, should be strengthened in a way that would command the willing homage of all spirits, that is, by the mental superiority which their opportunities of lengthened and laborious education enable them to acquire. By a wise ordination of Nature, the possessors of rank and fortune, simply as such, have a certain ascendant power over their fellows; and, by the same ordination, the possessors of learning have an ascendency also—and it would mightily conduce to the strength and stability of the commonwealth, if these influences were conjoined, or, in other words, if the scale of wealth and the scale of intelligence, in as far as that was dependent on literary culture, could be made to harmonize. The constitution of science, or the adaptation which obtains between the objects of knowledge and the knowing faculties, is singularly favourable to the alliance for which we now plead—insomuch that, to sound the depths of philosophy, time and independence and exemption from the cares and labours of ordinary life seem indispensable; and, on the other hand, profound discoveries, or a profound acquaintance with them, are sure to

command a ready deference even from the multitude, whether on account of the natural respect which all men feel for pre-eminent understanding, or on account of the palpable utilities to which, in a system of things so connected as ours, even the loftiest and most recondite science is found to be subservient. On the same principle that, in a ship, the skilful navigation of its captain, will secure for him the prompt obedience of the crew to all his directions;* or that, in an army,

* We have before us an anecdote communicated to us by a naval officer, (Captain Basil Hall) distinguished for the extent and variety of his attainments, which shows how impressive such results may become in practice. He sailed from San Blas on the west coast of Mexico, and after a voyage of 8000 miles, occupying eighty-nine days, arrived off Rio Janeiro, having, in this interval passed through the Pacific Ocean, rounded Cape Horn, and crossed the South Atlantic, without making any land, or even seeing a single sail, with the exception of an American whaler off Cape Horn. Arrived within a week's sail of Rio, he set seriously about determining, by lunar observations, the precise line of the ship's course, and its situation in it at a determinate moment, and having ascertained this within from five to ten miles, ran the rest of the way by those more ready and compendious methods, known to navigators, which can be safely employed for short trips between one known point and another, but which cannot be trusted in long voyages, where the moon is their only guide. The rest of the tale we are enabled by his kindness to state in his own words:—"We steered towards Rio Janeiro for some days after taking the lunars above described, and having arrived within fifteen or twenty miles of the coast, I hove-to till four in the morning when the day should break, and then bore up; for although it was very hazy, we could see before us a couple of miles or so. About eight o'clock it became so foggy that I did not like to stand in farther,

the consummate generalship of its commander will subordinate all the movements of the immense host, to the power of one controlling and actuating will—so, in general society, did wealth by means of a thorough scholarship on the part of the higher classes, but maintain an intimate fellowship with wisdom and sound philosophy—then, with the same conservative influence as in these other examples, would the intellectual ascendency thus acquired, be found of mighty effect, to consolidate and maintain all the gradations of the commonwealth.

15. It is thus that a vain and frivolous aristocracy, averse to severe intellectual discipline, and beset with the narrow prejudices of an order, let themselves down from that high van-

and was just bringing the ship to the wind again before sending the people to breakfast, when it suddenly cleared off, and I had the satisfaction of seeing the great sugar loaf peak, which stands on one side of the harbour's mouth, so nearly right a-head that we had not to alter our course above a point, in order to hit the entrance of Rio. This was the first land we had seen for three months, after crossing so many seas, and being set backwards and forwards by innumerable currents and foul winds." "The effect on all on board might well be conceived to have been electric; and it is needless to remark how essentially the authority of a commanding officer over his crew may be strengthened by the occurrence of such incidents, indicative of a degree of knowledge and consequent power beyond their reach."—Herschell's Discourse, p. 28, 29.

It is an extreme instance of the connection between mental power and civil or political ascendency, though often verified in the history of the world—that military science has often led to the establishment of a military despotism.

tage ground on which fortune hath placed them—where, by a right use of the capabilities belonging to the state in which they were born, they might have kept their firm footing to the latest generations. Did all truth lie at the surface of observation, and was it alike accessible to all men, they could not with such an adaptation of external nature to man's intellectual constitution, have realized the peculiar advantage on which we are now insisting. But it is because there is so much of important and applicable truth, which lies deep and hidden under the surface, and which can only be appropriated by men, who combine unbounded leisure with the habit or determination of strenuous mental effort—it is only because of such an adaptation, that they who are gifted with property are, as a class, gifted with the means, if they would use it, of a great intellectual superiority over the rest of the species. There is a strong natural veneration for wealth, and also a strong natural veneration for wisdom. It is by the union of the two that the horrors of revolutionary violence, might for ever be averted from the land. Did our high-born children of affluence, for every ten among them, the mere loungers of effeminacy and fashion, or the mere lovers of sport and sensuality and splendour—did they, for every ten of such, furnish but one enamoured of higher gymnastics, the

gymnastics of the mind; and who accomplished himself for the work and warfare of the senate, by his deep and comprehensive views in all the proper sciences of a statesman, the science of government, and politics, and commerce, and economics, and history, and human nature,—by a few gigantic men among them, thus girded for the services of patriotism, a nation might be saved—because arrested on that headlong descent, which, at the impulse of the popular will, it might else have made, from one measure of fair but treacherous promise, from one ruinous plausibility to another. The thing most to be dreaded, is that hasty and superficial legislation, into which a government may be hurried by the successive onsets of public impatience, and under the impulse of a popular and prevailing cry. Now the thing most needed, as a counteractive to this evil, is a thoroughly intellectual parliament, where shall predominate that masculine sense which has been trained for act and application by masculine studies; and where the silly watch-word of theory shall not be employed, as heretofore, to overbear the lessons of soundly generalized truth—because instead of being discerned at a glance, they are fetched from the depths of philosophic observation, or shone upon by lights from afar, in the accumulated experience of ages. We have infinitely more to apprehend from the demagogues than

from the doctrinaires of our present crisis; and it will require a far profounder attention to the principles of every question than many deem to be necessary, or than almost any are found to bestow, to save us from the crudities of a blind-fold legislation.*

16. And it augurs portentously for the coming destinies of our land, that, in the present rage for economy, such an indiscriminate havock should have been made—so that pensions and endowments for the reward or encouragement of science, should have had the same sentence of extinction passed upon them, as the most worth-

* This mental superiority which the higher classes might and ought to cultivate, is not incompatible, but the contrary, with a general ascent in the scholarship of the population at large. On this subject we have elsewhere said—that "there is a bigotry on the side of endowed seminaries which leads those whom it actuates to be jealous of popular institutions. And, on the other hand, there is a generous feeling towards these institutions, which is often accompanied with a certain despite towards the endowed and established seminaries. We think that a more comprehensive consideration of the actings and reactings which take place in society, should serve to abate the heats of this partisanship, and that what in one view is regarded as the conflict of jarring and hostile elements, should, in another, be rejoiced in as a luminous concourse of influences, tending to accomplish the grand and beneficent result of an enlightened nation. It is just because we wish so well to colleges, that we hail the prosperity of mechanic institutions. The latter will never outrun the former, but so stimulate them onwards, that the literature of our higher classes shall hold the same relative advancement as before over the literature of our artizans. It will cause no derangement and no disproportion. The light which shall then overspread the floor of

less sinecures. The difficulties of our most sublime, and often too our most useful knowledge, make it inaccessible to all but to those who are exempt from the care of their own maintenance—so that unless a certain, though truly insignificant portion of the country's wealth, be expended in this way, all high and transcendental philosophy, however conducive as it often is to the strength as well as glory of a nation must vanish from the land. When the original possessors of wealth neglect individually this application of it; and, whether from indolence or the love of pleasure, fall short of that

the social edifice, will only cause the lustres which are in the higher apartments to blaze more gorgeously. The basement of the fabric will be greatly more elevated, yet without violence to the symmetry of the whole architecture; for the pinnacles and upper stories of the building will rise as proudly and as gracefully as ever above the platform which sustains them. There is indefinite room in truth and science for an ascending movement, and the taking up of higher positions; and if, in virtue of a popular philosophy now taught in schools of art, we are to have more lettered mechanics, this will be instantly followed up by a higher philosophy in colleges than heretofore; and in virtue of which we shall also have a more accomplished gentry, a more intellectual parliament, a more erudite clergy, and altogether a greater force and fulness of mind throughout all the departments of the commonwealth. The whole of society will ascend together, and therefore without disturbance to the relation of its parts. But, in every stage of this progress, the endowed colleges will continue to be the highest places of intellect; the country's richest lore and its most solid and severest philosophy will always be found in them." Use and abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Endowments.

superiority in mental culture, of which the means have been put into their hands—we can only reproach their ignoble preference, and lament the ascendant force of sordid and merely animal propensities, over the principles of their better and higher nature. But when that which individuals do in slavish compliance with their indolence and passions, the state is also found to do in the exercise of its deliberative wisdom, and on the maxims of a settled policy—when instead of ordaining any new destination of wealth in favour of science, it would divorce and break asunder the goodly alliance by a remorseless attack on the destinations of wiser and better days—such a gothic spoliation as this, not a deed of lawless cupidity but the mandate of a senate-house, were a still more direct and glaring contravention to the wisdom of Nature, and to the laws of that economy which Nature hath instituted. The adaptation of which we now speak, between the external system of the universe, and the intellectual system of man, were grossly violated by such an outrage; and it is a violence which Nature would resent by one of those signal chastisements, the examples of which are so frequent in history. The truth is that, viewed as a manifestation of the popular will, which tumultuates against all that wont to command the respect and admiration of society, and is strong enough to enforce its dictations—it may

well be regarded, as one of the deadliest symptoms of a nation ripening for anarchy, that dread consummation, by which however, the social state, relieved of its distempers, is at length renovated like the atmosphere by a storm, after throwing off from it, the dregs and the degeneracy of an iron age.*

17. (5.) We shall do little more than state two other adaptations, although more might be noticed, and all do admit of a much fuller elucidation than we can bestow upon them. And first, there is a countless diversity of sciences, and correspondent to this, a like diversity in the tastes and talents of men, presenting, therefore, a most beneficial adaptation, between the objects of human knowledge and the powers of human knowledge. Even in one science there are often many subdivisions, each requiring a separate mental fitness, on the part of those, who might select it as their own favourite walk, which they most love, and in which they are best qualified to excel. In most of the physical sciences, how distinct the business of the observation is from that of the philosophy; and how important to their progress, that, for each appropriate work, there should be men of appropriate faculties or habits, who in the exe-

* The same effect is still more likely to ensue from the spoliation and secularization of ecclesiastical property.

cution of their respective tasks, do exceedingly multiply and enlarge the products of the mind—even as the grosser products of human industry are multiplied by the subdivision of employment.* It is well, that, for that infinite variety of intellectual pursuits, necessary to explore all the recesses of a various and complicated external nature, there should be a like variety of intellectual predilections and powers scattered over the species—a congruity between the world of mind and the world of matter, of the utmost importance, both to the perfecting of art, and to the progress and perfecting of science. Yet it is marvellous of these respective labourers, though in effect they work simultaneously and to each other's hands, how little respect or sympathy, or sense of importance, they have for any department of the general field, for any section in the wide encyclopædia of human learning, but that on which their own faculties are concentrated and absorbed. We cannot imagine aught more dissimilar and uncongenial, than the intentness of a mathematician on his demonstrations and diagrams, and the equal intentness, nay delight,

* There is no accounting for the difference of minds or inclinations, which leads one man to observe with interest the developement of phenomena, another to speculate on their causes; but were it not for this happy disagreement, it may be doubted whether the higher sciences could ever have attained even their present degree of perfection." Sir John Herschell's Discourses, p. 131.

of a collector or antiquarian on the faded manuscripts and uncial characters of other days. Yet in the compound result of all these multiform labours, there is a goodly and sustained harmony, between the practitioners and the theorists of science, between the pioneers and the monarchs of literature—even as in the various offices of a well-arranged household, although there should be no mutual intelligence between the subordinates who fill them, there is a supreme and connecting wisdom, which presides over and animates the whole. The goodly system of philosophy, when viewed as the product of innumerable contributions, by minds of all possible variety and men of all ages—bears like evidence to the universe being a spacious household, under the one and consistent direction of Him who is at once the Parent and the Master of a universal family.*

18. And here it is not out of place to remark, that it is the very perfection of the Divine workmanship, which leads every enquirer to imagine a surpassing worth and grace and dignity in his own special department of it. The fact is altogether notorious, that in order

* The benefit of subdivision in science should lead to the multiplication of professorships in our literary institutes, and at all events should prevent the parsimonious suppression of them, or the parsimonious amalgamation of the duties of two or more into one.

to attain a high sense of the importance of any science, and of the worth and beauty of the objects which it embraces—nothing more is necessary than the intent and persevering study of them. Whatever the walk of philosophy may be on which man shall enter, that is the walk which of all others he conceives to be most enriched, by all that is fitted to entertain the intellect, or arrest the admiration of the enamoured scholar. The astronomer who can unravel the mechanism of the heavens, or the chemist who can trace the atomic processes of matter upon earth, or the metaphysician who can assign the laws of human thought, or the grammarian who can discriminate the niceties of language, or the naturalist who can classify the flowers and the birds and the shells and the minerals and the insects which so teem and multiply in this world of wonders—each of these respective enquirers is apt to become the worshipper of his own theme, and to look with a sort of indifference, bordering on contempt, towards what he imagines the far less interesting track of his fellow-labourers. Now each is right in the admiration he renders to the grace and grandeur of that field which himself has explored; but all are wrong in the distaste they feel, or rather in the disregard they cast on the other fields which they have never entered. We should

take the testimony of each to the worth of that which he does know, and reject the testimony of each to the comparative worthlessness of that which he does not know; and then the unavoidable inference is that that must be indeed a replete and a gorgeous universe in which we dwell—and still more glorious the Eternal Mind, from whose conception it arose, and whose prolific fiat gave birth to it, in all its vastness and variety. And instead of the temple of science having been reared, it were more proper to say, that the temple of nature had been evolved. The archetype of science is the universe; and it is in the disclosure of its successive parts, that science advances from step to step—not properly raising any new architecture of its own, but rather unveiling by degrees an architecture that is old as the creation. The labourers in philosophy create nothing; but only bring out into exhibition that which was before created. And there is a resulting harmony in their labours, however widely apart from each other they may have been prosecuted—not because they have adjusted one part to another, but because the adjustment has been already made to their hands. There comes forth, it is true, of their labours, a most magnificent harmony, yet not a harmony which they have made, but a pre-existent harmony which they have only

made visible—so that when tempted to idolize philosophy, let us transfer the homage to Him who both formed the philosopher's mind, and furnished his philosophy with all its materials.

19. (6.) The last adaptation that we shall instance is rather one of mind to mind, and depends on a previous adaptation in each mind of the mental faculties to one another. For the right working of the mind, it is not enough that each of its separate powers shall be provided with adequate strength—they must be mixed in a certain proportion—for the greatest inconvenience might be felt, not in the defect merely, but in the excess of some of them. We have heard of too great a sensibility in the organ of hearing, giving rise to an excess in the faculty, which amounted to disease, by exposing the patient to the pain and disturbance of too many sounds, even of those so faint and low, as to be inaudible to the generality of men. In like manner we can imagine the excess of a property purely mental, of memory for example, amounting to a malady of the intellect, by exposing the victim of it to the presence and the perplexity of too many ideas, even of those which are so insignificant, that it would lighten and relieve the mind, if they had no place there at all.* Certain it is that the more full and

* It has been said of Sir James Macintosh, that the excess of his memory was felt by him as an incumbrance in the writing of

circumstantial is the memory, the more is given for the judgment to do—its proper work of selecting and comparing becoming the more oppressive, with the number and distraction of irrelevant materials. It would have been better that these had found no original admittance within the chamber of recollection; or that only things of real and sufficient importance had left an enduring impression upon its tablet. In other words, it would have been better, that the memory had been less susceptible or less retentive than it is; and this may enable us to perceive the exquisite balancing that must have been requisite, in the construction of the mind—when the very defect of one faculty is thus made to aid and to anticipate the operations of another. He who alone knoweth the secrets of the spirits, formed them with a wisdom to us unsearchable.

20. Certain it is however that variety in the proportion of their faculties, is one chief cause of the difference between the minds of men. And whatever the one faculty may be, in any individual, which predominates greatly beyond the average of the rest—that faculty is selected

history—adding as it did to the difficulty of selection. It is on the same principle that the very multitude of one's ideas and words may form an obstacle to extemporaneous speaking, as has been illustrated by Dean Swift under the comparison of a thin church emptying faster than a crowded one.

as the characteristic by which to distinguish him; and thus he may be designed as a man of judgment, or information, or fancy, or wit, or oratory. It is this variety in their respective gifts, which originates so beautiful a dependence and reciprocity of mutual services among men; and, more especially, when any united movement or united counsel is requisite, that calls forth the co-operation of numbers. No man combines all the ingredients of mental power; and no man is wanting in all of them —so that, while none is wholly independent of others, each possesses some share of importance in the commonwealth. The defects, even of the highest minds, may thus need to be supplemented, by the counterpart excellencies of minds greatly inferior to their own —and, in this way, the pride of exclusive superiority is mitigated; and the respect which is due to our common humanity is more largely diffused throughout society, and shared more equally among all the members of it. Nature hath so distributed her gifts among her children, as to promote a mutual helpfulness, and, what perhaps is still more precious, a mutual humility among men.

21. In almost all the instances of mental superiority, it will be found, that it is a superiority above the average level of the species, in but one thing—or that arises from the predominance of

one faculty above all the rest. So much is this the case, that when the example does occur, of an individual, so richly gifted as to excel in two of the general or leading powers of the mind, his reputation for the one will impede the establishment of his reputation for the other. There occurs to us one very remarkable case of the injustice, done by the men who have but one faculty, to the men who are under the misfortune of having two. In the writings of Edmund Burke, there has at length been discovered, a rich mine of profound and strikingly just reflection, on the philosophy of public affairs. But he felt as well as thought, and saw the greatness and beauty of things, as well as their relations; and so, he could at once penetrate the depths, and irradiate the surface of any object that he contemplated. The light which he flung from him, entered the very innermost shrines and recesses of his subject; but then it was light tinged with the hues of his own brilliant imagination, and many gazing at the splendour, recognized not the weight and the wisdom underneath. They thought him superficial, but just because themselves arrested at the surface; and either because with the capacity of emotion but without that of judgment, or because with the capacity of judgment but without that of emotion—they, from the very meagreness and mutilation of their own faculties, were incapable of that com-

plex homage, due to a complex object which had both beauty and truth for its ingredients. Thus it was that the very exuberance of his genius, injured the man, in the estimation of the pigmies around him; and the splendour of his imagination detracted from the credit of his wisdom. Fox had the sagacity to see this; and posterity now see it. Now that, instead of a passing meteor, he is fixed by authorship in the literary hemisphere, men can make a study of him; and be at once regaled by the poetry, and instructed by the profoundness of his wondrous lucubrations.

Chapter II.

On the Connection between the Intellect and the Emotions

1. The intellectual states of the mind, and its states of emotion, belong to distinct provinces of the mental constitution—the former to the percipient, and the latter to what Sir James Macintosh would term the *emotive* or *pathematic* part of our nature. Bentham applies the term *pathology* to the mind in somewhat the same sense—not expressive, as in medical science, of states of

disease, under which the body suffers; but expressive, in mental science, of states of susceptibility, under which the mind is in any way affected, whether painfully or pleasurably. Had it not been for the previous usurpation or engagement of this term by medical writers, who restrict the application of it to the distempers of our corporeal frame, it might have been conveniently extended to all the susceptibilities of the mental constitution—even when that constitution is in its healthful and natural state. According to the medical use of it, the Greek πασχω from which it is derived, is understood in the sense of the Latin translation, *patior*, to suffer. According to the sense which we now propose for it, in treating of mental phenomena, the Greek πασχω would be understood in the sense of the Latin translation, *afficior*, to be affected. When treating of the mental pathology, we treat, not of mental sufferings, but, more general, of mental susceptibilities. The πασχω of the Greek, whence the term comes, is equivalent, either to the "patior" or the "afficior" of Latin,—the former signifying "to suffer," and the latter simply "to be affected,"—the former sense being the one that is retained in medical, and the latter in mental pathology. The two differ as much the one from the other as passion does from affection, or the violence of a distempered does from the due and pacific effect of a natural influence.

Even the Latin patior might be translated, not merely into "suffer" but into "the being acted upon" or into "the being passive." Medical pathology is the study of those diseases under which the body suffers. Mental pathology is the study of all those phenomena that arise from influences acting upon the mind viewed as passive, or as not putting forth any choice or activity at the time. Now, when thus defined, it will embrace all that we understand by sensations, and affections, and passions. It is not of my will that certain colours impress their appropriate sensations upon my eye, or that certain sounds impress their sensations upon my ear. It is not of my will, but of an organization which I often cannot help, that I am so nervously irritable, under certain disagreeable sights and disagreeable noises. It is not of my will, but of an aggressive influence which I cannot withstand, that, when placed on an airy summit, I forthwith swim in giddiness, and am seized with the imagination, that if I turn not my feet and my eyes from the frightful precipice's margin, I shall topple to its base. Neither is it of my will that I am visited with such ineffable disgust at the sight of some loathsome animal. But these are strong instances, and perhaps evince a state bordering upon disease. Yet we may gather from them some general conception of what is meant by mental pathology, whose design it is to set forth all those states of feeling, into

which the mind is thrown, by the influence of those various objects that are fitted to excite, either the emotions or the sensitive affections of our nature. And, to keep the subject of mental pathology pure, we shall suppose these states of feeling to be altogether unmodified by the will, and to be the very states which result from the law of the external senses, or the laws of emotion, operating upon us at the time, when the mind is either wholly powerless or wholly inactive. To be furnished with one comprehensive term, by which to impress a mark on so large an order of phenomena, must be found very commodious; and though we have adverted to the etymology of the term, yet, in truth, it is of no consequence whether the process of derivation be accurate or not—seeing that the most arbitrary definition, if it only be precise in its objects, and have a precisely expressed sense affixed to it, can serve all the purposes for which a definition is desirable.

2. The emotions enter largely into the pathological department of our nature. They are distinguishable both from the appetites and the external affections, in that they are mental and not bodily—though, in common with these, they are characterized by a peculiar vividness of feeling, which distinguishes them from the intellectual states of the mind. It may not be easy to express the difference in language; but we never confound them in specific instances—being at no loss to which of

the two classes we should refer the acts of memory and judgment; and to which we should refer the sentiments of fear, or gratitude, or shame, or any of the numerous affections and desires of which the mind is susceptible.

3. The first belonging to this class that we shall notice is the desire of knowledge, or the principle of curiosity—having all the appearance and character of a distinct and original tendency in the mind, implanted there for the purpose to which it is so obviously subservient. This principle evinces its reality and strength in very early childhood, even anterior to the faculty of speech—as might be observed in the busy manipulations and exploring looks of the little infant; on any new article that is placed within its reach; and afterwards, by its importunate and never-ending questions. It is this avidity of knowledge which forms the great impellent to the acquisition of it—being in fact the hunger of the mind, and strikingly analogous to the corresponding bodily appetite, in those respects, by which each is manifested, to be the product of a higher wisdom than ours, the effect of a more providential care than man would have taken of himself. The corporeal appetency seeks for food as its terminating object, without regard to its ulterior effect in the sustaining of life. The mental appetency seeks for knowledge, the food of the mind, as its terminating

object, without regard to its ulterior benefits, both in the guidance of life, and the endless multiplication of its enjoyments. The prospective wisdom of man could be trusted with neither of these great interests; and so the urgent appetite of hunger had to be provided for the one, and the like urgent principle of curiosity had to be provided for the other. Each of them bears the same evidence of a special contrivance for a special object—and that by one who took a more comprehensive view of our welfare, than we are capable of taking for ourselves; and made his own additions to the mechanism, for the express purpose of supplementing the deficiency of human foresight. The resemblance between the two cases goes strikingly to demonstrate, how a mental constitution might as effectually bespeak the hand of an intelligent Maker, as does a physical or material constitution. It is true, that, with the great majority of men, the intellectual is not so urgent or imperious, as is the animal craving. But even for this difference, we can perceive a reason, which would not have been found, under a random economy of things. Each man's hunger would need to be alike strong, or at least strong enough to ensure the taking of food for himself—for to this effect, he will receive no benefit from another man's hunger. But there is not the same reason why each man's curiosity should be

alike strong—for the curiosity of one man might subserve the supply of information and intellectual food to the rest of the species. To enlarge the knowledge of the world, it is not needed, that all men should be endowed with such a strength of desire for it, as to bear them onward through the toils of original investigation. The dominant, the aspiring curiosity, which impels the adventurous traveller to untrodden regions, will earn discoveries, not for himself alone, but for all men—if their curiosity be but strong enough for the perusal of his agreeable record, under the shelter, and amid the comforts of their own home. And it is so in all the sciences. The unquenchable thirst of a few, is ever drawing supplies of new truth, which are shared in by thousands. There is an obvious meaning in this variety, between the stronger curiosity of the few who discover truth, and the weaker curiosity of the many who acquire it. The food which hunger impels man to take, is for his own aliment alone. The fruit of that study to which the strength of his own curiosity impels him, may become the property of all men.

4. But, apart from this singularity, we behold in curiosity, viewed as a general attribute, a manifest adaptation to the circumstances in which man is placed. If, on the one hand, we look to the rich and exhaustless variety of truth, in

a universe fraught with the materials of a most stupendous and ever-growing philosophy, and each department of which is fitted to stimulate and regale the curiosity of the human mind—we should say of such an external nature as this, that, presenting a most appropriate field to the inquisitive spirit of our race, it was signally adapted to the intellectual constitution of man. Or if, on the other hand, besides looking to the world as a theatre for the delightful entertainment of our powers, we behold it, in the intricacy of its phenomena and laws, in its recondite mysteries, in its deep and difficult recesses yet conquerable to an indefinite extent by the perseverance of man, and therefore as a befitting theatre for the busy and most laborious exercise of his powers—we should say of such an intellectual constitution as ours, that it was signally adapted to the system of external nature. It would require a curiosity as strong and steadfast as Nature hath given us, to urge us onward, through the appalling difficulties of a search so laborious. Hunger is the great impellent to corporeal labour, and the gratification of this appetite is its reward. Curiosity is a great impellent to mental labour, and, whether we look to the delights or the difficulties of knowledge, we cannot fail to perceive, that this mental appetency in man, and its counterpart objects in

Nature, are suited with marvellous exactness to each other.

5. But the analogy between the mental and the corporeal affections does not stop here. The appetite of hunger would, of itself, impel to the use of food—although no additional pleasure had been annexed to the use of it, in the gratifications of the palate. The sense of taste, with its various pleasurable sensations, has even been regarded, as a distinct proof of the benevolence and care of God. And the same is true of the delights which are felt by the mind, in the acquisition of knowledge—as when truth discloses her high and hidden beauties to the eye of the enraptured student; and he breathes an ethereal satisfaction, having in it the very substance of enjoyment, though the world at large cannot sympathize with it. The pleasures of the intellect, though calm, are intense; insomuch, that a life of deep philosophy were a life of deep emotion, when the understanding receives of its own proper aliment—having found its way to those harmonies of principle, those goodly classifications of phenomena, which the disciples of science love to gaze upon. And the whole charm does not lie in the ultimate discovery. There is a felt triumph in the march, and along the footsteps of the demonstration which leads to it; in the successive evolutions of the reasoning, as well as its successful con-

clusion. Like every other enterprize of man, there is a happiness in the current and continuous pursuit, as well as in the final attainment—as every student in geometry can tell, who will remember, not only the delight he felt on his arrival at the landing place, but the delight he felt when guided onward by the traces and concatenations of the pathway. Even in the remotest abstractions of contemplative truth, there is a glory and a transcendental pleasure, which the world knoweth not; but which becomes more intelligible, because more embodied, when the attention of the enquirer is directed to the realities of substantive nature. And though there be few who comprehend or follow Newton in his gigantic walk, yet all may participate in his triumphant feeling, when he reached that lofty summit, where the whole mystery and magnificence of Nature stood submitted to his gaze—an eminence won by him through the power and the patience of intellect alone; but from which he descried a scene more glorious far than imagination could have formed, or than ever had been pictured and set forth, in the sublimest visions of poetry.

6. It is thus that while the love of beauty, operating upon the susceptible imagination of the theorist, is one of those seducing influences, which lead men astray from the pursuit of experimental truth—he, in fact, who at the outset

resists her fascinations, because of his supreme respect for the lessons of observation, is at length repaid by the discoveries and sights of a surpassing loveliness. The inductive philosophy began its career, by a renunciation, painful we have no doubt at first to many of its disciples, of all the systems and harmonies of the schoolmen. But in the assiduous prosecution of its labours it worked its way to a far nobler and more magnificent harmony at the last—to the real system of the universe, more excellent than all the schemes of human conception—not in the solidity of its evidence alone, but as an object of tasteful contemplation. The self-denial which is laid upon us by Bacon's philosophy, like all other self-denial whether in the cause of truth or virtue, hath its reward. In giving ourselves up to its guidance, we have often to quit the fascinations of beautiful theory; but in exchange for these, are at length regaled by the higher and substantial beauties of actual nature. There is a stubbornness in facts before which the specious ingenuity is compelled to give way; and perhaps the mind never suffers more painful laceration, than when, after having vainly attempted to force nature into a compliance with her own splendid generalizations, she, on the appearance of some rebellious and impracticable phenomenon, has to practise a force upon herself, when she thus finds the

goodly speculation superseded by the homely and unwelcome experience. It seemed at the outset a cruel sacrifice, when the world of speculation, with all its manageable and engaging simplicities had to be abandoned; and, on becoming the pupils of observation, we, amid the varieties of the actual world around us, felt as if bewildered, if not lost, among the perplexities of a chaos. This was the period of greatest sufferance, but it has had a glorious termination. In return for the assiduity wherewith the study of nature hath been prosecuted, she hath made a more abundant revelation of her charms. Order hath arisen out of confusion; and, in the ascertained structure of the universe, there are now found to be a state and a sublimity, beyond all that was ever pictured by the mind, in the days of her adventurous and unfettered imagination. Even viewed in the light of a noble and engaging spectacle for the fancy to dwell upon, who would ever think of comparing with the system of Newton, either that celestial machinery of Des Cartes which was impelled by whirlpools of ether, or that still more cumbrous machinery of cycles and epicycles which was the progeny of a remoter age! It is thus that at the commencement of this observational process, there is an abjuration of beauty. But it soon reappears in another form, and brightens as we advance; and there at length

arises, on solid foundation, a fairer and goodlier system, than ever floated in airy romance before the eye of genius.* Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this. What we discover by observation, is the product of the divine imagination—bodied forth by creative power, into a stable and enduring universe. What we devise by our own ingenuity is but the product of human imagination. The one is the solid archetype of those conceptions which are in the mind of God. The other is the shadowy representation of those conceptions which are in the mind of man. It is even as with the labourer, who, by excavating the rubbish which hides and besets some noble architecture, does more for the gratification of our taste, than if, with his unpractised hand, he should attempt to regale us by plans and sketches of his own. And so the drudgery of experimental science, in exchange for that

* In the "Essays of John Sheppard,"—a work very recently published, and alike characterised by the depth of its christian intelligence and feeling, and the beauty of its thoughts—there occurs the following passage, founded on the Manuscript Notes taken by the author, of Playfair's Lectures. 'It was impressively stated in a preliminary lecture by a late eminent Scottish Professor of Natural Philosophy, that the actual physical wonders of creation far transcend the boldest and most hyberbolical imaginings of poetic minds;" "that the reason of Newton and Gallileo took a sublimer flight than the fancy of Milton and Ariosto." That this is quite true I need only refer you to a few astronomical facts glanced at in subsequent pages of this volume in order to evince.' Sheppard's Essays, p. 69.

beauty, whose fascinations it resisted at the outset of its career, has evolved a surpassing beauty from among the realities of truth and nature. The pain of the initial sacrifice is nobly compensated at the last. The views contemplated through the medium of observation, are found, not only to have a justness in them, but to have a grace and a grandeur in them, far above all the visions which are contemplated through the medium of fancy, or which ever regaled the fondest enthusiast in the enraptured walks of speculation and poetry. But the toils of investigation must be endured first, that the grace and the grandeur might be enjoyed afterwards. The same is true of science in all its departments, not of simple and sublime astronomy alone, but throughout of terrestrial physics; and most of all in chemistry, where the internal processes of actual and ascertained Nature are found to possess a beauty, which far surpasses the crude though specious plausibilities of other days. We perceive in this too, a fine adaptation of the external world to the faculties of man; a happy ordination of Nature by which the labour of the spirit is made to precede the luxury of the spirit, or every disciple of science must strenuously labour in the investigation of its truths, ere he can luxuriate in the contemplation of its beauties. It is by the patient seeking of truth first, that the pleasures of taste and

imagination are superadded to him. For, in these days of stern and philosophic hardihood, nothing but evidence, strict and scrutinized and thoroughly sifted evidence, will secure acceptance for any opinion. Whatever its authority, whatever its engaging likelihood may be, it must first be made to undergo the freest treatment from human eyes and human hands. It is at one time stretched on the rack of an experiment. At another it has to pass through fiery trial in the bottom of a crucible. At another, it has to undergo a long questionary process, among the fumes, and the filtrations, and the intense heat of a laboratory; and, not till it has been subjected to all this inquisitorial torture and survived it, is it preferred to a place in the temple of truth, or admitted among the laws and the lessons of a sound philosophy.

7. But, beside those rewards and excitements to science which lie in science itself, as the curiosity which impels to the prosecution of it, and the delights of prosperous study, and the pleasures that immediately spring from the contemplation of its objects—besides these, there is a remoter but not less powerful influence, and to which indeed we owe greatly more than half the philosophy of our world. We mean the respect in which high intellectual endowments are held by general society. We are not sure but that the love of fame has been of more

powerful operation, in speeding onward the march of discovery, than the love of philosophy for the sake of its own inherent charms; and there are thousands of our most distinguished intellectual labourers, who, but for an expected harvest of renown, would never have entered on the secret and solitary prosecution of their arduous walk. We are abundantly sensible, that this appetency for fame may have helped to vulgarize both the literature and science of the country; that men, capable of the most attic refinement in the one, may, for the sake of a wider popularity, have descended to verbiage and the false splendour of a meretricious eloquence; and that men, capable of the deepest research and purest demonstration in the other, may, by the same unworthy compliance with the flippancy of the public taste, have exchanged the profound argument for the showy and superficial illustration — preferring to the homage of the exalted few, the attendance and plaudits of the multitude. It is thus, that, when access to the easier and lighter parts of knowledge has been suddenly enlarged, the heights of philosophy may be abandoned for a season—the men who wont to occupy there, being tempted to come down from their elevation, and hold converse with that increasing host, who have entered within the precincts, and now throng the outer courts of

the temple. It is thus, that at certain transition periods, in the intellectual history of the species, philosophy may sustain a temporary depression —from which when she recovers, we shall combine, with the inestimable benefit of a more enlightened commonalty, both the glory and the substantial benefit of as cultured a literature and as lofty and elaborate a philosophy as before. And we greatly mistake, if we think, that in those minds of nobler and purer ambition, the love of fame is extinguished, because they are willing to forego the bustling attendance and the clamorous applauses of a crowd. They too are intensely set on praise, but it must be such praise as that of Atticus, 'the incense of which, though not copious, is exquisite—that precious aroma, which fills not the general atmosphere, but by which the few and the finer spirits of our race are satisfied. Theirs is not the broad daylight of popularity. It is a fame of a higher order, upheld by the testimony of the amateurs or the *élite* in science, and grounded on those rare achievements which the public at large can neither comprehend nor sympathize with. "They sit on a hill apart," and there breathe of an ethereal element, in the calm brightness of an upper region, rather than in that glare and gorgeousness by which the eye of the multitude is dazzled. It is not the eclat of a bonfire for the regaling of a mob, but the enduring though

quiet lustre of a star. The place which they occupy is aloft in the galaxy of a nation's literature, where the eyes of the more finely intellectual gaze upon them with delight, and the hearts only of such are lighted up in reverence and *con amore* towards them. Theirs is a high though hidden praise, flowing in secret course through the *savans* of a community, and felt by every true academic to be his most appropriate reward.'*

8. The emotions of which we have yet spoken stand connected, either in the way of cause or of consequence, with the higher efforts of the intellect—as the curiosity which prompts to these efforts, and the delights attendant on the investigation and discovery of truths which reward them; beside the grateful incense of those praises, whether general or select, that are awarded to mental superiority, and form perhaps the most powerful incitement to the arduous and sustained prosecution of mental labour. But there is a connection of another sort, between the emotions and the intellect, of still higher importance—because of the alliance which it establishes between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature. We often speak of the pleasure that we receive from one

* Use and Abuse of Literary and Ecclesiastical Endowments, p. 165—166.

class of the emotions, as those of taste—of the danger or disagreeableness of another, as anger or fear, or envy—of the obligation that lies upon us to cherish and retain certain other emotions, insomuch that the designation of virtuous is generally given to them, as gratitude, and compassion, and the special love of relatives or country, and in one word, all the benevolent affections of our nature. Now, however obvious when stated, it is not sufficiently adverted to, even when studying the philosophy of the subject, and still less in the practical government and regulation of the heart—that, for the very being of each of these specific emotions in the heart, there must a certain appropriate and counterpart object, whether through the channel of sense or of the memory, be present to the thoughts. We can only feel the emotion of beauty, in the act of beholding or conceiving a beautiful object; an emotion of terror, in the view of some danger which menaces us; an emotion of gratitude, in the recollection of a past kindness, or of the benefactor who conferred it. Such then is the necessary dependence between perception and feeling, that, without the one, the other cannot possibly be awakened. Present an object to the view of the mind, and the emotion suited to that object, whether it be love or resentment, or terror, or disgust, must consequently arise; and with as great sureness, as, on

presenting visible things of different colour to the eye, the green and red and yellow and blue impress their different and peculiar sensations on the retina. It is very obvious, that the sensations owe their being to the external objects, without the presence and the perception of which they could not possibly have arisen. And it should be alike obvious, that the emotions owe their being to a mental perception, whether by sense or by memory, of the objects which are fitted to awaken them. Let an object be introduced to the notice of the mind, and its correlative emotion instantly arises in the heart; let the object be forgotten or disappear from the mental view, and the emotion disappears along with it.

9. We deem it no exception to the invariableness of that relation, which subsists between an object and its counterpart emotion, that, in many instances, a certain given object may be present and in full view of the observer, without awakening that sensibility which is proper to it. A spectacle of pain does generally, but not always, awaken compassion. It would always, we think, if a creature in agony were the single object of the mind's contemplation. But the person, now in suffering, may be undergoing the chastisement of some grievous provocation; and the emotion is different, because the object is really different—an offender who has excited the anger

of our bosom, and, in the view of whose inflicted sufferings, this indignant feeling receives its gratification. Or the pain may be inflicted by our own hand on an unoffending animal in the prosecution of some cruel experiment. If compassion be wholly unfelt, it is not because in this instance the law has been repealed which connects this emotion with the view of pain; but it is because the attention of the mind to this object is displaced by another object; even the discovery of truth—and so what but for this might have been an intense compassion, is overborne by an intenser curiosity. And so with all the other emotions. Were danger singly the object of the mind's contemplation, fear, we think, would be the universal feeling; but it may be danger connected with the sight or the menaces of an insulting enemy who awakens burning resentment in the heart, and when anger rises fear is gone; or it may be danger shared with fellow-combatants, whose presence and observation kindle in the bosom the love of glory and impel to deeds of heroism—not because any law which connects, and connects invariably, certain emotions with certain objects, is in any instance reversed or suspended; but because, in this conflict and composition of moral forces, one emotion displaced another from the feelings, only, however, because one object displaced another from the thoughts. Still, in every instance, the

object is the stepping-stone to the emotion—insomuch, that if we want to recal a certain emotion, we must recal to the mind that certain object which awakens it; if we want to cease from the emotion, we must cease from thinking of its object, we must transfer the mind to other objects, or occupy it with other thoughts.

10. This connection between the percipient faculties of the mind and its feelings, reveals to us a connection between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature. How the one is brought instrumentally to bear upon the other, will be afterwards explained. But meanwhile it is abundantly obvious, that the presence or the absence of certain feelings stands connected with the presence or the absence of certain thoughts. We can no more break up the connection between the thought of any object that is viewed mentally, and the feeling which it impresses on the heart, than we can break up the connection between the sight of any object that is viewed materially, and the sensation which it impresses upon the retina. If we look singly and steadfastly to an object of a particular colour, as red, there is an organic necessity for the peculiar sensation of redness, from which we cannot escape, but by shutting our eyes, or turning them away to objects that are differently coloured. If we think singly and steadfastly on an object of a particular character, as an injury, there seems

an organic necessity also for the peculiar emotion of resentment, from which there appears to be no other way of escaping, than by stifling the thought, or turning the mind away to other objects of contemplation. Now we hear both of virtuous emotions and of vicious emotions; and it is of capital importance to know how to retain the one and to exclude the other—which is by dwelling in thought on the objects that awaken the former, and discharging from thought the objects that awaken the latter. And so it is by thinking in a certain way that wrong sensibilities are avoided, and right sensibilities are upholden. It is by keeping up a remembrance of the kindness, that we keep up the emotion of gratitude. It is by forgetting the provocation, that we cease from the emotion of anger. It is by reflecting on the misery of a fellow creature in its vivid and affecting details, that pity is called forth. It is by meditating on the perfections of the Godhead, that we cherish and keep alive our reverence for the highest virtue and our love for the highest goodness. In one word, thought is at once the harbinger and the sustainer of feeling: and this, of itself, forms an important link of communication between the intellectual and the moral departments of our nature.

11. We shall not be able to complete our views, either on the moral character of the emotions, or their dependence on the percipient facul-

ties of the mind, until we have established a certain ulterior principle which comes afterwards into notice. Neither do we now expatiate on their uses, of which we have already given sufficient specimens, in our treatment of the special affections. We would only remark at present, on their vast importance to human happiness—seeing that a state of mental happiness cannot even be so much as imagined without a state of emotion. They are the emotions, in fact, and the external affections together, which share between them the whole interest, whether pleasurable or painful, of human existence. And what a vivid and varied interest that is, may be rendered evident, by a mere repetition of those words which compose the nomenclature of our feelings—as hope, and fear, and grief, and joy, and love diversified into so many separate affections towards wealth, fame, power, knowledge, and all the other objects of human desire, besides the tasteful and benevolent emotions—which altogether keep their unremitting play in the heart, and sustain or fill up the continuity of our sensible being. It says enough for the adaptation of external nature to a mental constitution so complexly and variously endowed, that numerous as these susceptibilities are, the world is crowded with objects, that keep them in full and busy occupation. The details of this contemplation are inexhaustible; and we are not sure

but that the general lesson of the Divine care or Divine benevolence, which may be founded upon these, could be more effectually learned by a close attention of the mind upon one specific instance, than by a complete enumeration of all the instances, with at the same time only a briefer and slighter notice of each of them.

12. And it would make the lesson all the more impressive, if, instead of selecting as our example, an emotion of very exalted character, and of which the influence on human enjoyment stood forth in bright daylight to the observation of all, such as the sensibility of a heart that was feelingly alive to the calls of benevolence, or feelingly alive to the beauties of nature—we should take for our case some other kind of emotion, so common perhaps as to be ignobly familiar, and on which one would scarcely think of constructing aught so dignified or so serious as a theological argument. Yet we cannot help thinking, that it most emphatically tells us of the teeming, the profuse benevolence of the Deity—when we reflect on those homelier and those every-day sources, out of which, the whole of human life, through the successive hours of it, is seasoned with enjoyment; and a most agreeable zest is imparted from them, to the ordinary occasions of converse and companionship among men. When the love of novelty finds in the

walks of science the gratification that is suited to it, we can reason gravely on the final cause of the emotion, and speak of the purpose of Nature, or rather of the Author of Nature, in having instituted such a reward for intellectual labour. But we lose sight of all the wisdom and all the goodness that are connected with this mental ordination—when the very same principle, which, in the lofty and liberal *savant*, we call the love of novelty, becomes, in the plain and ordinary citizen, the love of news. Yet in this humbler and commonplace form, it is needless to say, how prolific it is of enjoyment—giving an edge as it were to the whole of one's conscious existence, and its principal charm to the innocent and enlivening gossip of every social party. Perhaps a still more effective exemplification may be had in another emotion of this class, that which arises from our sense of the ludicrous—which so often ministers to the gaiety of man's heart, even when alone; and which, when he congregates with his fellows, is ever and anon breaking forth into some humorous conception, that infects alike the fancies of all, and finds vent in one common shout of ecstacy. Like every other emotion, it stands allied with a perception as its antecedent, the object of the perception in this instance being the conjunction of things that are incongruous with each other—on the first discovery or con-

ception of which, the mirth begins to tumultuate in the heart of some one; and on the first utterance of which, it passes with irrepressible sympathy into the hearts of all who are around him—whence it obtains the same ready discharge as before, in a loud and general effervescence. To perceive how inexhaustible the source of this enjoyment is, we have only to think of it in connection with its cause; and then try to compute, if we can, all the possibilities of wayward deviation, from the sober literalities of truth and nature, whether in the shape of new imaginations by the mind of man, or of new combinations and events in actual history. It is thus that the pleasure connected with our sense of the ludicrous, forms one of the most current gratifications of human life; nor is it essential that there should be any rare peculiarity of mental conformation, in order to realize it. We find it the perennial source of a sort of gentle and quiet delectation, even to men of the most sober temperament, and whose habit is as remote as possible from that of fantastic levity, or wild and airy extravagance. When acquaintances meet together in the street, and hold colloquy for a few minutes, they may look grave enough, if business or politics or some matter of serious intelligence be the theme—yet how seldom do they part before some coruscation of playfulness has been

struck out between them; and the interview, though begun perhaps in sober earnest, but seldom passes off, without some pleasantry or other to enliven it. We should not dwell so long on this part of the human constitution, were there not so much of happiness and so much of benevolence allied with it—as is obvious indeed from the very synonymes, to which the language employed for the expression of its various phenomena and feeling has given rise. To what else but to the pleasure we have in the ludicrous is it owing, that a ludicrous observation has been termed a pleasantry; or how but to the affinity between happiness and mirth can we ascribe it, that the two terms are often employed as equivalent to each other; and whence but from the strong connection which subsists between benevolence and humour can it be explained, that a man is said to be in good humour, when in a state of placidness and cordiality with all who are around him? We are aware that there is not a single disposition wherewith Nature hath endowed us which may not be perverted to evil; but when we see so much both of human kindness and of human enjoyment associated with that exhilaration of heart to which this emotion is so constantly giving rise—ministering with such copiousness, both to the smiles of the domestic hearth, and the gaieties of festive companionship—we cannot

but regard it as the provision of an indulgent Father, who hath ordained it as a sweetener or an emollient amid the annoyances and the ills which flesh is heir to.

13. It were difficult to compute the whole effect of this ingredient, in alleviating the vexations of life; but certain it is that the ludicrous is often blended with the annoyances which befal us; and that its operation, in lightening the pressure of what might have otherwise been viewed as somewhat in the light of a calamity, is far from inconsiderable. This balancing of opposite emotions, suggested by different parts of the same complex event or object, and the effect of the one if a pleasant emotion, in assuaging the painfulness of the other, is not an uncommon phenomenon in the exhibitions of human feeling. A very obvious specimen of this is afforded by an acquaintance in the act of falling. There is no doubt an incongruity between the moment of his walking uprightly, and with the full anticipation of getting forward in that attitude to the object whither he is bending—and the next moment of his floundering in the mud, and hastening with all his might to gather himself up again. They who philosophize upon the laws of succession in the events of Nature, have a great demand for such successions as are immediate. They go busily in quest of the contiguous links, and properly conceive

that if any one hidden step be yet interposed, between the two which they regularly observe to follow each other, they have not completed the investigation, till that step also have been ascertained. It is therefore so far an advantage in regard to the above phenomenon, that there does not appear to be time even for the most rapid and fugitive intervention—for only let it occur in the presence of lookers on, and, with the speed of lightning, will it be followed up by the instant and obstreperous glee of a whole host of spectatorship.

14. But this very exhibition may give rise to a wholly different emotion. The provocative to laughter lies in the awkwardness of the fall. Let the awkwardness be conceived to abide as it was, and this other ingredient to be added, the severity of the fall—that a limb is fractured, or that a swoon, a convulsion, or a stream of blood is the immediate consequence. In proportion to the hurt that was sustained, would be the sympathy of far the greater number of the by-standers; and this might be so heightened by the palpable sufferings of him to whom the accident has befallen, that the sense of the ludicrous might be entirely overborne.

15. The two provocatives are the awkwardness of the fall and its severity. The two emotions are the mirth and the compassion. The

one of these may so predominate over the other as to leave the mind under its entire and single ascendency. A mathematician would require the point, at which, by a gradual increase or diminution upon either of the two elements, they were mutually neutralized—or the transition was made from the one to the other of them. In this we may not be able to satisfy him. But all may have been sensible of an occasion, when the two were so delicately poised, that the mind positively vibrated—so as to make a sort of tremulous and intermediate play, between these distinct and nearly opposite emotions. This is one of those nicer exhibitions of our nature that one feels an interest in remarking; and many perhaps may recollect the instances, when even some valued friend hath smarted pretty seriously, under some odd or ludicrous mishap in which he hath been involved, and when they have felt themselves in a state of most curious ambiguity, between the pity which they ought to feel, and the levity which they were not able to repress. The peculiarities of this midway condition are greatly aggravated, if there be so many acquaintances who share it among them, and more especially, if they meet together and talk over the subject of it—in which case, it will be no singular display of our mysterious nature, although the visitations of a common sympathy should be found to alternate with the high-sounding peals

of a most rapturous and uncontrollable merriment.

16. We cannot fail to perceive, in this instance too, how inseparable the alliance is between perception and feeling. According as the mind looks, so is the heart affected. When we look to the awkwardness of the mischance, whatever it may be, we become gay. When we look to its severity, we become sad. It is instructive to observe, with what fidelity the heart follows the mind in this process, and how whichever the object is that for the time is regarded by the one, it is sure to be responded to by an appropriate emotion from the other.

17. We should not have ventured on these illustrations, but for the lesson which they serve to establish. They prove the extent to which a sense of the ludicrous might lighten and divert the painfulness of those serious feelings to which humanity is exposed. It is true that much evil may be done, when it puts to flight, as it often does, seriousness of principle; but, on the other hand, there is unquestionable good done by it, when it puts to flight, either the seriousness of resentment—or the seriousness of suffering. And when we think of its frequent and powerful effect, both in softening the malignant asperities of debate, and in reconciling us to those misadventures and pettier miseries of life, which, if not so alleviated, would keep us in a state of continual festerment—we cannot but regard even

this humbler part of the constitution of man, as a palpable testimony both to the wisdom and goodness of Him who framed us.*

18. Before quitting this department of the subject, we may advert, not to an individual peculiarity, but to the respective characters by which two classes of intellect are distinguished, and to the effect of their mutual action and reaction on the progress of opinion in the world.

19. The first of these intellectual tendencies may be seen in those who are distinguished by their fond and tenacious adherence to the existing philosophy, and by their indisposition to any changes of it. They feel it painful to relinquish their wonted and established habits of thought—as if the mind were to suffer violence, by having to quit its ancient courses, and to unlearn the

* "The advantages which we derive from our susceptibility of this species of emotion, are, in their immediate influence on the cheerfulness, and therefore on the general happiness of society, sufficiently obvious. How many hours would pass wearily along, but for those pleasantries of wit, or of easier and less pretending gaiety which enliven what would have been dull, and throw many bright colours on what would have been gloomy. We are not to estimate these accessions of pleasure lightly, because they relate to objects that may seem trifling, when considered together with those more serious concerns, by which our ambition is occupied, and in relation to which, in the success or failure of our various projects, we look back on the past months or years of our life as fortunate or unfortunate. If these serious concerns alone were to be regarded, we might often have been very fortunate and very unhappy, as in other circumstances we might often have had much happiness in

opinions of other days. We have no doubt that the love of repose, the aversion to that mental labour which is requisite even for the understanding of a new system, or at least for the full comprehension and estimate of its proofs—enters largely into this dislike for all novelties of speculation, into this determined preference for the doctrines in which they have been educated—although the associations too of taste and reverence share largely in the result. It is thus that the old are more disinclined to changes; and there is a peculiar reason why schools and corporations of learning should make the sturdiest resistance to them. It is a formidable thing to make head against that majority within the walls of every venerable institute, which each new opinion has to encounter at the outset; and more especially,

the hours and days of years, which terminated at last in the disappointment of some favourite scheme. It is good to travel with pure and balmy airs and cheerful sunshine, though we should not find, at the end of our journey, the friend whom we wished to see; and the gaieties of social converse, though they are not, in our journey of life, what we travel to obtain, are during the continuance of our journey at once a freshness which we breathe, and a light that gives every object to sparkle to our eye with a radiance that is not its own." *Brown's Lectures*—Lecture 59. But this emotion is allied with benevolence as well as with enjoyment. There is perhaps not a more welcome topic at the tables of the great, than the characteristic peculiarities or oddities of humble life—and we have no doubt that along with the amusement which is felt in the cottage anecdotes of a domain, there is often awakened by them, a benevolent interest in the well-being of the occupiers.

if it tend to derange the methods of a university, or unsettle the long established practice of its masters. This will explain that inveteracy of long possession, which, operating both in many individual minds and in the bosom of colleges, gives formation and strength to what may be termed the conservative party in science or in the literary commonwealth—that party which maintains the largest and most resolute contest with all new opinions, and will not give way, till overpowered by the weight of demonstration, and energy of the public voice in their favour.

20. Opposed to this array of strength on the side of existing principles, we have the incessant operations of what may be termed the movement party in science or in the literary commonwealth —some of whom are urged onward by the mere love of novelty and change; others by the love of truth; and very many by a sort of ardent and indefinite imagination of yet unreached heights in philosophy, and of the new triumphs which await the human mind in its interminable progress from one brilliant or commanding discovery to another. We have often thought that a resulting optimism is the actual effect of the play or collision that is constantly kept up between these two rival parties in the world of letters. On the one hand it is well, that philosophy should not be a fixture, but should at length give way to the accumulating force of evidence. But

on the other hand it is well, that it should require a certain, and that a very considerable force of evidence, ere it shall quit its present holds, or resign the position which it now occupies. We had rather that it looked with an air of forbidding authority on the mere likelihoods of speculation than that, lightly set agog by every specious plausibility, it should open its schools to a restless and rapid succession of yet undigested theories. It is possible to hold out too obstinately and too long; but yet it is well, that a certain balance should obtain between the adhesive and the aggressive forces in the world of speculation; and that the general mind of society should have at least enough of the sedative in its composition, to protect it from aught like violent disturbance, or the incursion of any rash adventurer in the field of originality. And for this purpose it is well, that each novelty, kept at bay for a time, and made to undergo a sufficient probation, should be compelled, thoroughly to substantiate its claims—ere it be admitted to take a place beside the philosophy, which is recognized by all the authorities, and received into all the institutes of the land.

21. And they are the very same principles, which, when rightly blended, operate so beneficially, not in philosophy alone, but in politics. There is no spirit which requires more to be kept in check, than that of the mere wantonness

of legislation; and so far from being annoyed by that indisposition to change, which is rather the characteristic of all established authorities, we should regard it in the light of a wholesome counteractive, by which to stay the excesses of wild and wayward innovators. There is a great purpose served in society by that law of nature, in virtue of which it is that great bodies move slowly. It would not answer, if a government were to veer and to vacillate with every breath of speculation—if easily liable to be diverted from the steadfastness of their course, by every lure or by every likelihood which sanguine adventurers held out to them. It is well, that in the ruling corporation, there should be a certain strength of resistance, against which all splendid imaginations and all unsound and hollow plausibilities, might spend their force and be dissipated; and, so far from complaining of it as an impracticable engine which is so hard and difficult of impulse, we should look upon its very unwieldiness in the light of a safeguard, without which we should be driven to and fro by every wind of doctrine on a troubled sea that never rests. On these accounts we feel inclined that, in the vessel of the body politic, there should be a preponderance of ballast over sail; and that it really is so, we might put to the account of that optimism, which, with certain reservations, obtains to a very great degree, in the frame-work

and throughout the whole mechanism of human society.

22. But this property in the machine of a government to which we now advert, does not preclude that steady and sober-minded improvement which is all that is desirable. It only restrains the advocates of improvement from driving too rapidly. It does not stop, it only retards their course, by a certain number of defeats and disappointments, which, if their course be indeed a good one, are but the stepping-stones to their ultimate triumph. Ere that the victory is gotten, they must run the gauntlet of many reverses and many mortifications; and they are not to expect by one, but by several and successive blows of the catapulta, that inveterate abuses and long established practices can possibly be overthrown. It is thus, in fact, that every weak cause is thrown back into the nonentity whence it sprung, and that every cause of inherent goodness or worth is ultimately carried —rejected, like the former, at its first and earliest overtures; but, unlike the former, coming back every time with a fresh weight of public feeling and public demonstration in its favour, till, like the abolition of the slave trade or that of commercial restrictions, causes which had the arduous struggle of many long years to undergo, it at length obtains the conclusive seal upon it of the highest authority in the land, and a seal by

which the merits of the cause are far better authenticated, than if the legislature were apt to fluctuate at the sound of every new and seemly proposal. We have therefore no quarrel with a certain *vis inertiæ* in a legislature. Only let it not be an absolute fixture; and there is the hope, with perseverance, of all that is really important or desirable in reformation. The sluggishness that has been ascribed to great corporations is, in the present instance, a good and desirable property—as being the means of separating the chaff from the wheat of all those overtures, that pour in upon representatives from every quarter of the land; and, so far from any feeling of annoyance at the retardation to which the best of them is subjected, it should be most patiently and cheerfully acquiesced in, as being in fact the process, by which it brightens into prosperity, and at length its worth and its excellence are fully manifested.

23. It is not the necessary effect of this peculiar mechanism, it is but the grievous perversion of it, when the corrupt inveteracy has withstood improvement so long, that ere it could be carried, the assailing force had to gather into the momentum of an energy that might afterwards prove mischievous, when the obstacle which provoked it into action had at length been cleared away. It is then that the vessel of the state which might have been borne safely and pros-

perously onward in the course of ages, by a steady breeze and with a sufficiency of ballast, as if slipped from her moorings is drifted uncontrollably along, and precipitated from change to change with the violence of a hurricane.

Chapter III.

On the Connection between the Intellect and the Will.

1. There is distinction made between a mental susceptibility and a mental power. Should we attempt to define it, we might say of the power, that it implies a reference to something consequent, and of the susceptibility that it implies a reference to something antecedent. It is thus that a volition is conceived to indicate the former, and an emotion to indicate the latter. Anger would be spoken of rather as a susceptibility of the mind than as a power; and will rather as a power than as a susceptibility. We view anger in connection with the provocatives which went before it; and so regarding it as an effect, we conceive of the mind in which this effect has been wrought, as being at the time in a state of subject passiveness. We view the will in connection with the deeds which follow on

its determinations; and so regarding it as a cause, we conceive of the mind when it wills as being in a state of active efficiency. And yet a determination of the will may be viewed not merely as the prior term to the act which flows from it, but also as the posterior term to the influence which gave it birth—or in other words, either as the forthgoing of a power or as the result of a susceptibility. It is thus that desire, which on looking backward to the cause from whence it sprung, we should call a susceptibility —on looking forward to the effect which it prompts for the attainment of its object, we should call an impellent; and thus depth of feeling is identical, or at least, in immediate contact with decision and intensity of purpose.

2. But in our intent prosecution of this analysis, and use of those appropriate terms which are employed for expressing the results of it, we have often to desert the common language, and are apt to lose sight of certain great and palpable truths, of which that language is the ordinary vehicle. When tracing the intermediate steps, between the first exposure of the mind to a seducing influence, and the deed or perpetration of enormity into which it is hurried, we are engaged in what may properly be termed a physical enquiry—as much so as, when passing from cause to consequent, we are attending to any succession or train of phenomena in the

material world. But it is when thus employed that we are so apt to lose sight of the moral character of that which we are contemplating; and to forget when or at what point of the series it is that the designation whether of virtuous or vicious, the charge whether of merit or demerit, comes to be applicable.* It is well that, amid all the difficulties attendant on the physiological inquiry, there should be such a degree of clearness and uniformity in the moral judgments of men—insomuch that the peasant can, with a just and prompt discernment equal to that of the philosopher, seize on the real moral characteristics of any action submitted to his notice, and pronounce on the merit or demerit of him who has performed it. It is in attending to these

* Dr. Brown has well distinguished between the two inquiries in the following sentences. "In one very important respect, however, the inquiries, relating to the physiology of mind, differ from those which relate to the physiology of our animal frame. If we could render ourselves acquainted with the intimate structure of our bodily organs, and all the changes which take place, in the exercise of their various functions, our labour, with respect to them, might be said to terminate. But though our intellectual analysis were perfect, so that we could distinguish, in our most complex thought or emotion, its constituent elements, and trace with exactness the series of simpler thoughts which have progressively given rise to them, other inquiries, equally or still more important, would remain. We do not know all which is to be known of the mind when we know all its phenomena, as we know all which can be known of matter, when we know the appearances which it presents, in every situation in which it is possible to place it, and the manner in which it then acts or is acted upon

popular or rather universal decisions, that we learn those phenomena which are of main importance to our argument—now that, after having bestowed a separate attention on the moral and intellectual constitutions of human nature, we are investigating the connection which is between them.

3. The first of those popular or rather universal decisions, which we shall at present notice, is, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. A murderer may be conceived, instead of striking with the dagger in his own hand, to force it, by an act of refined cruelty, into the hand of him, who is the dearest relative or friend of his devoted victim; and, by his

by other bodies. When we know that man has certain affections and passions, there still remains the great inquiry, as to the propriety or impropriety of these passions, and of the conduct to which they lead. We have to consider, not only how he is capable of acting, but also, whether, acting in the manner supposed, he would be fulfilling a duty or perpetrating a crime. Every enjoyment which man can confer on man, and every evil which he can reciprocally inflict or suffer, thus become objects of two sciences—first of that intellectual analysis which traces the happiness and misery, in their various forms and sequences, as mere phenomena or states of the substance mind;—and secondly, of that ethical judgment, which measures our approbation and disapprobation, estimating, with more than judicial scrutiny, not merely what is done, but what is scarcely thought in secrecy and silence, and discriminating some element of moral good or evil, in all the physical good and evil, which it is in our feeble power to execute, or in our still frailer heart to conceive and desire." *Brown's Lectures*, Lecture I.

superior strength, to compel the struggling and the reluctant instrument to its grasp. He may thus confine it to the hand, and give impulse to the arm of one, who recoils in utmost horror from that perpetration, of which he has been made as it were the material engine; and could matters be so contrived, as that the real murderer should be invisible, while the arm and the hand that inclosed the weapon, and the movements of the ostensible one, should alone be patent to the eye of the senses—then he and not the other would be held by the by-stander as chargeable with the guilt. But so soon as the real nature of the transaction came to be understood, this imputation would be wholly and instantly transferred. The distinction would at once be recognized between the willing agent in this deed of horror, and the unwilling instrument. There would no more of moral blame be attached to the latter, than to the weapon which inflicted the mortal blow; and on the former exclusively, the whole burden of the crime and its condemnation would be laid. And the simple difference which gives rise to the whole of this moral distinction in the estimate between them, is, that with the one the act was with the will; with the other it was against it.

4. The will may be spoken of either as a faculty of the mind, or it may denote one separate and individual act of willing. He willed

to take a walk with me. It was his will so to do. But there is another term which is more properly expressive of the act, and is not at all expressive of the faculty. Those terms which discriminate, and which restrict language to a special meaning, are very convenient both in science and in common life. The will then may express both the faculty and the act of willing. But the act of willing has been further expressed by a term appropriated wholly to itself—and that is, volition. Mr. Locke defines volition to be "an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action." And Dr. Reid more briefly, but to the same effect, says that it is—"the determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power." He very properly remarks, however, that, after all, determination is only another word for volition; and he excuses himself, at the same time, from giving any other more logical definition—on the plea, that simple acts of the mind do not admit of one.

5. There is certainly a ground, in the nature and actual workings of the mental constitution, for the distinction, which has been questioned of late, between will and desire. Desire has been thus defined by Locke—"It is the uneasiness man finds in himself, upon the absence

of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it"—an uneasiness which many may remember to have felt in their younger days, at the sight of an apple of tempting physiognomy, that they would fain have laid hold of, but were restrained from touching by other considerations. The desire is just the liking that one has for the apple; and by its effectual solicitations, it may gain over the will to its side—in which case, through the medium of a volition, the apple is laid hold of, and turned to its natural application. But the will may, and often does, refuse its consent; and we then better perceive the distinction between the desire and the will, when we thus see them in a state of opposition—or when the urgency of the desire is met by other urgencies, which restrain the indulgence of it. One might be conceived, as having the greatest appetency for the fruit, and yet knowing it to be injurious to his health—so that, however strong his desires, his will keeps its ground against their solicitations. Or he may wish to reserve it for one of his infant children; and so his will sides with the second desire against the first, and carries this latter one into execution. Or he may reflect, after all, that the apple is not his own property, or that perhaps he could not pull it from among the golden crowds and clusters around it, without injury to the tree upon which it is hanging; and so he

is led by the sense of justice to keep both the one and the other desire at abeyance—and the object of temptation remains untouched, just because the will combats the desire instead of complying with it, and refuses to issue that mandate, or in other words, to put forth that volition, which would instantly be followed up by an act and an accomplishment. And thus, however good the tree is for food, and however pleasant to the eyes, and however much to be desired, so as to make one taste and be satisfied —yet, if strong enough in all these determinations of prudence or principle, he may look on the fruit thereof and not eat.

6. Dr. Brown and others would say, that there is nothing in this process, but the contest of opposite desires and the prevalence of the strongest one—and so identify will and desire with each other.* But though a volition should be the sure result of a desire, that is no more.

* Edwards, at the outset of his treatise on the Will, controverts Locke; but in such a way as reduces the difference between them very much to a question of nomenclature. On the one hand, the difference between a volition and a desire does not affect the main doctrine of Jonathan Edwards; for, though volitions be distinct from desires, they may nevertheless be the strict and unvarying results of them. Even Edwards himself seems to admit, that the mind has a different object in willing from what it has in desiring —an act of our own being the object of the one; the thing desired being the object of the other. It serves to mark more strikingly the distinction between willing and desiring, when even an act of our own is the proper object of each of them. There may be

reason why they should be identified, than why the prior term of any series in nature should be identified or confounded, with any of its posterior terms, whether more or less remote. In the process that we have been describing, there were different desires in play, but there were not different volitions in play. There was one volition appended to the strongest desire: but the other desires though felt by the mind, and therefore in actual being, had no volitions appended to them—proving that a desire may exist separately from the volition that is proper to it, and that therefore the two are separate and distinct from each other. The truth is, using Dr. Brown's own language, the mind is in a different state when framing a volition, from what it is when feeling a desire. When feeling a desire, the mind has respect to the object desired—which object, then in view of the mind, is acting with its own peculiar influence on a mental suscepti-

a great desire to inflict a blow on an offender; but this desire, restrained by considerations of prudence or principle, may not pass into a volition. Edwards would say that even here the volition does not run counter to the desire, but only marks the prevalence of the stronger desire over the weaker one. Now this is true; but without at all obliterating the distinction for which we contend. The volition does run counter to the weaker desire, though under the impulse of the stronger, and there are three distinct mental phenomena in this instance, the stronger desire, the weaker desire and the volition, which ought no more to be confounded, than any movement with the motive forces that gave rise to it, or than the posterior with the prior term of any sequence.

bility. When framing a volition the mind has respect, not properly to the object, but to the act by which it shall attain the object—and so is said to be putting forth a mental power.* But whether this distinction be accurately expressed or not, certain it is, the mind is differently conditioned, when in but a state of simple desire—from what it is when in the act of conceiving a volition. It is engaged with different things, and looking different ways—in the one case to the antecedent object which has excited the desire, in the other case to the posterior act on which the will has determined for the attainment of the object. The palsied man who cannot stretch forth his hand to the apple that is placed in the distance before him, may, nevertheless, long after it; and in him we perceive desire singly—for he is restrained by very helplessness from putting forth a volition, the proper object of which is some action of our own, and that we know to be in our own power. We accept with great pleasure of that simplification by Dr. Brown, in virtue of which we regard the mind not as a congeries of different faculties, but as, itself one and indivisible, having the capacity of passing into different states; and without conceiving any distinction of faculties, we only affirm that it is in a different state when it wills, from that in which it is when it simply desires.

* See Art. 1. of this Chapter.

Notwithstanding the high authority both of Dr. Brown and Mr. Mill, we think that in confounding these two, they have fallen into an erroneous simplification; and we abide by the distinction of Dugald Stewart and the older writers upon this subject.*

7. But the point of deepest interest is that step of the process, at which the character of right or wrong comes to be applicable. It is not at that point, when the appetites or affections of our nature solicit from the will a particular move-

* Hume says very well of desire, that—"it arises from good considered simply and aversion from evil. The will again exerts itself, when either the presence of the good or absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body." This is the definition of Hume, and it is a very good one. And it tallies with the sensible remark of Dr. Reid, that the object of every volition is some action of our own. And upon this he founds some very clear illustrations of the difference that there is between a desire and a volition. "A man desires that his children may be happy, and that they may behave well. Their being happy is no action at all; and their behaving well is not his action but theirs." "A man athirst has a strong desire to drink; but for some particular reason he determines not to gratify his desire," Here the man has the desire but not the will. In other cases he may have the will but not the desire. "A man for health may take a nauseous drug; for which he has no desire, but a great aversion." Desire, therefore, is not will; but only one of the incitements that often leads to it—though it may at all times be, and actually sometimes is withstood. It is, however, because desire is so often accompanied by will, that we are apt to overlook the distinction between them.

I may here observe that to frame a volition is sometimes expressed more shortly by the phrase, to will. I will put forth my

ment; neither is it at that point, when either a rational self love or a sense of duty remonstrates against it. It is not at that point when the consent of the will is pleaded for, on the one side or other—but all-important to be borne in mind, it is at that point when the consent is given. When we characterize a court at law for some one of its deeds—it is not upon the urgency of the argument on one side of the question, or of the reply upon the other, that we found our estimate; but wholly upon the decision of the bench, which decision is carried into effect by a certain order given out to the officers who execute it. And so, in characterising an individual for some one of his doings, we found our estimate, not upon

hand, is different from, I desire to put it forth. There may be reasons why I should restrain the desire—so that though I desire it, I may not will it. For this application of the verb to will, we have the authority of the best English writers. "Whoever," says Dr. South, "wills the doing of a thing, if the doing of it be in his power, he will certainly do it; and whoever does not do the thing which he has in his power to do, does not properly will it." And Locke says, "the man that sits still is said to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it." Dr. South makes a happy discrimination, which serves to throw light upon the precise nature of a volition as opposed to other things that may or may not lead to a volition—when he says, "that there is as much difference between the approbation of the judgment and the actual volitions of the will, as between a man's viewing a desirable thing, and reaching after it with his hand." He further says of a wish, which is nought but a longing desire, that—"a wish is properly the desire of a man who is sitting or lying still; but an act of the will is a man of business vigorously going about his work."

the desires of appetite that may have instigated him, on the one hand, or upon the dictates of conscience that may have withstood these upon the other—not upon the elements that conflicted in the struggle, but on the determination that put an end to it—even that determination of the will, which is carried into effect by those volitions, on the issuing of which, the hands, and the feet, and the other instruments of action are put into instant subserviency.

8. To prove how essentially linked together, the morality of any act is with its wilfulness, it is of no consequence, whether the volition that gave rise to the act, be the one which preceded it immediately as its proximate cause, or be a remote and anterior volition—in which latter case, it is termed a purpose, conceived at some period which may have long gone by, but which was kept unalterable till the opportunity for its execution came round.* There may be an interval of time, between that resolution of the will which is effective, and that performance by which it is carried into effect. One may resolve

* It is true that if the desire were to cease for the object to be attained by the proposed act, the purpose would cease along with it, but it were confounding the things which in reality are distinct from each other, to represent on this account the desire and the purpose as synonymous. The one respects the object that is wished for; the other respects the action, by which the object is to be attained.

to-day, with full consent and purpose of the will, on some criminal enterprise for to-morrow. It is to-day that he has become the criminal, and has incurred a guilt to which even the performance of the morrow may bring no addition and no enhancement. The performance of to-morrow does not constitute the guilt, but only indicates it. It may prove what before the execution of the will was still an uncertainty. It may prove the strength of that determination which has been already taken—how it can stand its ground through all the hours which intervene between the desire and its fulfilment; how meanwhile the visitations of reflection and remorse have been kept at a distance, or all been disregarded; how with relentless depravity, the purpose has been adhered to, and the remonstrances of conscience or perhaps the entreaties of virtuous friendship have all been set at nought; how, with a hardihood that could brave alike the disgrace and the condemnation which attach to moral worthlessness, he could proceed with unfaltering step from the reprobate design to its full and final accomplishment—nor suffer all the suggestions of his leisure and solitude, however affecting the thought of that innocence which he is now on the eve of forfeiting, or a tenderness for those relatives who are to be deeply wounded by the tidings of his fall, or the authority of a

father's parting advice, or the remembrance of a mother's prayers, to stay his hand.

9. That an action then be the rightful object, either of moral censure, or approval, it must have had the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of a volition—else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning, as are the pulsations of the wrist. Something ludicrous might occur, which all of a sudden sets one irresistibly on the action of laughing; or a tale of distress might be told, which whether he wills or not, forces from him the tears of sympathy, and sets him as irresistibly on the action of weeping; or, on the appearance of a ferocious animal, he might struggle with all his power for a serene and manly firmness, yet struggle in vain against the action of trembling; or if instead of a formidable a loathsome animal was presented to his notice, he might no more help the action of a violent recoil perhaps antipathy against it, than he can help any of the organic necessities of that constitution which has been given to him; or even upon the observation of what is disgusting in the habit or countenance of a fellow man, he may be overpowered into a sudden and sensitive aversion; and lastly, should some gross and grievous transgression against the decencies of civil-

ized life be practised before him, he might no more be able to stop that rush of blood to the complexion which marks the inward workings of an outraged and offended delicacy, than he is able to alter or suspend the law of its circulation. In each of these cases the action is involuntary; and precisely because it is so, the epithet neither of morally good nor of morally evil can be applied to it. And so of every action that comes thus to speak of its own accord; and not at the will or bidding of the agent. It may be painful to himself. It may also be painful to others. But if it have not had the consent of his will, even that consent without which no action that is done can be called voluntary, it is his misfortune and not his choice; and though not indifferent in regard to its consequences on the happiness of man, yet, merely because disjoined from the will, it in point of moral estimation is an act of the purest indifference.

10. How then, it may be asked, can any moral character be affixed to an emotion, which seems to be an organic or pathological phenomenon, wherewith the will may have little, perhaps nothing to do. Nothing we have affirmed is either virtuous or vicious, unless the voluntary in some way intermingles with it; and how then shall we vindicate the moral rank which is commonly assigned to the mere susceptibilities of our nature? We regard compassion as a vir-

tuous sensibility; and we regard malignity, or licentiousness, or envy, as so many depraved affections; and yet, on our principle, they are virtuous or vicious, only in so far as they are wilful. It is clearly at the bidding of his will, that a man acts with his hand, and therefore we are at no loss to hold him responsible for his doings; but we must learn how it is at the bidding of his will that he feels with his heart, ere we can hold him responsible for his desires. If apart from the will, there be neither moral worth nor moral worthlessness—if it be implied in the very notion of desert that the will has had some concern in that which we thus characterize—if neither actions nor affections are, without volitions, susceptible of any moral reckoning—it may require some consideration to perceive, how far the element of moral worth is at all implicated in an emotion. If the emotions of sympathy be as much the result of an organic framework as the emotions of taste, and if this be true of all the emotions—it remains to be seen, why either praise or censure should be awarded to any of them. Whether an emotion of taste arises within me at the sight of beauty, or an emotion of pity at the sight of distress—the mind may have been as passive, or there may have been as much of the strictly pathological in the one emotion as in the other.

11. Now it may be very true, that the will

has as little to do with that pathological law, by which the sight of distress awakens in my bosom an emotion of pity, as with that other pathological law by which the sight of a red object impresses on my retina the sensation peculiar to that colour. Yet the will, though not the proximate, may have been the remote and so the real cause, both of the emotion and sensation notwithstanding. It may have been at the bidding of my will, that, instead of hiding myself, from my own flesh, I visited a scene of wretchedness, and entered within the confines as it were of that pathological influence, in virtue of which, after that the spectacle of suffering was seen the compassion was unavoidable. And it is also at the bidding of my will, that I place myself within view of an object of sense; that I direct my eye towards it, and keep it open to that sensation, which, after the circumstances that I have voluntarily realized, is equally unavoidable. I might have escaped from the emotion, had I so willed, by keeping aloof from the spectacle which awakened it. And I might escape from the sensation, if I so will, by shutting my eyes, or turning them away from the object which is its cause; or, in other words, by the command which I have over the looking faculty that belongs to me. And perhaps the mind has a looking faculty as well as the body, in virtue of which, as by the one objects are either removed

from, or made present to the sight, so by the other, objects may be either removed from, or made present to the thoughts. Could we ascertain the existence and operations of such a faculty, this would explain how it is, that the emotions are subordinated not immediately but mediately to the will—that the mind by the direction of its looking faculty towards the counterpart objects, could, on the one hand, will these emotions into being; or by the direction of it away from these objects, could, on the other hand, will them again into extinction. Such we hold to be the faculty of *attention*. It forms the great link between the intellectual and moral departments of our nature; or between the percipient and what has already been named the pathematic departments. It is the control which the will has over this faculty that makes man responsible for the objects which he chooses to entertain, and so responsible for the emotions which pathologically result from them.

12. If it be by a voluntary act that he comes to see certain objects, then, whatever the emotions are which are awakened by these objects, he may be said to have willed them into being.—In like manner, if it be by a voluntary act that he comes to think of certain objects, then, may it also be said, that he wills all the emotions which follow in their train. It is admitted on all hands, that, by the power which the will has

over the muscles of the human frame, it can either summon into presence or bid away certain objects of sight. And, notwithstanding the effect which the expositions of certain metaphysical reasoners have had, in obscuring the process, it is also admitted, almost universally, that, by the power which the will has over the thinking processes, it can either summon into presence or bid away certain objects of thought. The faculty of attention we regard as the great instrument for the achievement of this—the ligament which binds the one department of our constitution to the other—the messenger, to whose wakefulness and activity we owe all those influences, which pass and repass in constant succession between our moral and intellectual nature.

13. Dr. Reid, in his book on the active powers, has a most important chapter on those operations of the mind that are called voluntary. Among these, he gives a foremost place to attention—where, instead however of any profound or careful analysis, he presents us with a number of very sensible remarks; and from the undoubted part which the will has in the guidance and exercise of this faculty, he comes to the sound conclusion, that a great part of wisdom and virtue consists in giving the proper direction to it.

14. Dugald Stewart ranks attention among

the intellectual faculties;—and seems to regard it as an original power, which had very much escaped the notice of former observers. But Dr. Brown we hold to have been far the most successful in his expositions of this faculty; and by which he makes it evident, that it is not more distinct from the mental perception of any object of thought, than the faculty of looking to any object of sight, is distinct from the faculty of seeing it.

15. In his chapter on the external affections combined with desire, he institutes a beautiful analysis; in the conduct of which, he has thrown the magic tints of poetry over a process of very abstract but conclusive reasoning. We fear, that, in this age of superficial readers, the public are far from being adequately aware of that wondrous combination of talent, which this singularly gifted individual realized in his own person; and with what facility, yet elegance, he could intersperse the graces of fancy, among the demonstrations of a most profound and original metaphysics. The passage to which we now refer, is perhaps the finest exemplification of this in all his volumes; and though we can hardly hope, that the majority, even of the well educated, will ever be tempted to embark on his adventurous speculations—yet many, we doubt not, have been led by the fascination of his minor accomplishments, to brave the depths and

the difficulties of that masterly course which he has given to the world. For among the steeps and the arduous elevations of that high walk which he has taken, he kindly provides the reader with many a resting place—some enchanted spot, over which the hand of taste hath thrown her choicest decorations; or where, after the fatigues and the triumphs of successful intellect, the traveller may from the eminence that he has won, look abroad on some sweet or noble perspective, which the great master whose footsteps he follows hath thrown open to his gaze. It is thus that there is a constant relief and refreshment afforded along that ascending way, which but for this would be most severely intellectual; and if never was philosophy more abstruse, yet never was it seasoned so exquisitely, or spread over a page so rich in all those attic delicacies of the imagination and the style which could make the study of it attractive.

16. There is a philosophy not more solid or more sublime of achievement than his, but of sterner frame—that would spurn "the fairy dreams of sacred fountains and Elysian groves and vales of bliss." For these he ever had most benignant toleration, and himself sported among the creations of poetic genius. We are aware of nought more fascinating, than the kindness and complacency, wherewith philosophy, in some of the finer spirits of our race, can make her

graceful descent into a humbler but lovelier region than her own—when "the intellectual power bends from his awful throne a willing ear and smiles."

17. "If," says Dr. Brown, "Nature has given us the power of seeing many objects at once, she has given us also the faculty of looking but to one—that is to say of directing our eyes on one only of the multitude;" and again, "there are some objects which are more striking than others, and which of themselves almost call us to look at them. They are the predominant objects, around which others seem to arrange themselves."

18. The difference between seeing a thing and looking at it, is tantamount to the difference which there is, between the mere presence of a thought in one's mind and the mind's attention to that which is the object of thought. Now the look, according to Dr. Brown's analysis, is made up of the simple external affection of sight, and a desire to know more about some one of the things which we do see. We think it the natural consequence of the error into which he has fallen, of confounding the desire with the will, that he has failed in giving a complete or continuous enough description of the process of attention—for, without any violence to the order of his own very peculiar contemplations, he might have gone on to say, as the effect of

this mixed perception and desire on the part of the observer, that he willed to look to the object in question; and he might have spoken of the volition which fastened his eye and his attention upon it. Both he and Mr. Mill seem averse to the intervention of the will in this exercise at all—the one finding room only for desire; and the other for his processes of association, ascribing attention to the mere occurrence of interesting sensations or ideas in the train. Now if this question is to be decided by observation at all, or by consciousness which is the faculty of internal observation, the mental states of desiring and willing seem just as distinguishable as any other mental states whatever. At the time when the mind desires, it bears a respect towards the desirable object; at the time when it wills, it bears a respect towards something different from this, to that act of its own which is put forth for the purpose of attaining the object. The desire that is felt towards the object is specifically a distinct thing, from the volition which prompts or precedes the action. The desire may have caused the volition; but this is no reason why it should be confounded with the volition. And in like manner, a feeling of interest in an idea, or rather in the object of an idea, is quite distinguishable from that volition which respects a something different from this object—which

respects an act or exercise of the mind, even the attention that we shall give to it. The interest that is felt in any object of thought may have been the cause, and the sole cause of the attention which we give to it. But the necessary connection which obtains between the parts of a process, is no reason why we should overlook any part, or confound the different parts with each other. In this instance, Mr. Hume seems to have observed more accurately than either of the philosophers whom we have now named, when he discriminates between the will and the desire, and tells us of the former, that it exerts itself when the thing desired is to be attained by any action of the *mind* or body. A volition is as distinctly felt in the mental as in the bodily process—although it be in the latter only, that the will first acts on some one of the muscles as its instrument, and issues in a visible movement as its required service. The power of the will over an intellectual process is marked by the difference, the palpable difference which there is, between a regulated train of thought and a passive reverie. And there is nothing in the intervention of the will to contravene, or even to modify the general laws of association. Neither does the wish to recover a particular idea, involve in it the incongruity of that idea being both present with and absent from the mind at the same time. We may not

have an idea that is absent, and yet have the knowledge of its being related to some other idea that is present; and we therefore attend to this latter idea and dwell upon it, for the purpose, as is well expressed by Mr. Mill, of—"giving it the opportunity of exciting all the ideas with which it is associated; for by not attending to it, we deprive it more or less of that opportunity." It is therefore, as he elsewhere expresses it, that we detain certain ideas and suffer others to pass. But there is nothing inconsistent with the laws or phenomena of association, in our saying of this act of detention that it is a voluntary act—that we detain certain ideas, because we will to detain them.*

19. It is this which *virtuefies* emotion, even though there be nothing virtuous which is not voluntary. It is true that once the idea of an object is in the mind, its counterpart emotion may, by an organic or pathological law, have come unbidden into the heart. The emotion may have come unbidden; but the idea may not have come unbidden. By an act of the will, it may, in the way now explained, have been summoned at the first into the mind's presence; and at all events it is by a continuous act of the will that it is detained and dwelt

* See the Chapter on the Will in Mill's analysis of the human mind.

upon. The will is not in contact with the emotion, but it is in contact with the idea of that object which awakens the emotion—and therefore, although not in contact with the emotion, it may be vested with an effectual control over it. It cannot bid compassion into the bosom, apart from the object which awakens it; but it can bid a personal entry into the house of mourning, and then the compassion will flow apace; or it can bid a mental conception of the bereaved and afflicted family there, and then the sensibility will equally arise, whether a suffering be seen or a suffering be thought of. In like manner, it cannot bid into the breast the naked and unaccompanied feeling of gratitude; but it can call to recollection, and keep in recollection the kindness which prompts it—and the emotion follows in faithful attendance on its counterpart object. It is thus that we can will the right emotions into being, not immediately but mediately—as the love of God, by thinking on God—a sentiment of friendship, by dwelling in contemplation on the congenial qualities of our friend—the admiration of moral excellence, by means of a serious and steadfast attention to it. It is thus too that we bid away the wrong emotions, not separately and in disjunction from their objects, for the pathological law which unites objects with emotions we cannot break asunder. But we rid our heart

of the emotions, by ridding our mind of their exciting and originating thoughts; of anger, for example, by forgetting the injury; or of a licentious instigation, by dismissing from our fancy the licentious image, or turning our sight and our eyes from viewing vanity. It is this command of the will over the attention, which, transmuting the intellectual into the moral, makes duties of heedfulness and consideration —and duties too of prime importance, because of the place which attention occupies in the mental system, as the great ligament between the percipient and the pathematic parts of our nature. It is by its means that the will is made to touch at least the springs of emotion—if it do not touch the emotions themselves. The will tells on the sensibilities, through an intermediate machinery which has been placed at its disposal; and thus it is, that the culture or regulation of the heart is mainly dependent on the regulation of the thoughts.

20. We may thus be enabled to explain, and perhaps more clearly than before, the force and inveteracy of habit; and that, not by the power of emotions to suggest emotions, but purely by the power of thoughts to suggest thoughts. In this process, the motions will of course intermingle with their own counterpart thoughts; and both ideas and feelings will succeed each other in their customary trains all

the more surely, the oftener it has been suffered to pass unbroken by any intervention of the will, any remonstrance from the voice of conscience. It is in this way that the wretched voluptuary, becomes every year the more helpless victim of his own depraved inclinations—because more and more lorded over by those foul imaginations, which are lighted up to him, from almost every object he sees or thinks of; and which now he scarcely has the power, because he never had the honest or sustained will to bid away. That may truly be called a moral chastisement under which he suffers. The more he has sinned, the more helpless is the necessity under which he lies of sinning—a bondage strengthened by every act of indulgence, till he may become the irrecoverable slave of those passions which war against the principles of a better and higher nature. And he is domineered over by passions, because domineered over by thoughts; and it is only by the force or mastery of counteracting thoughts, that the spell is broken—or, in other words, it is through an intellectual medium, that the moral distemper is cleared away. If he be rescued from his delusions to sobriety and virtue, ideas will be the stepping-stones of his returning path—the sirens that will recall him to himself, by chasing away the fascinations wherewith he is encompassed. Could the percipient part of his nature be set

right, the pathological part of it would become whole. He would yet behave himself aright, did he only bethink himself aright; and noble recoveries have been effected, even from most deep and hopeless infatuation, simply by the power of thoughts—when made to dwell on the distress of friends, the poverty and despair of children, the ruin of health as well as fortune, the displeasure of an angry God, the horrors of an unprovided death-bed or an undone eternity.

21. Actions are voluntary in themselves, in that the mind can will them directly into being. Emotions, though not voluntary in themselves, are so far voluntary in their proximate or immediate causes—in that the mind, to a certain extent, and by the control which it has over the faculty of attention, can will those ideas into its presence by which the emotions are awakened. It is well

* A strict confinement to our assigned object has hitherto prevented any allusion to Christianity, from which indeed we purposely abstain, till we approach more nearly towards the conclusion of this essay. Still we may here remark how strikingly accordant the philosophy of our nature is with the lessons of the Gospel in regard to the reciprocal acting of its moral and intellectual parts on each other—and that not merely in what Scripture enjoins on the management of temptations; but in its frequent affirmation, as a general and reigning principle, of the power which its objective doctrines have in transforming the subjective mind which receives them—exemplified in such phrases, as "being sanctified by the truth," and "keeping our hearts in the love of God, by building ourselves up on our most holy faith."

that man is thus vested, not only with a control over his actions; but also in a great degree with a control over his emotions, these powerful impellents to action—and it required an exquisite fitting of the intellectual to the moral in man's mental system, ere such a mechanism could be framed. But we not only behold in the relation between the will and the emotions, a skilful adaptation in the parts of the human constitution to each other; we also behold a general and manifold adaptation to this peculiarity, in the various objects of external nature. Man can, by means of these objects, either kindle the right emotions in his bosom, or make his escape from those emotions that trouble and annoy him. By an entry into an abode of destitution, he can effectually soften his heart; by an entry into an abode of still deeper suffering, where are to be found the dead or the dying, he can effectually solemnize it. But a still more palpable use of that indefinite number of objects wherewith the world is so filled and variegated, is, that by creating an incessant diversion of the thoughts from such objects as are of malignant influence, it may rid the inner man of the grief, or the anger, or the wayward licentiousness of feeling, which might otherwise have lorded over him; and to the urgent calls of business or duty or amusement, do we owe such lengthened periods of exemption both from the emotions that pain,

and from the emotions that would vitiate and deprave us.

22. But there is another application, of at least as high importance, to which this peculiarity of our mental structure is subservient. By the command which the will has over the attention, we become responsible, not only for our states of emotion, but also in a great degree for our intellectual states. The imagination that there is neither moral worth nor moral delinquency in the state of a man's belief, proceeds on the voluntary having had no share in the process which leads to it. Now through the intermedium of the very same faculty, the faculty of attention, the will stands related to the ultimate convictions of the understanding, precisely as it stands related to the ultimate emotions of the heart. It is true that as the object in view of the mind is, so the emotion is.—And it is as true that as the evidence in view of the mind is, so the belief is. In neither case has the will to do with the concluding sequence; but in both cases it has equally to do with the sequences that went before it. There may be a pathological necessity beyond our control, in that final step of the succession, which connects the object that is perceived with its counterpart emotion, or the evidence that is perceived with its counterpart belief. But in like manner as it is by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised,

that the object is perceived by us, so is it by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the evidence is perceived by us. It is thus that on innumerable questions, and these of vital importance, both to the present well-being and the future prospects of humanity, the moral may have had causal antecedency over the intellectual; and the state of a man's creed may depend on the prior state of his character. We have already seen how a present compassion may have been the result of a previous choice; and so may a present conviction be the result of a previous choice—being in proportion not to the evidence possessed by the subject, but to the evidence attended to, and perceived in consequence of that attention. The designations of virtuous and vicious are only applicable to that which is voluntary; and it is precisely because, through the faculty of attention, the voluntary has had so much to do, if not immediately with the belief, at least with the investigations which lead to it—that man may be reckoned with for the judgments of his understanding, as well as for the emotions of his heart or the actions of his history.

23. That man is not rightfully the subject of any moral reckoning for his belief, would appear then, to be as monstrous a heresy in science as it is in theology, as philosophically unsound as it is religiously unsound; and deriving all its

plausibility from the imagination, that the belief is in no way dependent upon the will. It is not morally incumbent upon man to see an object, which is placed beyond the sphere of his vision —nor can either a rightful condemnation or a rightful vengeance be laid upon him, because he has not perceived it. It must lie within that sphere, else he is no more responsible for not having reached it with his eye, than for not having stretched forth his hand to any of the distant bodies in the firmament. It must be within range of his seeing; and then the only question which needs to be resolved is, what the will has to do with the seeing of it. Now to see is not properly an act of the will, but to look is altogether so; and it is the dependence of his looking faculty on the will, which makes man responsible for what he sees or what he does not see, in reference to all those objects of sight, that are placed within the territory of sensible vision. And if there be but a looking faculty in the mind, man may be alike responsible for what he believes or what he does not believe, in reference, not to sensible objects alone, but to those truths which are placed within the territory of his intellectual or mental vision. Now attention is even such a faculty. Man can turn and transfer it at pleasure from one to another topic of contemplation. He can take cognizance of any visible thing, in virtue of the power which he has over

the eye of his body—a power not to alter the laws of vision, but to bring the organ of vision within the operation of these laws. And he can take cognizance of any announced truth, in virtue of the power he has over his attention which is his mental eye—a power, not to alter the laws of evidence, but to bring the organ of the intellect within their operation. Attention is the looking organ of the mind—the link of communication between man's moral and man's intellectual nature—the messenger, as it were, by which the interchange between these two departments is carried on—a messenger too at the bidding of the will, which saith to it at one time go and it goeth, at another come and it cometh, and at a third do this and it doeth it. It is thus that man becomes directly responsible for the conclusions of his understanding—for these conclusions depend altogether, not on the evidence which exists, but on that portion of the evidence which is attended to. He is not to be reckoned with, either for the lack or the sufficiency of the existent evidence; but he might most justly be reckoned with, for the lack or the sufficiency of his attention. It is not for him to create the light of day; but it is for him both to open and to present his eye to all its manifestations. Neither is it for him to fetch down to earth the light of the upper sanctuary. But if it be indeed true that that light hath come into the world, then it

is for him to guide the eye of his understanding towards it. There is a voluntary part for him to perform; and thenceforward the question is involved with most obvious moralities. The thing is now submitted to his choice. He may have the light, if he only love the light; and if he do not, then are his love of darkness and the evil of his doings, the unquestionable grounds of his most clear and emphatic condemnation.

24. And this principle is of force, throughout all the stages in the process of the enquiry—from the very first glance of that which is the subject of it, to the full and finished conviction in which the enquiry terminates. At the commencement of the process, we may see nothing but the likelihoods of a subject—not the conclusive proofs, but only as yet the dim and dawning probabilities of the question—nothing which is imperative upon our belief, and yet every thing which is imperative upon our attention. There may be as great a moral perversity in resisting that call, which the mere semblance of truth makes upon our further attention—as in resisting that call, which the broad and perfect manifestation of it makes upon our conviction. In the practice of Scottish law, there is a distinction made between the precognition and the proof—carried into effect in England by the respective functions of the grand and petty jury; it being the office of the former to find a true bill, or to decide whether the mat-

ter in question should be brought to a further trial; and it being the office of the latter to make that trial, and to pronounce the final verdict thereupon. Now what we affirm is, that there might be to the full as grievous a delinquency in the former act of judgment as in the latter; in the denial of a further hearing to the cause after the strong probabilities which have transpired at the one stage, as in the denial of a fair verdict after the strong and satisfactory proofs which have transpired at the other. All the equities of rectitude may be as much traversed or violated, at the initial or progressive steps of such an enquiry, as by the ultimate judgment which forms the termination of it. To resist a good and valid precognition, and so to refuse the trial, is a moral unfairness of the very same kind, with that resistance of a good and valid proof which leads to the utterance of a false verdict. He were an iniquitous judge, who should internally stifle the impression of those verities, which now brightened forth upon him, at the close of his investigation. But he also were an iniquitous judge, who should stifle the impression of those verisimilitudes, that even but obscurely and languidly beamed upon him at the outset.

25. Now, in all the processes of the human intellect, there is a similar gradation silently yet substantially carried forward. There is first an aspect of probability, which constitutes

no claim upon our immediate belief, but which at least constitutes a most rightful claim upon our attention, a faculty, as we before said, at the bidding of our will, and for the exercise of which we are therefore responsible—seeing that whenever there is a rightful claim upon our attention, and the attention is not given, it is wrongously withheld. But we know that the effect of this faculty, is to brighten every object of contemplation to which it is directed, gradually to evolve into greater clearness all its lineaments, and lastly to impress the right conviction upon the understanding. In other words, the man, on such an occasion as this, is intellectually right, but just because he is morally right. He becomes sound in faith; but only in virtue of having become sound in principle. The true belief in which he ultimately lands, is not all at once forced upon him, by the credentials wherewith it was associated; but he had the patience and the candour to wait the unrolling of these credentials; or rather he helped to unrol them with his own hand. He fastened his regards upon some proposition which involved in it the interests or the obligations of humanity; because there sat upon it, even at the first, a certain creditable aspect, which had he had the hardihood to withstand or to turn from, it would have made him chargeable, not with a mental alone, but with a moral perversity—not with

the error that springs from a mistaken judgment, but with the guilt that springs from the violation of an incumbent duty. Many are the truths which do not carry an instant and overpowering evidence along with them; and which therefore, at their first announcement, are not entitled to demand admittance for themselves as the articles of a creed. Nevertheless they may be entitled to a hearing; and, by the refusal of that hearing, man incurs, not the misfortune of an involuntary blunder, but the turpitude of a voluntary crime.

Chapter IV.

On the Defects and the Uses of Natural Theology.

1. We behold in the influence which the will has over the intellectual states, the same adaptations which we did in the influence of the will over the emotions. In the first place, it is well that the will should have a certain over-ruling power over the conclusions of the understanding —seeing that if emotions supply the great impellent forces; doctrines, or the truths which are believed, supply the great principles of action. And secondly, there is a striking adaptation, in this part of our constitution, to the things

and the objects which be around us. For although there be much of truth, having that sort of immediate and resistless evidence, which forces itself upon our convictions whether we will or not—there is also much, and that too practically the most momentous, of which we can only attain the conviction and the knowledge, by a lengthened often a laborious process of enquiry. In like manner as of material objects, they may be seen but imperfectly at the first; and we become fully and minutely acquainted with their visible properties, only by a prolonged look, which is a sustained and voluntary act—so, many are the objects of thought, both the reality and the nature of which, are but dimly apprehended on the first suggestion of them; and of which, we can only be made firmly to believe and thoroughly to know, by means of a prolonged attention, which is a sustained and voluntary act also. It is thus that the moral state determines the intellectual—for it is by the exercise of a strong and continuous will, upholding or perpetuating the attention, that what at the outset were the probabilities of a subject are at length brightened into its proofs, and the verisimilitudes of our regardful notice become the verities of our confirmed faith.

2. Of all the subjects to which the attention of the human mind can be directed, this principle admits of pre-eminent application to the

subject of theology—as involving in it, both the present duties and the final destinies of our race. In no other track of inquiry, are the moral and the intellectual more thoroughly blended,—as might be evinced by tracing the whole progress, from the first or incipient disposition of mind towards the theme, to the devotedness of its confirmed assurance.

3. Going back then to the very earliest of our mental conceptions on this subject, we advert first to the distinction in point of real and logical import, between unbelief and disbelief. The former we apprehend, to be the furthest amount of the atheistical verdict on the question of a God. The atheist does not labour to demonstrate that there is no God. But he labours to demonstrate that there is no adequate proof of there being one. He does not positively affirm the position, that God is not; but he affirms the lack of evidence for the position, that God is. His verdict on the doctrine of a God is only that it is not proven. It is not that it is disproven. He is but an Atheist. He is not an Antitheist.

4. Now there is one consideration, which affords the enquirer a singularly clear and commanding position, at the outset of this great question. It is this. We cannot, without a glaring contravention to all the principles of the experimental philosophy, recede to a further

distance from the doctrine of a God, than to the position of simple atheism. We do not need to take our departure from any point further back than this, in the region of antitheism; for that region cannot possibly be entered by us but by an act of tremendous presumption, which it were premature to denounce as impious, but which we have the authority of all modern science for denouncing as unphilosophical. To make this palpable, we have only to contrast the two intellectual states, not of theism and atheism, but of theism and antitheism—along with the two processes, by which alone, we can be logically and legitimately led to them.

5. To be able to say then that there is a God, we may have only to look abroad on some definite territory, and point to the vestiges that are given of His power and His presence somewhere. To be able to say that there is no God, we must walk the whole expanse of infinity, and ascertain by observation, that such vestiges are to be found nowhere. Grant that no trace of Him can be discerned in that quarter of contemplation, which our puny optics have explored—does it follow, that, throughout all immensity, a Being with the essence and sovereignty of a God is nowhere to be found? Because through our loopholes of communication with that small portion of external nature which is before us, we have not seen or ascertained a God—must we

therefore conclude of every unknown and untrodden vastness in this illimitable universe, that no diversity is there. Or because, through the brief successions of our little day, these heavens have not once broken silence, is it therefore for us to speak to all the periods of that eternity which is behind us; and to say, that never hath a God come forth with the unequivocal tokens of His existence? Ere we can say that there is a God—we must have seen, on that portion of Nature to which we have access, the print of His footsteps, or have had direct intimation from Himself; or been satisfied by the authentic memorials of His converse with our species in other days. But ere we can say that there is no God—we must have roamed over all nature, and seen that no mark of a Divine footstep was there; and we must have gotten intimacy with every existent spirit in the universe, and learned from each, that never did a revelation of the Deity visit him; and we must have searched, not into the records of one solitary planet, but into the archives of all worlds, and thence gathered, that, throughout the wide realms of immensity, not one exhibition of a reigning and living God ever has been made. Atheism might plead a lack of evidence within its own field of observation. But antitheism pronounces both upon the things which are, and the things which are not within that

field. It breaks forth and beyond all those limits, that have been prescribed to man's excursive spirit, by the sound philosophy of *experience*; and by a *presumption the most tremendous, even the usurpation of all space* and of all time, it affirms that there is no God. To make this out, we should need to travel abroad over the surrounding universe till we had exhausted it, and to search backward through all the hidden recesses of eternity; to traverse in every direction the plains of infinitude, and sweep the outskirts of that space which is itself interminable; and then bring back to this little world of ours, the report of a universal blank, wherein we had not met with one manifestation or one movement of a presiding God. For man not to know of a God, he has only to sink beneath the level of our common nature. But to deny him, he must be a God himself. He must arrogate the ubiquity and omniscience of the Godhead.*

* This idea has been powerfully rendered by Foster in the following passage extracted from one of his essays.—

"The wonder turns on the great process, by which a man could grow to the immense intelligence that can know there is no God. What ages and what lights are requisite for this attainment? This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity, while a God is denied. For unless this man is omnipresent, unless he is at this moment in every place in the Universe, he cannot know but there may be in some place manifestations of a Deity by which even *he* would be overpowered. If he does not absolutely know every

6. It affords a firm outset to this investigation, that we cannot recede a greater way from the doctrine to be investigated, than to the simple point of ignorance or unbelief. We cannot, without making inroad on the soundest principles of evidence, move one step back from this, to the region of disbelief. We can figure an inquirer taking up his position in midway atheism. But he cannot, without defiance to the whole principle and philosophy of evidence, make aggression thence on the side of antitheism. There is a clear intellectual principle, which forbids his proceeding in that direction; and there is another principle equally clear, though not an intellectual but a moral one, which urges him, if not to move, at least to look in the opposite direction. We are not asking him, situated where he is, to believe in God. For the time being, we as little expect a friendly as we desire a hostile decision upon

agent in the Universe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himself the chief agent in the Universe, and does not know what is so, that which is so may be God. If he is not in absolute possession of all the propositions that constitute universal truth, the one which he wants may be that there is a God. If he cannot with certainty assign the cause of all that he perceives to exist, that cause may be a God. If he does not know every thing that has been done in the immeasurable ages that are past, some things may have been done by a God. Thus unless he knows all things, that is, precludes another Deity by being one himself, he cannot know that the Being whose existence he rejects, does not exist.

the question. Our only demand for the present is, that he shall entertain the question. And to enforce the demand, we think that an effective appeal might be made to his own moral nature. We suppose him still to be an atheist, but no more than an atheist—for, in all right Baconian logic, the very farthest remove from theism, at which he or any man can be placed by the lack of evidence for a God, is at the point of simple neutrality. We might well assume this point, as the utmost possible extreme of alienation from the doctrine of a Creator, to which the mind of a creature can in any circumstances be legitimately carried. We cannot move from it, in the direction towards antitheism, without violence to all that is just in philosophy; and we might therefore commence with enquiring, whether, in this lowest state of information and proof upon the question, there can be any thing assigned, which should lead us to move, or at least to look in the opposite direction.

7. In the utter destitution, for the present, of any argument, or even semblance of argument, that a God is—there is, perhaps, a certain duteous movement which the mind ought to take, on the bare suggestion that a God may be. The certainty of an actual God binds over to certain distinct and most undoubted proprieties. But so also may the imagination of a possible God—in which case, the very idea of a God, even in

its most hypothetical form, might lay a responsibility, even upon atheists.

8. To make this palpable, we might imagine a family suffering under extreme destitution, and translated all at once into sufficiency or affluence by an anonymous donation. Had the benefactor been known, the gratitude that were due to him becomes abundantly obvious; and in the estimation of every conscience, nothing could exceed the turpitude of him, who should regale himself on the bounties wherewith he had been enriched, and yet pass unheedingly by the giver of them all. Yet does not a proportion of this very guilt rest upon him, who knows not the hand that relieved him, yet cares not to enquire? It does not exonerate him from the burden of all obligation that he knows not the hand which sustains him. He incurs a guilt, if he do not want to know. It is enough to convict him of a great moral delinquency, if he have gladly seized upon the liberalities which were brought in secret to his door, yet seeks not after the quarter whence they have come—willing that the hand of the dispenser should remain for ever unknown, and not wanting any such disclosures as would lay a distinct claim or obligation upon himself. He altogether lives by the bounty of another; yet would rather continue to live without the burden of those services or acknowledgments that are due to him. His

ignorance of the benefactor might alleviate the charge of ingratitude; but it plainly awakens the charge again, if he choose to remain in ignorance, and would shun the information that might dispel it. In reference then to this still undiscovered patron of his family, it is possible for him to evince ingratitude; to make full exhibition of a nature that is unmoved by kindness and withholds the moral responses which are due to it, that can riot with utmost selfishness and satisfaction upon the gifts while in total indifference about the giver—an indifference which might be quite as clearly and characteristically shown, by the man who seeks not after his unknown friend, as by the man who slights him after that he has found him.

9. It may thus be made to appear, that there is an ethics connected with theology, which may come into play, anterior to the clear view of any of its objects. More especially, we do not need to be sure of God, ere we ought to have certain feelings, or at least certain aspirations towards him. For this purpose we do not need, fully and absolutely to believe that God is. It is enough that our minds cannot fully and absolutely acquiesce in the position that God is not. To be fit subjects for our present argument, we do not need to have explored that territory of nature which is within our reach; and thence gathered, in the traces of a designer's hand the

positive conclusion that there is a God. It is enough if we have not traversed, throughout all its directions and in all its extent, the sphere of immensity; and if we have not scaled the mysterious altitudes of the eternity that is past; nor, after having there searched for a divinity in vain, have come at length to the positive and the peremptory conclusion, that there is not a God. In a word, it is quite enough, that man is barely a finite creature, who has not yet put forth his faculties on the question whether God is; neither has yet so ranged over all space and all time, as definitely to have ascertained that God is not—but with whom though in ignorance of all proofs, it still remains a possibility that God may be.

10. Now to this condition, there attaches a most clear and incumbent morality. It is to go in quest of that unseen benefactor, who for aught I know, has ushered me into existence, and spread so glorious a panorama around me. It is to probe the secret of my being and my birth; and, if possible, to make discovery whether it was indeed the hand of a benefactor, that brought me forth from the chambers of nonentity, and gave me place and entertainment in that glowing territory, which is lighted up with the hopes and the happiness of living men. It is thus that the very conception of a God throws a responsibility after it; and that duty, solemn and imperative duty, stands asso-

ciated with the thought of a possible deity, as well as with the sight of a present deity, standing in full manifestation before us. Even anterior to all knowledge of God, or when that knowledge is in embryo, there is both a path of irreligion and a path of piety; and that law which denounces the one and gives to the other an approving testimony, may find in him who is still in utter darkness about his origin and his end, a fit subject for the retributions which she deals in. He cannot be said to have borne disregard to the will of that God, whom he has found. But his is the guilt of impiety, in that he has borne disregard to the knowledge of that God, whom he was bound by every tie of gratitude to seek after—a duty not founded on the proofs that may be exhibited for the being of a God, but a duty to which even the most slight and slender of presumptions should give rise. And who can deny that, antecedent to all close and careful examination of the proofs, there are at least many presumptions in behalf of a God, to meet the eye of every observer? Is there any so hardy as to deny, that the curious workmanship of his frame *may* have had a designer and an architect, that the ten thousand independent circumstances which must be united ere he can have a moment's ease, and the failure of any one of which would be agony, may not have met at random, but that there may be a skilful and

unseen hand to have put them together into one wondrous concurrence, and that never ceases to uphold it; that there may be a real and living artist, whose fingers did frame the economy of actual things, and who hath so marvellously suited all that is around us to our senses and our powers of gratification? Without affirming aught which is positive, surely the air that we breathe, and the beautiful light in which we expatiate, these elements of sight and sound so exquisitely fitted to the organs of the human frame-work, *may* have been provided by one who did benevolently consult in them our special accommodation. The graces innumerable that lie widely spread over the face of our world, the glorious concave of heaven that is placed over us, the grateful variety of seasons that like Nature's shifting panorama ever brings new entertainment and delight to the eye of spectators—these may, for aught we know, be the emanations of a creative mind, that originated our family and devised such a universe for their habitation. Regarding these, not as proofs, but in the humble light of presumptions for a God, they are truly enough to convict us of foulest ingratitude—if we go not forth in quest of a yet unknown, but at least possible or likely benefactor. They may not resolve the question of a God. But they bring the heaviest reproach on our listlessness to the question; and show that, anterior to our assured

belief in his existence, there lies upon us a most imperious obligation to 'stir ourselves up that we may lay hold of Him.'

11. Such presumptions as these, if not so many demands on the belief of man, are at least so many demands upon his attention; and then, for aught he knows, the presumptions on which he ought to enquire may be more and more enhanced, till they brighten into proofs which ought to convince him. The *prima-facie* evidence for a God may not be enough to decide the question; but it should at least decide man to entertain the question. To think upon how slight a variation either in man or in external nature, the whole difference between physical enjoyment and the most acute and most appalling of physical agony may turn; to think how delicate the balance is, and yet how surely and steadfastly it is maintained, so as that the vast majority of creatures are not only upheld in comfort, but often may be seen disporting themselves in the redundance of gaiety; to think of the pleasurable sensations wherewith every hour is enlivened, and how much the most frequent and familiar occasions of life are mixed up with happiness; to think of the food, and the recreation, and the study, and the society, and the business, each having an appropriate relish of its own, so as in fact to season with enjoyment the great bulk of our existence in the world; to

think that, instead of living in the midst of grievous and incessant annoyance to all our faculties, we should have awoke upon a world that so harmonized with the various senses of man, and both gave forth such music to his ear and to his eye such manifold loveliness; to think of all these palpable and most precious adaptations—and yet to care not, whether in this wide universe there exists a being who has had any hand in them—to riot and regale oneself to the uttermost in the midst of all this profusion—and yet to send not one wishful inquiry after that Benevolence which for aught we know may have laid it at our feet—this, however shaded from our view the object of the question may be, is, from its very commencement, a clear outrage against its ethical proprieties. If that veil of dim transparency, which hides the Deity from our immediate perceptions, were lifted up; and we should then spurn from us the manifested God—this were direct and glaring impiety. But anterior to the lifting of that veil, there may be impiety. It is impiety to be so immersed as we are, in the busy objects and gratifications of life; and yet to care not whether there be a great and a good spirit by whose kindness it is that life is upholden. It needs not that this spirit should reveal himself in characters that force our attention to him, ere the guilt of our impiety has begun. But ours is the guilt of impiety, in

not lifting our attention towards God, in not seeking after Him if haply we may find Him.

12. Man is not to blame, if an atheist, because of the want of proof. But he is to blame, if an atheist, because he has shut his eyes. He is not to blame, that the evidence for a God has not been seen by him, if no such evidence there were within the field of his observation. But he is to blame, if the evidence have not been seen, because he turned away his attention from it. That the question of a God may lie unresolved in his mind, all he has to do, is to refuse a hearing to the question. He may abide without the conviction of a God, if he so choose. But this his choice is matter of condemnation. To resist God after that He is known, is criminality towards Him; but to be satisfied that He should remain unknown, is like criminality towards Him. There is a moral perversity of spirit with him who is willing, in the midst of many objects of gratification, that there should not be one object of gratitude. It is thus that, even in the ignorance of God, there may be a responsibility towards God. The Discerner of the heart sees, whether, for the blessings innumerable wherewith He has strewed the path of every man, He be treated, like the unknown benefactor who was diligently sought, or like the unknown benefactor who was never cared for. In respect, at least of desire after God, the

same distinction of character may be observed between one man and another—whether God be wrapt in mystery, or stand forth in full developement to our world. Even though a mantle of deepest obscurity lay over the question of His existence; this would not efface the distinction, between the piety on the one hand which laboured and aspired after Him; and the impiety upon the other which never missed the evidence that it did not care for, and so grovelled in the midst of its own sensuality and selfishness. The eye of a heavenly witness is upon all these varieties; and thus, whether it be darkness or whether it be dislike which hath caused a people to be ignorant of God, there is with Him a clear principle of judgment, that He can extend even to the outfields of atheism.

13. It would appear then, that, even in the initial state of the human mind on the question of a God, there is an impellent force upon the conscience, which man ought to obey, and which he incurs guilt by resisting. We do not speak of that light which irradiates the termination of the inquirer's path, but of that embryo or rudimental light which glimmers over the outset of it; which serves at least to indicate the commencement of his way; and which, for aught he knows, may brighten, as he advances onwards, to the blaze of a full and finished revelation. At no point of this progress, does the trumpet give an

uncertain sound,' extending, if not to those who stand on the ground of Antitheism, (which we have already pronounced upon and we trust proved to be madly irrational)—at least to those who stand on the ground of Atheism, who, though strangers to the conviction, are certainly not strangers to the conception of a Deity. It is of the utmost practical importance, that even these are not beyond the jurisdiction of an obvious principle; and that a right obligatory call can be addressed to men so far back on the domain of irreligion and ignorance. It is deeply interesting to know, by what sort of moral force, even an atheist ought to be evoked from the fastness which he occupies—what are the notices, by responding to which, he should come forth with open eyes and a willing mind to this high investigation; and by resisting which, he will incur a demerit, whereof a clear moral cognizance might be taken, and whereon a righteous moral condemnation might be passed. The "fishers of men" should know the uttermost reach of their argument; and it is well to understand of religion, that, if she have truth and authority at all, there is a voice proceeding from her which might be universally heard—so that even the remotest families of earth, if not reclaimed by her, are laid by her under sentence of righteous reprobation.

14. On this doctrine of the moral dynamics,

which operate and are in force, even in our state of profoundest ignorance respecting God, there may be grounded three important applications.

15. The first is that all men, under all the possible varieties of illumination, may nevertheless be the fit subjects for a judicial cognizance. Their theology, seen through the hazy medium of a dull and imperfect evidence, may have arisen no higher than to the passing suggestion of a God—a mere surmise or rumination about an unseen spirit, who, tending all their footsteps, was their guardian and their guide through the dangers of the pathless wilderness. Now in this thought, fugitive though it be, in these uncertain glimpses whether of a truth or of a possibility, there is that, to which the elements of their moral nature might respond—so that to them, there is not the same exemption from all responsibility, which will be granted to the man who is sunk in hopeless idiotism, or to the infant of a day old. Even with the scanty materials of a heathen creed, a pure or a perverse morality might be grounded thereupon—whether, in those longings of a vague and undefined earnestness that arise from him who feels in his bosom an affinity for God and godliness; or, in the heedlessness of him, who, careless of an unknown benefactor, would have been alike careless, although he had stood revealed to his gaze, with as much light and evidence as is to be had in

Christendom. These differences attest what man is, under the dark economy of Paganism; and so give token to what he would be, under the bright economy of a full and finished revelation. It is thus that the Searcher of the heart will find out data for a reckoning, even among the rudest of nature's children, or among those whose spiritual light glimmers most feebly. Even the simple theology of the desert can supply the materials of a coming judgment —so that the Discerner of the inner man will be at no loss for a principle, on which He might clearly and righteously try all the men of all the generations that be upon the face of the earth.

16. The second important bearing of this principle is on the subject of religious education. For what is true of a savage is true of a child. Its moral may outrun its argumentative light. Long anterior to the possibility of any sound conviction as to the character or existence of a God, it may respond with sound and correct feeling to the mere conception of Him. We hold, that, on this principle, the practice of early, nay even of infantine religious education, may, in opposition to the invectives of Rousseau and others, be fully and philosophically vindicated. For the effect of this anticipative process is, that, though it do not *at once* enlighten the mind on the question of a God, it at least awakens to the

question. It does not consummate the process; but, in as far as the moral precedes the intellectual, it makes good the preliminary steps of the process—insomuch that, in every Christian land, the youth and the manhood are accountable for their belief, because accountable for their use or their neglect of that enquiry, by which the belief ought to have been determined. They have all from their infancy heard of God. Many have been trained to think of Him, amidst a thousand associations of reverence. Some, under a roof of piety, have often lisped the prayers of early childhood to this unseen Being; and, in the often repeated sound of morning and evening orisons, they have become familiar to His name. Even they who have grown up at random through the years of a neglected boyhood, are greatly within the limits of that responsibility for which we plead. They are fully possessed, if not with the certainty, at least with the idea, of a great eternal Sovereign. The very imprecations of profaneness may have taught it to them. The very Sabbath they spend in riot and blasphemy at least remind them of a God. The worship-bell of the church they never enter, conveys to them, if not the truth, at least an imagination of the truth, which, if it do not arrest them by a sense of obligation, will leave guilt upon their souls—though it be guilt against a God who is unknown.

17. But lastly, we may now perceive what that is, on which a teacher of religion finds an introduction for his topic, even into the minds of people in the lowest state both of moral and intellectual debasement. They may have not that in them, at the outset of his ministrations, which can enable them to decide the question of a God; but they have at least that in them, which should summon all their faculties to the respectful entertainment of it. They have at least such a sense of the divinity, as their own consciences will tell, should put them on the regards and the enquiries of moral earnestness. This is a clear principle which operates at the very commencement of a religious course; and causes the first transition, from the darkness and insensibility of alienated nature, to the feelings and attentions of seriousness. The truth is, that there is a certain rudimental theology every where, on which the lessons of a higher theology may be grafted—as much as to condemn, if not to awaken the apathy of nature. What we have already said of the relation in which the father of a starving household stands to the giver of an anonymous donation, holds true of the relation in which all men stand to the unseen or anonymous God. Though in a state of absolute darkness, and without one token or clue to a discovery, there is room for the exhibition of moral differences among men—for even then, all the elements of

morality might be at work, and all the tests of moral propriety might be abundantly verified; and still more, after that certain likelihoods had arisen, or some hopeful opening had occurred for investigating the secret of a God. There is the utmost moral difference that can be imagined between the man who would gaze with intense scrutiny upon these likelihoods, and the man who either in heedlessness or aversion would turn his eyes from them; between the man who would seize upon such an opening and prosecute such an investigation to the uttermost, and the man who either retires or shrinks from the opportunity of a disclosure that might burden him both with the sense and with the services of some mighty obligation.

18. And the same moral force which begins this enquiry, also continues and sustains it. If there be power in the very conception of a God to create and constitute the duty of seeking after Him, this power grows and gathers with every footstep of advancement in the high investigation. If the thought of a merely possible deity have rightfully awakened a sense of obligation within us to entertain the question; the view of a probable deity must enhance this feeling, and make the claim upon our attention still more urgent and imperative than at the first. Every new likelihood makes the call louder, and the challenge more incumbently binding than before.

In proportion to the light we had attained, would be the criminality of resisting any further notices or manifestations of that mighty Being with whom we had so nearly and so emphatically to do. Under the impulse of a right principle, we should follow on to know God—till, after having done full justice both to our opportunities and our powers, we had made the most of all the available evidence that was within our reach, and possessed ourselves of all the knowledge that was accessible.

19. We can conceive, how, under the influence of these considerations, one should begin and prosecute the study of Natural Theology, till he had exhausted it. But an interesting inquiry remains. We have already endeavoured to estimate what the proper leadings of the mind are, at the commencement and along the progress of the study. The remaining question is, what were the proper leadings of the mind at the termination of it.

20. And first it will be seen, on the principles which we have already endeavoured to establish, that no alleged defect of evidence in Natural Theology can extinguish the use of it—a use which might still remain, under every conceivable degree, whether of dimness or of distinctness in its views. Even the faint and distant probabilities of the subject, may still lay upon us, the duty of careful and strenuous

inquisition; and that, long anterior to our full acquaintance with the certainties of the subject. The verisimilitudes of the question are the signal posts, by following the intimations of which, we are at length conducted to the verities of the question. Although Natural Theology therefore should fail to illuminate, yet, by a moral force upon the attention, it may fully retain the power to impel. Even if it should have but some evidence, however slender, this should put us at the very least into the attitude of enquirers; and the larger the evidence, the more earnest and vigilant ought the enquiry to be. Thus a great object is practically fulfilled by Natural Theology. It gives us to conceive, or to conjecture, or to know so much of God, that, if there be a profest message with the likely signatures upon it of having proceeded from Him—though not our duty all at once to surrender, it is at least our bounden duty to investigate. It may not yet be entitled to a place in our creed; but it is at least entitled to a place in the threshold of the understanding—where it may wait the full and fair examination of its credentials. It may not be easy to measure the intensity of Nature's light; but enough if it be a light, that, had we obeyed its intimations, would have guided us onwards to larger manifestations of the Deity. If Natural Theology but serve thus to fix and direct our inquiries, it may fulfil a most important part as

the precursor of revelation. It may not be itself the temple; but it does much by leading the way to it. Even at the outset period of our thickest ignorance, there is a voice which calls upon us to go forth in quest of God. And in proportion as we advance, does the voice become more urgent and audible, in calling us onward to further manifestations. It says much for Natural Theology, that it begins at the commencement, and carries us forward a part of this way; and it has indeed discharged a most important function, if, at the point where its guesses or its discoveries terminate, it leaves us with as much light, as should make us all awake to the further notices of a God, or as shall leave our heedlessness wholly inexcusable.

21. There is a confused imagination with many, that every new accession, whether of evidence or of doctrine, made to the Natural, tends in so far, to reduce the claims or to depreciate the importance of the Christian Theology. The apprehension is, that, as the latter was designed to supplement the insufficiency of the former,—then, the more that the arguments of Natural Theology are strengthened, or its truths are multiplied; the more are the lessons of the Christian Theology unneeded and uncalled for. It is thus that the discoveries of reason are held as superseding, or as casting a shade of insignificance, and even of discredit over the discoveries

of revelation. There is a certain dread or jealousy, with some humble Christians, of all that incense which is offered at the shrine of the divinity by human science—whose daring incursion on the field of theology, it is thought, will, in very proportion to the brilliancy of its success, administer both to the proud independence of the infidel, and to the pious alarm of the believer.

22. But to mitigate this disquietude, it should be recollected, in the first place, that, if Christianity have real and independent evidence of being a message from God, it will be all the more humbly and respectfully deferred to, should a previous natural theology have assured us of His existence, and thrown the radiance of a clear and satisfying demonstration over the perfections of His character. However plausible its credentials may be, we should feel no great interest in its statements or its overtures, if we doubted the reality of that Being from whom it professes to have come; and it is precisely in as far as we are preoccupied with the conviction of a throne in heaven, and of a God sitting upon that throne, that we should receive what bore the signatures of an embassy from Him with awful reverence.

23. But there is another consideration still more decisive of the place and importance of Christianity, notwithstanding every possible

achievement by the light of nature. There are many discoveries which, so far from alleviating, serve but to enhance the difficulties of the question. For example, though science has made known to us the magnitude of the universe, it has not thereby advanced one footstep towards the secret of God's moral administration; but has, in fact, receded to a greater distance, from this now more hopeless, because now more complex and unmanageable problem than before. To multiply the data of a question, is not always the way to facilitate its solution; but often the way, rather, to make it more inextricable. And this is precisely the effect of all the discoveries that can be made by natural theology, on that problem which it is the special office of Christianity to resolve. With every new argument by which philosophy enhances the goodness and greatness of the Supreme Being, does it deepen still more the guilt and ingratitude of those who have revolted against Him. The more emphatically it can demonstrate the care and benevolence of God—the more emphatically, along with this, does it demonstrate the worthlessness of man. The same light which irradiates the perfections of the divine nature, irradiates, with more fearful manifestation than ever, the moral disease and depravation into which humanity has fallen. Had natural theology been altogether extinct, and there had been no sense of a

law or law-giver among men, we should have been unconscious of any difficulty to be redressed, of any dilemma from which we needed extrication. But the theology of nature and conscience tells us of a law; and in proportion as it multiplies the claims of the Law-giver in heaven, does it aggravate the criminality of its subjects upon earth. With the rebellious phenomenon of a depraved species before our eyes, every new discovery of God, but deepens the enigma of man's condition in time, and of his prospects in eternity; and so makes the louder call for that remedial system, which it is the very purpose of Christianity to introduce into the world.

24. We hold that the theology of nature sheds powerful light on the being of a God; and that, even from its unaided demonstrations, we can reach a considerable degree of probability, both for His moral and natural attributes. But when it undertakes the question between God and man, this is what it finds to be impracticable. It is here where the main helplessness of nature lies. It is baffled in all its attempts to decipher the state and the prospects of man, viewed in the relation of an offending subject to an offended sovereign. In a word, its chief obscurity, and which it is wholly unable to disperse, is that which rests on the hopes and the destiny of our species. There is in it enough of manifestation to awaken the fears of guilt, but not enough

again to appease them. It emits, and audibly emits, a note of terror; but in vain do we listen for one authentic word of comfort from any of its oracles. It is able to see the danger, but not the deliverance. It can excite the forebodings of the human spirit, but cannot quell them—knowing just enough to stir the perplexity, but not enough to set the perplexity at rest. It can state the difficulty, but cannot unriddle the difficulty—having just as much knowledge as to enunciate the problem, but not so much as might lead to the solution of the problem. There must be a measure of light, we do allow; but, like the lurid gleam of a volcano, it is not a light which guides, but which bewilders and terrifies. It prompts the question, but cannot frame or furnish the reply. Natural theology may see as much as shall draw forth the anxious interrogation, "What shall I do to be saved?" The answer to this comes from a higher theology.

25. These are the grounds on which we would affirm the insufficiency of that academic theism, which is sometimes set forth in such an aspect of completeness and certainty, as might seem to leave a revelation or a gospel wholly uncalled for. Many there are who would gloss over the difficulties of the question; and who, in the midst of all that undoubted outrage which has been inflicted by sinful creatures on the truth and the holiness and the justice of God, would,

by merging all the attributes of the Divinity into a placid and undistinguishing tenderness, still keep their resolute hold of heaven, as at least the splendid imagination, by which to irradiate the destinies of our species. It is thus that an airy unsupported romance has been held forth as the vehicle, on which to embark all the hopes and the hazards of eternity. We would not disguise the meagreness of such a system. We would not deliver the lessons of natural theology, without telling at the same time of its limits. We abjure the cruelty of that sentimentalism, which, to hush the alarms of guilty man, would rob the Deity of his perfections, and stamp a degrading mockery upon his law. When expounding the arguments of natural theology, along with the doctrines which it dimly shadows forth, we must speak of the difficulties which itself suggests but which it cannot dispose of; we must make mention of the obscurities into which it runs, but which it is unable to dissipate—of its unresolved doubts—of the mysteries through which it vainly tries to grope its uncertain way—of its weary and fruitless efforts—of its unutterable longings. And should, on the one hand, the speculations of human ingenuity, and, on the other, the certainties of a well accredited revelation, come forth to illuminate this scene of darkness—we must not so idolize the light or the sufficiency of

nature, as to turn from the firmament's meridian blaze, that we might witness and admire the tiny lustre of a glow-worm.

26. The two positions are perfectly reconcileable—first of the insufficiency of natural religion; and secondly, the great actual importance of it. It is the wise and profound saying of D'Alembert, that, 'man has too little sagacity to resolve an infinity of questions, which he has yet sagacity enough to make.' Now this marks the degree, in which natural theology is sagacious—being able, from its own resources, to construct a number of cases, which at the same time it is not able to reduce. These must be handed up for solution to a higher calculus; and thus it is, that the theology of nature and of the schools, the theology of the ethical class—though most unsatisfactory, when treated as a terminating science—is most important, and the germ of developements at once precious and delightful, when treated as a rudimental one. It is a science, not so much of dicta as of desiderata; and, from the way in which these are met by the counterpart doctrines of the gospel, the light of a powerful and most pleasing evidence is struck out by the comparison between them. It is that species of evidence which arises from the adaptation of a mould to its counterpart form; for there is precisely this sort of fitting, in the adjustment which

obtains, between the questions of the natural and the responses of the supernatural theology; For the problem which natural theology cannot resolve, the precise difficulty which it is wholly unable to meet or to overcome, is the restoration of sinners to acceptance and favour with a God of justice. All the resources and expedients of natural theology are incompetent for this solution—it being, in fact, the great desideratum which it cannot satisfy. Still it performs an important part in making us sensible of the desideratum. It makes known to us our sin; but it cannot make known to us salvation. Let us not overlook the importance of that which it does, in its utter helplessness as to that which it does not. It puts the question, though it cannot answer the question; and nowhere so much as at this turning-point, are both the uses and the defects of natural theology so conspicuously blended.

27. Natural theology then, however little to be trusted as an informer, yet as an enquirer, or rather as a prompter to enquiry, is of inestimable service. It is a high function that she discharges, for though not able to satisfy the search, she impels to the search. We are apt to undervalue, if not to set her aside altogether, when we compare her obscure and imperfect notices with the lustre and the fulness of revelation. But this is because we overlook the virtue that lies in the probabilities of a subject

—a virtue, either, on the one hand, to fasten the attention; or, on the other hand, to condemn the want of it. This we hold to be the precise office of natural theology—and an office too, which she performs, not merely as the theology of science among those who listen to her demonstrations in the academic hall; but which she also performs with powerful and practical effect, as the theology of conscience, throughout all the classes of our general population. It is this initial work which makes her so useful, we should say so indispensable, as a preliminary to the gospel. Natural theology is quite overrated by those who would represent it as the foundation of the edifice. It is not that, but rather the taper by which we must grope our way to the edifice. The stability of a fabric is not greater than the stability of that upon which it rests; and it were ascribing a general infirmity to revelation, to set it forth, as leaning upon natural theism, in the way that a mathematical doctrine leans upon the axioms or first principles of the science. Christianity rests on its own proper evidence; and if, instead of this, she be made to rest on an antecedent natural religion, she becomes weak throughout, because weak radically. It is true that in theology, the natural goes before the revealed, even as the cry of weakness or distress goes before the relief to which it aspires, and which it is prompted to seek after. It goes before, not

synthetically in the order of demonstration, but historically in the mind of the enquirer. It is not that natural religion is the premises, and Christianity the conclusion; but it is that natural religion creates an appetite which it cannot quell; and he who is urged thereby, seeks for a rest and a satisfaction which he can only obtain in the fulness of the gospel. Natural theology has been called the basis of Christianity. It would accord better with our own views of the place which it occupies, and of the high purpose which it undoubtedly serves —if it were called the basis of Christianization.

28. The most important exemplification of the way in which natural religion bears upon Christianity, is furnished by the question of a sinner's acceptance with God. Natural religion can suggest to man the apprehension of his guilt; for however dim her objective view of the Deity, there is no such dimness in her ethical notion of what is due even to an uncertain God. Without having seriously resolved the question, we may stand convicted to our own minds of a hardened and habitual carelessness of the question. If our whole lives long have been spent in the midst of created things, without any serious or sustained effort of our spirits in quest of a Creator—if, as our consciences can tell, the whole drift and practical earnestness of our thoughts are towards the gifts, with but a rare and occasional anxiety towards the Giver—if the sense of

Him touch but lightly on our spirits, and we, by our perpetual lapses from the sacred to the secular, prove that our gravitation is to earth, and that in truth our best-loved element is atheism—if the notices of a God, however indistinct wherewith we are surrounded, instead of fastening our regards on this high contemplation, do but disturb without at all influencing the general tenor of our engagements—these are things of which the light of Nature can take cognizance; and these are things because of which, and of their felt unworthiness, nature is visited by the misgivings both of remorse and of terror. She has data enough on which to found the demonstration and the sense of her own unworthiness; and hence a general feeling of insecurity among all spirits, a secret but strong apprehension that all is not right between them and God.

29. This is not a matter of mere sensitive and popular impression; but in strict accordance with the views of a calm and intelligent jurisprudence. It enters into the very essence of our conception of a moral government, that it must have sanctions—which could not have place, were there either to be no dispensation of rewards and punishments; or were the penalties, though denounced with all the parade and proclamation of law, to be never executed. It is not the lesson of conscience, that God would, under the mere impulse of a parental fondness

for the creatures whom He had made, let down the high state and sovereignty which belong to Him; or that He would forbear the infliction of the penalty, because of any soft or timid shrinking from the pain it would give to the objects of His displeasure. There is nothing either in history or nature, which countenances such an imagination of the Deity, as that, in the relentings of mere tenderness, He would stoop to any weak or unworthy compromise with guilt. The actual sufferings of life speak loudly and experimentally against the supposition; and when one looks to the disease and the agony of spirit, and above all the hideous and unsparing death, with its painful struggles and gloomy forebodings, which are spread universally over the face of the earth—we cannot but imagine of the God who presides over such an economy, that He is not a being who will falter from the imposition of any severity, which might serve the objects of a high administration. Else all steadfastness of purpose, and steadfastness of principle were fallen from. God would stand forth to the eye of His own creatures, a spectacle of outraged dignity. And He of whom we image that He dwells in an unviolable sanctuary, the august monarch of heaven and earth —with a law by subjects dishonoured, by the sovereign unavenged—would possess but the semblance and the mockery of a throne.

30. Such a conception is not only a violence to the apprehensions of nature, but is even acknowledged at times by our academic theists, as a violence to the sound philosophy of the subject. The most striking testimony to this effect is that given by Dr. Adam Smith, on the first appearance of his "Theory of Moral Sentiments;" nor does it detract from its interest or its value, that he afterwards suppressed it, in the subsequent editions of his work.—"All our natural sentiments," he says, "prompt us to believe, that as perfect virtue is supposed necessarily to appear to the Deity as it does to us, as for its own sake and without any farther view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, so must vice of hatred and punishment. That the gods neither resent nor hurt was the general maxim of all the different sects of the ancient philosophy; and if by resenting, be understood that violent and disorderly perturbation which often distracts and confounds the human heart; or if by hurting, be understood the doing of mischief wantonly, and without regard to propriety or justice, such weakness is undoubtedly unworthy of the divine perfection. But if it be meant that vice does not appear to the Deity to be for its own sake the object of abhorrence and aversion, and what for its own sake, it is fit and reasonable should be punished, the truth of this maxim can by no

means be so easily admitted. If we consult our natural sentiments we are apt to fear lest before the holiness of God, vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of human virtue can ever seem to be of reward. Man when about to appear before a Being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow creatures he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs: But the case is quite different, when about to appear before his infinite Creator. To such a Being, he can scarcely imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever appear to be the proper objects either of esteem or of reward. But he can easily conceive how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty should render him the proper object of aversion and punishment; neither can he see any reason why the divine indignation should not be let loose, without any restraint, upon so vile an insect as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the justice; but he must entreat it from the mercy of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past mis-

conduct, are upon this account the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left, for appeasing that wrath which he knows he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement, he imagines must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his manifold offences. The doctrines of revelation coincide in every respect with these original anticipations of nature; and as they teach us how little we can depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they show us at the same time that the most powerful intercession has been made, and that the most dreadful atonement has been paid, for our manifold transgressions and iniquities."

31. This interesting passage seems to have been written by its author, under a true apprehension of that dilemma, in which the world is involved. He admits a moral government on the part of God. He admits a universal delinquency on the part of man. And his feeling is, that the government would be nullified by a mere act of indemnity, which rendered no

acknowledgment to the justice which had been violated, or to the authority of that law which had been trampled on. In these circumstances, he casts about as it were for an adjustment; and puts forth a conjectural speculation; and guesses what the provision should be, which, under a new economy, might be adopted for repairing a defect, that is evidently beyond all the resources of natural theism; and proposes the very expedient of our profest revelation, for the resolving of a difficulty which had been else impracticable. We deem it a melancholy fact, that this noble testimony to the need of a gospel, should have disappeared in the posterior editions of his work—revised and corrected as they were by his own hand. It is not for men to sit in the chair of judgment; and never should they feel a greater awe or tenderness upon their spirits, than when called to witness or to pronounce upon the aberrations of departed genius. Yet when one compares the passage he could at one time have written, with the memoir that, after an interval of many years, he gave to the world of David Hume, that ablest champion of the infidel cause—one fears lest, under the contagion of a near and withering intimacy with him, his spirit may have imbibed of the kindred poison; and he at length have become ashamed, of the homage that he once had rendered to the worth and importance of Christianity.

32. This notwithstanding remains one of the finest examples of the way, in which the Natural bears upon the Christian theology; and of the outgoings, by which, the one conducts to a landing-place in the other. We hold that there are many such outgoings; that at the uttermost margin of the former there is a felt want, and that in accurate counterpart to this, the latter has something to offer in precise and perfect adaptation thereto. Now the great error of our academic theism, as commonly treated, is that it expresses no want; that it reposes in its own fancied sufficiency; and all its landing-places are within itself, and along the uttermost limits of its own territory. It is no reproach against our philosophical moralists, that they have not stepped beyond the threshold of that peculium, which is strictly and appropriately theirs; or not made incursion into another department than their own. The legitimate complaint is, that, on taking leave of their disciples, they warn them not, of their being only yet at the outset or in the prosecution of a journey, instead of having reached the termination of it. They in fact take leave of them, in the middle of an unprotected highway—when they should have reared a finger-post of direction to the places which lie beyond. The paragraph which we have now extracted, was just such a finger-post—though taken down, we deeply regret to say, by the very

hand that had erected it. Our veneration for his name must not restrain the observation, that, by this, he undid the best service which a professor of moral science can render to humanity. Along the confines of its domain, there should be raised, in every quarter, the floating signals of distress, that its scholars, instead of being lulled into the imagination that now they may repose as in so many secure and splendid dwelling places, should be taught to regard them only as towers of observation—whence they have to look for their ulterior guidance and their ulterior supplies, to the region of a conterminous theology.

33. There is a difficulty here in the theism of nature, within the whole compass of which, no solution for it can be found. It will at least afford a specimen of the way in which the one bears upon the other, if we state the method of escape from this difficulty that has been provided in the theism of Christianity. The great moral problem which under the former waits to be resolved, is to find acceptance in the mercy of God, for those who have braved His justice, and done despite to the authority of His law; and that, without any compromise of truth or dignity. By the offered solution of the New Testament, a channel has been opened up, through a high mediatorship between God and man, for the descent of a grace and a mercy the most

exuberant on a guilty world; and through it, the overtures of reconciliation are extended unto all; and a sceptre of forgiveness, but of forgiveness consecrated by the blood of a great atonement, has been stretched forth, even to the most polluted and worthless outcasts of the human family; and thus the goodness of the divinity obtained its fullest vindication, yet not a goodness at the expense of justice—for the affront done to an outraged law, has been amply repaired by the homage to its authority of an illustrious sufferer, who took upon himself the burden of all those penalties which we should have borne; and, in the spectacle of whose deep and mysterious sacrifice, God's hatred of moral evil stands forth in most impressive demonstration. So that, instead of a conflict or a concussion between these two essential attributes of His nature, a way has been found, by which each is enhanced to the uttermost, and a flood of most copious and convincing illustration has been poured upon them both.

34. This specimen will best illustrate of moral philosophy, even in its most finished state, that it is not what may be called a terminating science. It is at best but a science *in transitu;* and its lessons are those of a preparatory school. It contains but the rudiments of a nobler acquirement; and he discharges best the functions of a teacher, not who satiates but who excites the ap-

petite, and then leaves it wholly unappeased. This arises from the real state and bearing of the science, as being a science, not so much of doctrines as of desiderata. At most it leaves its scholars in a sort of twilight obscurity. And, if a just account is rendered of the subject, there will unavoidably be the feeling, that, instead of having reached a secure landing-place, we have broken off, as in the middle of an unfinished demonstration.

35. That indeed is a most interesting adjustment between Moral Philosophy and the Christian Theology, which is represented to us by the unresolved difficulties of the one science, and the reduction which is made of these difficulties in the other. We have far the most important example of this, in the doctrine of the atonement —that sublime mystery, by which the attributes of the divinity have all been harmonized; and the most liberal outlet has been provided for mercy to the offender, while still the truth and justice of the Lawgiver have been vindicated, and all the securities of His moral government are upholden. By the disloyalty of our race, the principles of Heaven's jurisprudence are brought to a test of utmost delicacy; for there seems to be no other alternative, than that man should perish in overwhelming vengeance, or that God should become a degraded sovereign. It nullifies the moral government of the world, if all force

and authority be taken from its sanctions; and it is a problem which even 'angels desired to look into,' how the breach could be healed, which had been made by this world's rebellion, and yet the honour of heaven's high Sovereign be untarnished by the compromise. The one science lands us in the difficulty; and by the other alone it is, that we are extricated. The one presents us with the case; but, for the solution of it, we must recur to a higher calculus, to an instrument of more powerful discovery and of fuller revelation. The one starts a question which itself cannot untie; and the other furnishes the satisfactory response to it. The desideratum of the former meets with the doctrine of the latter; and it is this frequent adjustment, as of a mould to its counterpart die; it is this close and manifold adaptation between the wants of nature and the overtures of a profest revelation; it is this fitting of the supernal application to the terrestrial subject upon which it is laid; it is the way, more especially, in which the disruption between heaven and earth has been restored; and the frightful chasm that sin had made on the condition and prospects of our species is wholly repaired to all who will through the completeness of an offered Saviour; it is this mingled harmony of the greater and lesser lights, which gives evidence that both have been kindled by the same hand, and that it is He who put the

candle which glimmers so feebly into my heart, it is He also who poured the noonday effulgence of Christianity around me.

36. It were foreign to our prescribed subject to attempt an exposition, in however brief and rapid a sketch, of the credentials of Christianity. We only remark, that, amid the lustre and variety of its proofs, there is one strikingly analogous, and indeed identical in principle, with our own peculiar argument. If in the system of external nature, we can recognize the evidence of God being its author, in the adaptations wherewith it teems to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man—there is room and opportunity for this very evidence in the book of an external revelation. What appears in the construction of a world might be made to appear as manifestly in the construction of a volume, whose objective truths may present as obvious and skilful an accommodation to our mental economy, as do the objective things of a created universe. And it is not the less favourable, for an indication of its divine original, that whereas Nature, as being the original system, abounds with those fitnesses which harmonize with the mental constitution in a state of health—Christianity, as being a restorative system, abounds in fitnesses to the same constitution in a state of disease. We are not sure, but that in the latter, from its very design, we shall meet with still more delicate

and decisive tests of a designer, than have yet been noticed in the former; and certain it is, that the wisdom and goodness and even power of a moral architect, may be as strikingly evinced in the reparation, as in the primary establishment of a Moral Nature.

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Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 11 March, 2020